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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the modern notion of free-speech was born within the Westphalian 
nation-state. It suggests that the legal rights framework - particular to the Westphalian nation-
state - not only legitimizes and legalizes the right to free-speech, but also enables us to invoke 
legally the necessary limitations that demand the limitation of free-speech in certain contexts. 
However, such a legal-rights framework is exclusive to the nation-state and cannot be 
enforced on an international level, outside of the nation-state boundary. With reference to 
examples on an international level, this thesis demonstrates that calls for the limitation of 
free-speech are indeed legitimate and necessary but cannot be enforced on an international 
level for the reasons just mentioned. In order to address this problem, this thesis proposes a 
framework - based on a Kantian model - that enables us to invoke the limitation of free-
speech on an international level without appealing to a legal-rights discourse to do so. 
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Introduction: The context of the debate 
The topic of this thesis emerged as a result of watching the unfolding furore and anger that 
emerged as a result of the publication of twelve cartoons in the Danish newspaper lyllands-
Posten on 30th September 2005. Public condemnation came from people of many different 
communities, cultures and religions, but the most vehement criticism came from Muslims. 
The anger and violence that emerged in the wake of the publication of the cartoons can be 
attributed to two factors; firstly, the content of the cartoons generated widespread anger for 
the way in which they depicted the prophet Mohammed. The cartoons had less than subtle 
insinuations, not only suggesting a link between Islam and fundamentalist terrorism, but also 
portraying the prophet Mohammed as an instigator of violence and bloodshed. The graphic 
descriptions can also be said to be less than accurate for the way in which the religions of 
Islam and Hinduism are conflated. In one ca1100n, the prophet Mohammed is depicted with a 
turban on his head, which is a garment more synonymous with Hinduism than Islam. 
Secondly, the cartoons that were published in the lyllands-Posten in Denmark were quickly 
picked up by newspapers in other European countries, such as Die Welt in Gennany, creating 
even more widespread anger. 
As angry Muslim demonstrators protested and decried the publication of the cartoons and the 
defamation of the prophet Mohammad, the Danish Prime Minister, Fogh Rasmussen, refused 
to entertain the idea of censoring the media as this might interfere with the much cherished 
right offreedom of speech (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 13). The right to freedom of speech, as 
will be shown in Chapter One, was given birth and legitimised by the Westphalian nation-
state. The incident sparked a hotly contested debate concerning the sensitive issue of free 
speech. One of the most interesting questions concerning the controversy was why there was 
no quick resolution. What is of particular importance for this thesis is that the publication of 
the cartoons had ramifications for free speech at an international level; although the cartoons 
were published by a newspaper within the sovereign Danish nation-state, the message of the 
cartoons had a direct impact on communities that transcend the nation-state. Muslims from 
different nation-states around the globe were equally hurt and offended by the publication of 
the cartoons. The boycotting of Danish goods and the rioting in countries ranging from 
Indonesia to Saudi Arabia is testament to this. 
In the wake of protests around the globe, the following debate concerning free speech became 
an international issue. That is, the debate concerning the legitimacy and legality of censoring 
free speech became an international issue that had ramifications beyond the sovereign nation-
state. It is important to state at the outset that it is not the intention of this thesis to distinguish 
between freedom of speech on an international level, outside of the nation-state, and freedom 
of speech within the nation-state as if they are two separate things. What this thesis is going 
to point out is that while freedom of speech is in part limited by the same social and historical 
restrictions outside of the nation-state as it is within the nation-state, the codification of these 
limitations in law that characterises the nation-state as juridical entity is absent at 
international level. As it will be argued in Chapter One, the notion of modem free speech 
emerged within the Westphalian nation-state, and while the Westphalian nation-state 
legitimises and legalizes the right to free speech, the nation-state also acts as a limitation of 
sorts. This is because the sovereign nation-state is the only political structure with the legal 
ability to limit free speech. 
But why is the ability to limit free speech limited to the nation-state? The answer to this 
question, which will be explained throughout this thesis, is that the rights discourse 
associated with the sovereign nation-state that legalize the right and limitation of free speech 
cannot be extended outside of the sovereign nation-state boundary. It is true that member 
states of international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the European Union 
(EU) have committed themselves to upholding legislation that is entrenched in the United 
Nations Charter for Human Rights (UNCHR) and the European Charter for Human Rights 
(ECHR); however, organizations like the UN and the EU do not actually have the legal right 
to intervene in matters pertaining to the sovereign nation-state such as the claims to freedom 
of speech of its citizens. As will be shown in Chapter Two, organizations like the UN and the 
EU are unable to fully engage with the sensitive issue of free speech on an international level 
as they are restricted to using a rights discourse particular to the sovereign nation-state. What 
the cartoon debacle made clear is that there is an equal need to limit freedom of speech on an 
international level as there is within the sovereign nation-state. 
The problem is that we cannot legally invoke or legitimise calls for the limitation of freedom 
of speech on an international level because we cannot appeal to a rights discourse particular 
to the nation-state to do so. Such an argument will be elaborated upon in Chapter Three. As 
will be shown in Chapter Three governments are often unwilling to restrict free speech as 
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doing so is seen to be a violation of the individual rights discussed in Chapter Two. Within 
the nation-state, a rights discourse allows us to legalize what, in Chapter Four, I elaborate on 
as the historical and social limitations of free speech. Outside of the nation-state we are 
unable to legalize the same historical and social limitations even though the call for such 
limitations is legitimate and even though there may be a pressing need to do so. Outside of 
the nation-state, no sovereign body has the ability to legally invoke restrictions on free 
speech. This brings us to the critical question that this thesis aims to address: does this mean 
that we cannot conceive of limitations on freedom of speech at an international level or do we 
perhaps have to re-think the very notion of limitation itself? The aim of this thesis is to argue 
the latter. 
Before such a task can be undertaken, it will be necessary to show how the modern notion of 
free speech emerged within the context of the Westphalian nation-state. This will be the 
objective in Chapter One. It will be demonstrated in Chapter Two that while the rights 
discourse inherent to the Westphalian nation-state legalizes - as in makes possible - free 
speech, such a rights discourse acts as a limitation of sorts because we cannot legally invoke 
limitations of free speech on an international level outside of the sovereign nation-state. By 
discussing the Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Defamation of Religions Act passed in 
2006, Chapter Two will demonstrate the impossibility of legally invoking the limitation of 
free speech on an international stage using the rights discourse inherent to the nation-state. 
This thesis is not an attempt to distinguish between nation-state free speech and international 
free speech as if they are two separate notions. It will be demonstrated that on an 
international level , free speech is subject to the same social-historical limitations as it is 
within the nation-state. The difference is that within a nation-state these socio-linguistic 
limitations are codified in law (as, for instance "hate speech"), which makes the limitation of 
free speech possible - a codification and enforcement that is absent at international level. 
This does not necessarily mean we cannot limit free speech at international level. Rather, in 
Chapters Three and Four I argue for a different way of conceiving limitations at this level 
with reference to the work of Jacques Derrida. This discussion starts by identifying the 
tension between absolute, unrestrained freedom of speech and the historical reality of 
limitations as a productive tension, more specifically as aporetic. 
How are we to reconcile the claim to absolute freedom of speech with the social-historical 
limitations that demand the limitation of free speech? Is it even possible to reconcile the 
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absolute claim to freedom of speech with the social-historical contexts that demand its 
limitation? In order to address this problem I discuss Derrida' s analysis of a number of 
concepts where a similar contradiction exists between the absolute and the historical. In 
discussing these concepts, Derrida uses the term aporia to describe the contradictions 
inherent in them. Derrida's analysis is particularly useful because he suggests a way to 
reconcile the absolute with the social-historical. If it can be suggested that the concept of free 
speech is similarly aporetic to the concepts discussed by Derrida, such an analysis may offer 
us a way of acknowledging both a person's claim to absolute free speech and the social-
historical limitations that demand the limitation of free speech. 
This is not a thesis in philosophy and I cannot here do justice to a philosophical exposition of 
the concept aporia with reference to its long history in Western thought. Instead, I shall 
proceed in Chapter Three by demonstrating, with reference to Derrida's work, how the 
concept of aporia works by analyzing four aporetic concepts in detail. These concepts are 
"forgiveness", "democracy", "hospitality" and "justice". As Derrida's analysis demonstrates, 
within each of these concepts is an aporetic tension between the absolute and the social-
historical. Such an analysis is not an attempt to demonstrate how "hospitality", "forgiveness", 
"justice" and "democracy" are linked to freedom of speech. Rather, by analysing each of 
these concepts I shall merely demonstrate how the concept of aporia operates in order to 
proceed analogically, that is, by suggesting that the concept of freedom of speech operates 
similarly or is similarly aporetically structured. 
Having outlined how the concept of aporia works III Chapter Three, Chapter Four will 
suggest that the concept of free speech is similarly aporelic. However, we are still left with 
the first problem just discussed; even though the suggestion that free speech is aporetic 
provides us with a way of conceiving the tension between absolute freedom and its limitation, 
we have to consider how the necessary social-historical limitations of free speech can be 
implemented on an international level. In order to answer this question, the conclusion of this 
thesis will describe in some detail a proposal by Kant (2006) for the adoption of universal 
codes of conduct by nation-states. 
Kant's proposal is particularly attractive because it offers us a way to call for the legitimate 
restriction of free speech even in the absence of the possibility of codifying its socio-
linguistic limitations as law, that is, without appealing to a legal-rights discourse particular to 
the sovereign nation-state. Kant (2006:75) was particularly concerned about the idea of a 
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global Leviathan that would have the legal ability to police the actions of states; he was well 
aware of the potential for such a global state to abuse its power. Without the ability to appeal 
to a legal framework as a means to policing the actions of states, Kant (2006:75-82) argues 
that the answer to global stability depends on what he refers to as "the internal perfection" of 
nation-states such that they will come to realize the necessity of controlling their actions. It 
will be suggested that Kant's argument offers us a way to conceive and appeal to the 
limitation of free speech without invoking a legal framework for doing so. Although we 
cannot appeal to a rights discourse to support the call for the limitation of speech, it will be 
suggested that such calls are nevertheless legitimate in a different, extra-juridical sense. 
Because of the absence of a means of legal enforcement, it will be suggested that the only 
solution is for nation-state governments to recognise the ethical imperative to limit free 
speech when prudence demands it. On the basis of such recognition, it is hoped that nation-
states will voluntarily abide by international legislation that demands the limitation of free 
speech in certain contexts. 
By way of illustrating this very different way of conceiving limitations on freedom of speech 
I shall briefly look at the decision by NATO to intervene in Kosovo during the Balkans 
conflict in March 1999. Such a case scenario is particularly pertinent for the purposes of this 
thesis because it demonstrates a way to conceptualize the notion of a "legitimate" action 
outside a "legal" framework. The decision by NATO to intervene in Kosovo was 
controversial because it was deemed "legitimate but illegal" (Wheeler, 2000:146). This 
example will show us that there are ways of legitimately calling for a moral code of conduct 
without appealing to a legal-rights discourse. Using Kant's (2006) framework, this thesis 
concludes by suggesting that it is possible to legitimately call for the limitation of free speech 
on an international level without appealing to a legal-rights discourse particular to the 
sovereign nation-state. 
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Chapter 1. The binding roots of free speech 
1.1 Introduction 
It is the objective of this chapter to trace the origins of the modern notion of free speech to 
the birth of the nation-state. Although the concept of free speech can trace its roots five 
hundred years before the birth of Christ to the Greek city-state of Athens, the modern notion 
of free speech and its association with individual liberty only emerged later with the birth of 
the modern nation-state. It is necessary to distinguish between a ' concept' of free speech, and 
a 'notion' offree speech. A concept is abstract and timeless. It is divorced from any particular 
socio-historical contexts. A notion, on the other hand, gains particular meaning from 
operating in a particular context or period. As Hargreaves (2002:3001) argues, free speech as 
a notion has had different meanings in different contexts. The understanding of free speech in 
Democratic Athens was different from an understanding of free speech in the context of the 
' Enlightenment', particularly in its relationship to civil liberties and a democratic discourse. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to trace the particular notion of free speech that 
emerged in the context of the nation-state and the democratic ideals associated with the rule 
of a democratic citizenry. Such an analysis of the notion of free speech and its emergence 
within the nation state is important because that context still determines our understanding of 
free speech today. If we want to engage the notion - its possibilities and limitations - we 
have to start with understanding this notion of free speech and how it came about in the 
context of the nation-state. 
It is important to note that, throughout history, free speech has been justified as a means 
towards a particular end and not solely as an end in itself (Hargreaves, 2002:302). Within 
particular social-historical contexts, the notion of free speech has always been defended on 
the basis of a particular set of principles and beliefs. For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
necessary to look at how free speech has been justified as a means to two specific ends, 
namely truth and democracy. As two distinct arguments in favour of free speech, both the 
'the argument from truth' and 'the argument from democracy' can be situated within the 
Enlightenment discourse that emerged in 16th Century western Europe and which still largely 
determines the possibilities and limitations of the way we think about freedom of speech. But 
first it is necessary to provide a very concise background to the concept "freedom of speech". 
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1.2 The roots of free speech 
1.2.1 FI'ee speech in the democra tic city of Athens 
According to Hargreaves (2002:5), the notion of freedom was inseparably bound to the Greek 
city-states and especially Athens. It is important to note that such freedom was not yet the 
individual freedom as it is associated with Westphalian nation-states. Nevertheless, such 
freedom in Athens allowed people to choose their own rulers and determine their own 
destiny. The fact that government by consent had succeeded government by compulsion was 
a sign of an early form of democracy (MacDowell , 1978:46). All adu lt male citizens of 
Athens became voting members of the Ecciesia, a council charged with making major 
decisions. The Boule consisted of a rotating Council of Five Hundred and was responsible for 
drawing up the agenda of the Ecclesia. A third arm of the Athenian democracy was made up 
of the Dikasteria, which consisted of up to two-thousand jurors who adjudged on private 
disputes and had the responsibility of calling the city's leaders to account (Hargreaves, 
2002:5). As Hargreaves (2002:5) argues, free speech was an inseparable part of such a 
democratic order. Never before had democratic citizens been given the right to debate and 
determine rule on such matters as peace and war. Free speech was a necessary, though 
ancillary, right for the Athenian citizenry to participate in government. Hence, the equality of 
speaking rights became known as isegoria and was integral to the idea of the 'rule of the 
many' (Hargreaves, 2002:6). However, despite the profundity of the principle of isegoria, it 
was by no means applied universally. The right to participate in debate was a benefit only 
enjoyed by a privileged caste of native-born Athenian citizens and excluded women, slaves, 
and the large number of resident aliens in Athens that made up the merchant class. Although 
the Athenian notion of democracy bears a passing resemblance to the democratic notion of 
free speech synonymous with the Westphalian nation-state, Athenian democracy was 
exercised in a collective sense. Free speech could only be expressed by members of the polis 
and was not synonymous with individual liberty (Hargeaves, 2002:6). Hence, a person could 
only invoke his "right" to free speech as a member of a group rather than as a separate 
individual. Free speech also did not prevent the individual from being interfered with by the 
polis with regards to his private life. As Pericles (cited in Hargreaves, 2002: 6) stated: 
We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own 
business. We say that he has no business at all. 
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A man's duty was always to the polis, even when the interests of the polis conflicted with his 
own individual interests. Despite the existence of a democratic framework in Athens certain 
forms of dissent were not tolerated (Mulgan, 1984: 61). For example, the philosopher 
Anaxagoras was exiled for spreading the blasphemous view that the sun was not a god at all, 
but a huge lump of stone 'larger than the Pelopennese' (Hargreaves, 2002:7). Anaxagoras had 
come to this conclusion after watching a meteorite fall to the earth. The politician 
Thucydides, too, was ostracized for opposing the building of the Parthenon. According to 
Thucydides, the city of Athens was decorating itself with temples as a harlot decorated 
herself with jewels, using tribute money stolen from Athenian allies (Hargreaves, 2002:7-8). 
Thucydides argued that the Allies had contributed the money in order to secure themselves 
from invasion by neighbouring states. Thucydides was banished from Athens for ten years for 
the sake of public well-being (Hargreaves, 2002:7). 
Free speech in Athens did not extend to ideas that were thought to imperil the state. Athenian 
dramatists were also limited in their freedom of expression. They had to observe the laws 
relating to impiety and blasphemy and could be charged with sedition (Hargreaves, 2002:7). 
As Muller (1962:32) argues, despite the fact that Athens was the freest state in the ancient 
world, the liberty of expression had well-recognised limits. The notion of free speech in 
ancient Greece differed from the modern, democratic - and, I shall argue, Westphalian -
notion of free speech in a number of important respects. Free speech in ancient Greece was 
not synonymous with individual liberty but only existed in relation to the polis. Free speech 
was also limited to male citizens of Athenian society of voting age. This brings me to a more 
precise discussion of our modern understanding of the notion of free speech. 
1.2.2 Free speech: the Enlightenment and th e nation-state 
A very different notion of free speech developed in the Enlightenment period of the 16th 
century and was marked by the emergence of the nation-state. As Hegel (cited in Plant, 
1973: 18) points out, ancient Greece was characterised by a cultural and social homogeneity 
that ceased to exist with the emergence of the Enlightenment period. Hegel (Plant, 1973: 18-
19) was of course referring to the breakdown of an all-round capacity with regards to the 
participation of man 1 in civil society. Greek culture was homogeneous to the extent that there 
were no basic divisions or discrepancies between modes of experience. Civil society in Greek 
I Where I use the generic term 'man' as a reference to human beings as a whole, I do so to conform 
with its use in traditional philosophical texts such as those of Milton (1929), Mill (1971) and Locke 
(1689). I am aware of the objection that such a term excludes women. 
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culture did not show the same level of complexity as Western Europe during the 
Enlightenment period. Societies in Western Europe differed, however, in that the increasing 
complexity of society synonymous with the Enlightenment period meant that civil society 
had become increasingly fractured or fragmented . The social cohesion associated with early 
Greek societies was being replaced in Western Europe with an autonomous individuality that 
was a product of societal fracture. Such changes in civil society had ramifications for the 
notion of free speech. Particularly important here was the manner in which free speech 
discourse started to revolve around the rights of the individual as opposed to the well-being 
of the nation-state or the polis associated with ancient Greece. According to Ferguson (cited 
in Plant, 1973:24), 
[tJo the ancient Greek ... the individual was nothing, the public evelything. To the ... 
modern in too many nations of Europe the individual is everything and the public 
nothing ... We in times more polished employ the calm we have gained not in fostering 
zeal for those laws and the constitution of government to which they owe their 
protection, but in practising apart and each for himself the several arts of personal 
advancement or profit. 
The emergence of the Enlightenment symbolised the transformation of a person's ability to 
invoke rights solely as a member of the polis or community to the ability to invoke rights as 
an individual. Writing much later, the Frenchman Diderot began his work on the 
Encyclopedia in 1750 with the avowed intention of indoctrinating public opinion with the 
ideals of the Enlightenment (Hargreaves, 2002:56). Although the notion of free speech came 
relatively late to France, philosophers such as Voltaire and Diderot were already beginning to 
integrate the concept of free speech with the emerging ideas of the Enlightenment. It is 
crucial to point out that the evolution of modern free speech and its relationship to both "the 
argument fTom democracy" and "the argument from truth" was a slow process and emerged 
as a result of this Enlightenment discourse (Hargreaves, 2002:5-7). Along with the role of the 
Enlightenment, it is important to discuss how the notion of democratic free speech began to 
take shape in England in the 16'h Century - particularly with regards to the shift in power 
from a monarchy or kingdom to a parliamentary democracy more commonly associated with 
the Westphalian nation-state. 
1.2.3 Free speech in early modern England 
Although the creation of the Magna Carta in Britain in 1215 signalled the beginning of the 
end of the absolute power of the monarchy in Britain, free political or religious speech was 
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still not tolerated by the authorities for a long time. In 1275, Parliament outlawed "any 
slanderous News ... or false news or tales where by discord or slander may grow between the 
King and the people ... " Thus, if we are to trace the origins of our modern notion of free 
speech, it is necessary to historicize the concept's emergence within the historical period of 
transformation in Britain that resulted in a shift in power from the monarch to citizenry and 
the redefinition of territoriality in terms of state formation, or the movement from a monarch 
to a parliamentary nation-state. Of particular importance is the role played by the Civil War 
that occurred in England between 1644 and 1649 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 
The civil war between the Parliamentarians under Cromwell and the Monarchy under Charles 
I was to provide the setting for John Milton's Areopagitica, which was written in 1644 
(Schwoerker, 1929:168). Milton's document was a response to the looming threat of an 
authoritarian state that would emerge with the overthrow of the Royalists in 1649. 
Anticipating this perceived threat, Milton's document is acknowledged as one of the first 
pleas directed at the British government to limit licensing and publication laws that 
constrained the ability of citizens to publish openly and freely (Hargreaves, 2002: 1 01). The 
return of King Charles II from exile in 1660 was to symbolize a return of the monarchy to 
power over parliamentary rule (Hargreaves, 1992:55) evidenced in the attempt of Charles II 
and James II to free themselves from such restraints. Charles II returned to revoke the "rule 
of law" that had been formally declared in 1660 and which centralized sovereign power in the 
hands of the British government rather than the monarchy. However, the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688 re-established parliament as the supreme commander of British politics under King 
William, the ruler of Holland (Schwoerker, 1992:74). 
The re-emergence of parliament as the supreme ruler of the land was to provide the basis for 
John Locke's famous work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694). Although 
Locke endorsed the belief that power should reside with the parliament and not the 
monarchy, like Milton he emphasized the need for the "sovereign" citizenry to retain power 
over the state. Writing in exile, Locke (1694) argued for the rights of citizens to "rouse 
themselves and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends 
for which government was first erected". Similarly to Milton, Locke's essay opposed press 
licensing on the grounds that free speech was a necessary means to ensuring that power 
remained with the sovereign citizenry for, without access to unlimited speech, citizens of the 
state would not be able to engage in rational deliberations when making decisions about how 
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to govern the nation. The arguments put forward by Milton (1684) and Locke (1694) 
provided the basis for the "argument from democracy" which will be discussed further on in 
this chapter. 
The arguments forwarded by Locke (1694), Milton (1644), and later John Stuart Mill (1859), 
also provide the foundation for "the argument from truth" which will be discussed in the next 
section. It is important to note that, although "the argument from truth" and "the argument 
from democracy" are coterminous, it was not the primary intention of these thinkers that free 
speech should exist solely for democracy' s sake (Hargreaves, 2002:301). It is true that the 
modern notion of free speech emerged as a product of these thinkers, but Mill, Milton and 
Locke proposed free speech for different purposes. Both Mill and Milton opposed 
government censorship on the grounds that truth can only emerge in an environment where 
opinions are freely expressed. Despite publishing his Letter of Toleration (1689), Locke still 
maintained that a distinction should be maintained between political rights and religious 
rights (Hargreaves, 2002:302). The point of mentioning this is that, although the modern 
notion of free speech emerged out of the nation-state, the kind of democratic ideals that exist 
in most countries today did not really come to fruition until much later. What is important for 
the purposes of this thesis is that the roots of modern free speech and their association with 
democratic governance are a product of "the argument from truth" and the Enlightenment. 
While the emergence of the democratic nation-state made our modern understanding of free 
speech possible, it will later be argued that the same nation-state context also and at the same 
time limited the understanding of free speech in important ways. How we are to think about 
this co-incidence of possibility and limitation is the subject of Chapters Three and Four. In 
the rest of this chapter, I shall elaborate on the meaning of freedom of speech with reference 
to two analytical arguments, one "the argument from truth" (henceforth "the truth argument") 
and two, "the argument from democracy" (henceforth "the democracy argument"). 
1.3 The "Truth Argument" 
Of all the arguments that have been forwarded to justify a principle of unrestrained free 
speech, the most pervasive and ubiquitous has been the truth argument (Schauer, 1982: 15). In 
order to understand the reasons why such an argument for unrestrained free speech has 
traditionally been so popular, the argument has to be contextualized within the Enlightenment 
discourse of mid 18th century Europe. In what is regarded as the birth of the social sciences, 
the Enlightenment movement, which is particularly associated with the French Enlightenment 
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era, aimed to assert scientific rationalism as the pinnacle means of accumulating 
"knowledge" about the world (Osborne, 1998: 1-2). The argument is based on the principle 
that an "objective" truth exists independently of cultural relativity and subjective human 
interpretation. Juxtaposed against the existence of an "objective" truth is "absolute" falsity. 
Thus, the ontological view that "truth" or "knowledge" can be accumulated through the 
senses is allied with the a priori belief that absolute truth can only be verified through a 
process of rationality and commonsense reasoning. We can assume an opinion to be "true" if 
it makes logical or rational sense or we have direct evidence of the opinion being true through 
observation (Osborne. 1998: 1-2). The emergence of Enlightenment thought is synonymous 
with the displacement of religion and more importantly of the church as guardian of 
knowledge. In the context of this thesis, what is more important is the fact that the emergence 
of the nation-state as the principle sovereign entity in Europe coincides with the emergence of 
the Enlightenment era (Osborne, 1998:29-30). Thus, the role of the church as the dominant 
sovereign entity within a monarchical system was to be replaced by the birth of the nation-
state and modern science. As Osborne (1998:31) points out, "in the age of Enlightenment 
truth is closely related to the various ways in which humans seek to govern". 
Control over humans is not determined solely on the basis of sovereignty or coercion but by 
appeals to the truth. In order for the nation-state to govern, it has to justify decisions based on 
rationality and scientific reasoning (Osborne, 1998:31). As Plant (1973 :32) argues, the 
project of rationality and the emergence of scientific modernism are synonymous with the 
nation-state. The shift from oligarchic and monarchical systems of power to the secular 
nation-state is rooted in scientific principles that emerged with prominent Enlightenment 
thinkers in the 17th century such as Rousseau (1971) and Hobbes (1914). The "truth 
argument" has been particularly pervasive because of the commonly held belief that it leads 
to the discovery of absolute truth (Schauer, 1982: 15). Such an argument is rooted in the 
positivist, scientific paradigm of modernist thought for, as Hargreaves (2002:302) argues, it is 
debatable whether truth would necessarily emerge in the "marketplace of ideas" if ideas were 
allowed free expression. Philosophical thinkers like Nietzsche have long questioned the 
association between power and knowledge. Is truth merely a subjective entity to be 
determined by those in power? Post-modern theorists would question the existence of 
objective truth and insist on acknowledging the relationship between truth and power - that 
is, that power is constitutive of truth and vice versa. 
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In the context of Western modernity, however, the "truth argument" is premised on the idea 
that truth is not only possible but also a means of good governance. The emergence of 
objective truth was seen to be synonymous with absolute "freedom" and the understanding 
that only through freedom could truth be manifested. As Osborne (1998:31) states, such an 
idea is prevalent in Mill's On Liberty (1859) where freedom of opinion is a precondition for 
the emergence of truth, which is, in turn, a precondition for good governance. 
Historically, then, the emergence of rationalism is coterminous with the emergence of the 
nation-state. The philosophical reasoning behind a principle of unrestrained free speech rests 
on the belief that open discussion, free exchange of ideas, freedom of enquiry and freedom to 
criticise are imperative conditions in the search for such absolute truth (Schauer, 1982: 15). 
The placement of limitations and conditions on the ability to criticise existing beliefs would, 
it has been argued, make it difficult if not impossible to distinguish between truth and 
falsehood. Instead we will inevitably end up wandering aimlessly between the two. 
The "truth argument" rests on similar principles to laissez faire free-market capitalism. In the 
same way that the free market will function without government interference, the theory 
argues that truth will inevitably emerge when all opinions may freely engage in the 
"marketplace of ideas" without government hindrance or regulation (Schauer, 1982:16). By 
allowing competing ideas and opinions to engage with each other freely, we are providing a 
platform upon which 'truth' can emerge. By testing opinions within the marketplace, we are 
subjecting an opinion to a more reliable test than the appraisal of any government or 
individual. As already mentioned, such an idea has been criticised for two reasons. Not only 
would post-modernists question the existence of an "objective" truth that will emerge 
independently of those who have a power-related interest in expressing it, they would also 
argue Western societies have traditionally been dominated by liberal-democratic, capitalist 
ideologies. In the "marketplace of ideas", particular notions or ideas concerning truth will 
emerge as a product of certain dynamics related to capitalist ideology. There is a strong link 
between truth assertions and power. 
The famous Darwinian theory of the "survival of the fittest" is an apt way to describe such a 
process. According to the logic of this theory, any opinion that manages to withstand 
criticism within the "marketplace of ideas" can claim to be "truthful". Outside of the 
"marketplace of ideas" it is doubtful whether an opinion would be subjected to as much 
scrutiny and criticism. Thus, according to the "argument from truth", unhindered free speech 
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is a necessary/indispensable means to acquiring the truth rather than existing as an end in 
itself. 
It is clear, then, that the emergence of post-modernism has serious ramifications for such a 
justification for absolute free speech for if we can no longer acknowledge the existence of an 
"absolute" truth, but only a range of differing truths, the "truth argument" becomes 
redundant. Can we still invoke an absolute/necessary need for "absolute" speech if we can no 
longer ensure that it will lead to an objective truth? 
According to Schauer (1982:15), the prominence of the "truth argument" principle is evident 
in the ubiquitous free speech discourse surrounding the nation-state and its relationship with 
its citizens. In the United States, for example, the basic tenets of the principle are evident in 
the writings of judges responsible for outlining the theoretical foundations of the First 
Amendment in the United States constitution. Holmes argues that "the best test of truth is the 
power of an opinion to get itself accepted in the competition of the market" (cited in Schauer, 
1982: 15). Frankfurter lends support to Judge Holmes by arguing that 
.. . the history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error which 
once held sway as official truth by beliefi which in turn have yielded to other truths. 
Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth ought not to be fettered, no matter what 
orthodoxies he may challenge (cited in Schauer, 1982: 16). 
Thus, the theoretical foundations of the First Amendment in the United States are built on the 
principle that the government should place no restrictions on free speech of any kind. Instead 
speech should be allowed to operate freely in order to ensure the maximum potential for truth 
to reveal itself. 
If the theoretical foundations of constitutional documents such as the First Amendment have 
been driven by this particular argument for truth, it is because the history of free speech 
literature itself is dominated by this particular doctrine. John Milton's Areopagitica (1644) is 
commonly regarded as the earliest comprehensive defence in favour of unrestricted free 
speech (Canavan, 1971 :50). It is interesting to note that Milton's discussion centres once 
again on the relationship between free speech and the nation-state. His argument is premised 
on the idea that the government is the greatest potential threat to unhindered free speech. 
Milton argued in favour of restricting government censorship and restrictions on publishing 
and licensing. According to Milton (1929:500), the removal of such restrictions will enable 
ideas and opinions to be tested and openly critiqued, thus enabling society to exchange truth 
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for error. Milton (1929:500) maintained that the Long Parliament, by its "licensing and 
prohibition", had injured truth. As Milton (1929:501) states, "Let truth and falsehood grapple; 
who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" 
Following on from Milton, John Stuart Mill's famous On Liberty (1859) is also regarded as 
one of the earliest defences in favour of liberty of thought and discussion (Schauer, 1982:16). 
Like Milton, Mill subscribes to the view that the search for "truth" should be the ultimate 
goal for any society. Mill's justification for the right of speech to be completely unhindered is 
premised on the assumption that unrestricted freedom will increase the general utility of 
society. As Mill (1971 a: 256) argues, utility can be defined as happiness, pleasure, or the 
satisfaction of desires or preferences. Thus, the fundamental idea behind utility is that the best 
action is the action that leads to the maximum anlOunt of utility possible. If we define utility 
in this context as the satisfaction of a particular desire - in this case the accumulation of truth 
- Mill's justification for unrestricted free speech is utilitarian because such a process will lead 
to the emergence of truth, hence, the utility has been increased. The acquisition of truth is 
synonymous with absolute liberty and the right to question and disseminate opinions at will. 
While this view is contentious, before it can be criticised it will be necessary to outline the 
main tenets of Mill 's argument. 
1.3.1 Mill's utilitarian justification for free speech 
Mill (1971 b: 142) argues that the unpopularity of a particular view is not a satisfactory reason 
to si lence it in the public domain. As he states: 
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he 
had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind (Mill, 197Jb:142). 
For Mill, the might of the majority over the minority has no role to play in the dissemination 
and restriction of opinions and ideas. Even if a view is universally disliked by a majority of 
people, it is unjust to restrict such an opinion as to do so would be to the detriment of greater 
society as a whole. To suppress such views would be to "rob the human race, posterity as 
well as the existing generation, of the chance to exchange truth for error" (Mill, 1971b:142). 
Thus, according to Mill's reasoning, regardless of whether a pal1icular view is true, false or a 
mixture of the two, society will never gain by refusing such a view expression in the public 
domain. By suppressing a true opinion society loses the opportunity to rectify a false belief 
that was originally believed to be true (Cowley, 1963:32). Even if we suppress an opinion 
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that turns out to be false, we still lose out on the chance to reaffirm an originally accepted 
true view (Wolff, 1996: 118). For example, if a large portion of society was of the opinion 
that the earth was round but was not entirely sure, by offering critics the opportunity to 
express their arguments that the earth is flat society has the chance to add certainty to the 
view that the earth is round. Credibility is added to the "truthful" opinion because it has been 
critiqued and has emerged intact, thus adding more certainty to the true belief. However, 
despite the fact that credibility would be added to a true view were it to be challenged by a 
view that turned out to be false, one must ask whether allowing a false view is necessary or 
inescapable to add certainty (Schauer, 1971 :20). For is it not possible to be absolutely certain 
of a belief without juxtaposing it against a false view? 
Mill responds to this problem by arguing that we can never assume infallibility with regards 
to an opinion. As he points out, there is a difference between our being certain of a view and 
the view itself being certain (Mill, 1971 b: 181). There is plenty of evidence from history of 
opinions that were considered to be infallible and have later proven to be false. The original 
belief that the earth was flat is one such example. Wolff (1996: 119) also alludes to an 
example from history where the ancient library in Alexandria was considered to be of no use 
by the Caliph Omar who had control over the fate of the library when the Arabs invaded 
Alexandria in 640AD. The Caliph argued that if the library contained the same information as 
the Koran, it was of no use as the Koran already contained all the necessary truths. However, 
if the library contained information that contradicted the Koran, the literature should be 
destroyed for leading people away from the "truth" contained in the Koran. Wolff (1996: 119-
120) specifically alludes to this example to demonstrate that society can never claim 
infallibility with regards to beliefs. 
1.3.2 Rousseau's response to Mill 
As supporters of the argument from truth, both Milton and Mill subscribe to the view that the 
replacement of falsity with truth is always a desirable objective for society. Thus, the search 
for truth is necessary for increasing the maximum utility possible for society as a whole. By 
arguing in favour of unhindered speech, both theorists also subscribe to the view that truth 
will inevitably emerge in the "marketplace of ideas" so long as there is no interference from 
the state (Schauer, 1982:18-19). Although offered as a retort to Mill's claim that it is in 
society's interest always to search for the truth, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's response can be 
considered as a repost to the "truth argument" principle as a whole. 
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In his Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts (1649), Rousseau (cited in Wolff, 1996:120-21) 
addresses the specific question of "[ w ]hether the restoration of the Sciences and the Arts has 
had a purifying effect on morals". His analysis, however, is also directed at the broader 
question of whether it is always better to know the truth than to remain ignorant. In a direct 
plea to God, Rousseau states, "Almighty God! Thou who holdest in Thy hand the minds of 
men, deliver us from the fatal arts and sciences ... give us back ignorance, innocence, and 
poverty, which alone can make us happy and are precious in Thy sight" (cited in Wolff, 
1996:120-21). Rousseau highlights the possibility that there are times when the happiness of 
society as a whole is increased when opinions are suppressed. Regardless of whether they are 
true or false, certain opinions can have a detrimental affect on the happiness of society as a 
whole. Rousseau's argument seems to be based on the vigilant need to protect a breakdown in 
society's moral cohesiveness (Wolff, 1996:121). One could argue that morals and values are 
the cohesive bond that prevents society from falling into selfishness and moral decay. 
Hypothetically, regardless of whether a belief in a "god" is proven to be false, such a belief is 
important for the stability and happiness of society as a whole. The maintenance of the false 
belief is necessary to prevent society from disintegrating into a state of social upheaval. 
Rousseau's critique raises a pertinent objection to Mill's justification for unrestricted free 
speech. If Mill's argument is based on the premise that the revelation of truth will increase 
the general utility within society, Rousseau's objection surely highlights a major flaw in 
Mill's argument for it is conceivable that the dissemination of "true" beliefs may potentially 
decrease happiness in society (Wolff, 1996: 121). Such a criticism is also directed at all 
theorists who defend the "truth argument". The principle subscribes to the belief or is 
premised on the assumption that the revelation of truth is a desirable end in itself. Thus, the 
search for truth does not need to be contextualized within a greater means to an end such as 
the increase of utility in society. The acquisition of knowledge is merely said to be a worthy 
aim in itself (Schauer, 1982: 19). 
Rousseau's argument is not limited only to moral or ethical opinions. He also indicates the 
possible dangers surrounding the dissemination of scientific truths. On the basis of 
Rousseau's argument, whether we allow opinions to be disseminated in society should not be 
based on their contribution to knowledge but rather on their utility for society. Thus, if an 
opinion or belief is likely to decrease happiness in society, there is an argument to suggest 
that such an opinion should be suppressed. 
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While Rousseau 's reasoning is convincing, Mill responds with a criticism of his own. How 
are we to decide which opinions are detrimental to the general happiness and stability of 
society and which are innocuous? As Mill himself states, 'The usefulness of an opinion is 
itself matter of opinion; as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as 
much as the opinion itself' (Mill, 1971 b: 148). Thus, Mill points out the problem of deciding 
which opinions should be suppressed and which should not. How are we to know what effect 
opinions will have on society if we do not allow them to be expressed? It would require 
tremendous foresight to predict the detrimental effect of an opinion before it has even been 
disseminated. Mill (1971 b: 161) also rightly points out that we would need a select group of 
individuals to decide whether opinions should be suppressed. But despite the possibility that 
such a hypothetical panel would be knowledgeable on the effects of opinions, the decisions 
they make would not exclude a certain amount of guesswork or subjective opinion. This 
dilemma results in an obvious conundrum. There is the danger that the suppression of 
opinions would be justified with regards to the protection of society, but in actual fact such 
individuals may just find the opinions disagreeable with their own personal beliefs (Wolff, 
1996: 125). In other words, the protection of society is merely a front for advancing and 
protecting their prejudices. Truth is inseparable from power. 
Such a problem is similar to one of the main criticisms aimed at Hobbes's version of social 
contract theory. Hobbes (1914) argues that individuals in a state of nature cannot form a 
social contract because of a lack of trust. However, as Hampton (1986: 190) points out, if 
people cannot form a contract in a state of nature, this begs the question of how they will 
commit to a contract to leave a state of nature. For if humans do not trust each other out of 
fear of making themselves vulnerable to their fellow men, why would they submit to a 
sovereign entity such as a government that has complete control over their fate? The creation 
of a state would result in a centralization of power in the hands of a few men (Hampton, 
1986: 190). The resulting apprehension is understandable as there is no reason to suspect that 
the state will not take advantage of this vulnerability and exert absolute control over humans 
who live under the rule of the state. This would put them in an even more vulnerable position 
than previously existed in a state of nature because the state is being given carle blanche to 
exert absolute control over all affairs (Hampton, 1986: 190-1). This analogy is useful because 
it highlights the logical paradox alluded to by Mill in his response to Rousseau. If we were to 
select a panel of experts who have the sole authority to permit or restrict free speech, how 
would we go about such a process? This begs the question of whether all opinions would be 
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entertained or only the opinions of a select few. Who gets to decide which people sit on the 
panel? As with Hobbes's social contract, we encounter a fundamental circularity when we 
attempt to select representatives who control access to free speech - which really is the 
question of power and censorship. The solution to the problem inevitably duplicates the 
problem it tries to solve. 
Despite the strength of Mill's objection, we must add that just because we are uncertain 
whether the dissemination of beliefs will cause harm, this does not give us carle blanche to 
say that opinions should not be suppressed at all. Mill still needs to prove that opinions will 
not have a detrimental effect on society (Wolff, 1996: 122). Rousseau's argument sounds 
logical if "true" opinions are allowed to be expressed. However, we can only ascertain that 
they are true once we allow them into the arena. But is there anything wrong with allowing 
the expression of "false" opinions? Such an argument is purely academic as there is no way 
of knowing whether an opinion is absolutely "true" or "false" even when it has been 
expressed. Thus, we never have the luxury of knowing the effect of an opinion prior to its 
dissemination in the public domain. Although he never explicitly states it, Rousseau might 
argue that even "false" beliefs have the potential to cause harm simply through their ability to 
offend others. It is also possible that a belief will be considered "true" until it has been proven 
"false" and that during this period such an opinion has the potential to cause great harm. Mill 
(1971 b: 148) argues that we should always take "false" beliefs seriously. Such opinions often 
have the ability to usurp "true" beliefs simply because the "true" belief has not been forced to 
defend itself and refine its arguments in the past. In order to ensure that our "true" beliefs 
stand up to criticism, we need to keep testing them against differing and contradictory 
opinions. As Mill (1971 b: 161) states, "[ilf we do not consider challenges to our opinion, then 
however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as 
a dead dogma, not a living truth". As an example of such a scenario, Wolff (1996: 122) points 
to the example of evolutionary theory in the United States. While acknowledging the 
existence of flaws in the evolutionary argument, Darwinists never seriously considered the 
possibility that a well-prepared and rigorous argument against evolutionary theory would be 
prepared by skilful, religious fundamentalists. Proposing their own theory of "creation 
science" as an alternative to evolutionary theory, religious academics have managed to catch 
the evolutionists off guard. Such an example indicates the dangers of a lack of competition in 
the "marketplace of ideas". In order for an argument to remain sound it has to keep refining 
itself against a number of opposing and contradictory beliefs and opinions. Such a view is 
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synonymous with the role that testing and falsifying has in Karl Popper's epistemology. 
Popper (1964:34) argued that rather than attempting to determine whether a view was true, 
we should instead attempt to refute such a view by testing it against competing hypotheses. If 
the belief is not found to be flawed against competing hypotheses, the belief can be said to be 
true. Once again, Mill 's argument holds the search for "truth" to be the key to happiness and 
utility in society. Competition among competing ideas is crucial if "truth" is to survive. Mill 
seems to stubbornly support his belief that the search for "truth" is paramount (Wolff, 
1996: 123). He does not seem to agree with Rousseau that the suppression of a belief is 
mitigated by circumstances in which the general utility of society is at risk. Mill (1971 b: 181 ) 
would seem to stand by his opinion that "truth" should persevere. 
That said, Mill does concede that there are occasions when it is necessary to limit freedom of 
expression. While he argues that we cannot always know when an opinion will have a 
detrimental effect, when the effects of such an opinion are blatantly clear he agrees that there 
is a need for suppression - that is, when emotional or physical harm is an obvious result. Mill 
(1971: 184) states, 
[aJn opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is 
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, may justly 
incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house 
of a corn-dealer. 
Such a scenario would be an example where the likelihood of an opinion causing harm is 
quite high. It is not so evident what Mill would say if the evidence were not so obvious. 
Would he still endorse the suppression of beliefs that might, in the opinion of some, cause 
harm or unrest? If there were a lack of certainty would he still be willing to concede his belief 
that speech should be unrestrained? Thus, as Wolff (1996:123-124) argues, Mill has been 
forced to concede that a government may suppress the speech of citizens when it has the 
capability to inflict harm upon others. 
The idea that free speech can be suppressed when it poses a danger to others is indicative of 
the ambivalent relationship of modern free speech to the nation-state. While the nation-state 
makes modern free speech possible as individual, democratic right, the nation-state also 
enacts limitation on that right in the sense that government is entitled to rescind free speech 
when it infringes other human rights or when it poses a grave threat to the continued 
existence of the community s such. What Mill seems to be suggesting is that the democratic 
right to free speech is not always compatible with other civil rights, such as the right to be 
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free from harm. However, this raises the problem of the slippery slope: can we definitively 
define what we mean by harm? Mill defines harm as "the subjection of individual spontaneity 
to external control, only in respect to those actions each of which concern the interest of other 
people" (Mill, 1971b:136). It would not seem implausible to suggest that almost all actions 
can potentially cause harm to someone else. Mill (1971b:136) attempts to solve this problem 
by dividing actions into "self-regarding" and "other-regarding" actions. "Self-regarding" 
actions are those that only have consequences for the perpetrator. If such an action "harms" 
another person, it is only by their consent. "Other-regarding" actions are actions that "harm" 
or involve at least one other person (Mill , 1971 b: 136). An example of a "self-regarding" 
action would perhaps be someone who prays by himself in his room. An example of an 
"other-regarding" action would be someone who went onto the street corner and started 
preaching his or her religion to passing pedestrians. Such an action could be considered 
harmful because it is an attempt to subject the individual to external control. 
At a first glance, Mill 's solution would seem to distinguish between actions that cause harm 
and those that do not. A person praying alone in private would seem to cause nobody harm. 
However, were I trying to convert that person to my own particular religion, they would be 
doing me great harm by refusing to comply with my wishes. As Wolff (1996: 124-25) points 
out, one would be hard pressed to highlight a "self-regarding" action that is completely 
divorced from harming others. Hypothetically, Mill might respond by arguing that the effects 
of such actions are so minimal that they do not warrant sufficient concern. We might decide 
that we should only concern ourselves with actions that cause physical hurt or extreme forms 
of emotional distress. The point, however, is that the distinction between a "self-regarding" 
and an "other-regarding" action is not absolute or clear cut. In other words, both have the 
ability to create "harm" simply because both actions inevitably encroach on other people. It is 
pertinent to note that it was important for Mill to retain such a distinction if he were to justify 
his principle of unhindered speech. An analysis of his writings would suggest a weary 
awareness of the dangers of the state and its ability to hinder free speech. Mill's (l97b: 126) 
objective in On Liberty (1859) was to chart "the nature and limits of the power which can be 
legitimately exercised ... over the individual". Despite the fact that he acknowledged the 
need for the state to restrict speech in certain contexts, he wanted such restrictions to be as 
limited as possible. Easton (1994:1) highlights Mill's concern by saying, "stimulated by his 
fears over the new majoritarianism, Mill saw it as crucial to identify a clear limit to 
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interference from the state and from custom, otherwise life for the individual would become 
intolerable". 
It was Mill 's prerogative to create a "Harm Principle" that would be able to outline the 
specific boundaries between the state and its citizens. Thus Mill (1971 b: 135) argues that the 
function of such a principle is: "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection". Mill stipulates the boundaries of the principle in two succinct points. Firstly, he 
argues that society may not regulate the actions of an individual that are purely "self-
regarding". In other words, if the actions of an individual have no repercussions upon 
anybody else, society has no right to regulate such actions. The most society can do is offer 
advice, persuasion, instruction or tolerance. Secondly, he argues that society may intervene in 
the actions of an individual that have an effect on others. Thus, if the actions of an individual 
are "other-regarding", society is warranted in engaging with such actions in a manner deemed 
necessary. Such a response may be pursued through legal or social means (Mill , 1971 b: 135). 
As has been mentioned however, the distinction between a "self-regarding" action and an 
"other-regarding" action is so vague as to render the "Harm Principle" meaningless when it is 
applied outside of its theoretical context. As Wolff (1996: 125) points out, Mill would not be 
interested in such petty trivialities. Mill was at pains to differentiate between actions that 
indi viduals found intolerable purely because they found them disagreeable and actions that 
caused genuine harm (Wolff, 1996:125-26). Mill's definition of harm as "the subjection of 
individual spontaneity to external control , only in respect to those actions of each, which 
concern the interests of other people" (Mill, 1971 b:203) is useful for explaining exactly what 
constitutes harm. However, what did Mill mean by the term "interests"? Wolff (1996: 125) 
argues that although the term is used most commonly to refer to financial matters, Mill was 
not only concerned with people's financial well-being. His term "interests" also extends to an 
individual 's personal safety and security. Thus, the prevention of murder, rape and theft 
would be considered in an individual's interest. Through an analysis of the "Liberty 
Principle", Mill's understanding of free speech could be perhaps be interpreted as a right to 
disseminate opinions or beliefs so long as the repercussions of such beliefs would not be 
harmful to other citizens. Thus Mill (1971 b:205) outlines the boundaries of his "Liberty 
Principle" by saying: 
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Each person should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. 
This conduct consists ... in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain 
interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be 
considered as rights. 
Mill's "Liberty Principle" is sound in theory but becomes problematic on a practical level 
because the list of activities that can potentially cause harm is so vast that almost any activity 
could be regarded as an "other-regarding" action. 
The point of this discussion has been to highlight the historical foundations and principles of 
free speech by situating it in the Enlightenment discourse that emerged in the mid ISth 
century. Both the truth and democracy arguments rely explicitly or implicitly on the 
epistemological limits of nation-state discourse - individuals conceived as citizens living in a 
territorially bounded space ruled over by a sovereign authority - in order to illustrate why the 
pursuit of truth is a good thing. By highlighting the arguments of Milton (1929), Mill 
(1971a,b) and Rousseau (1971), the objective of this discussion has not only been to indicate 
the problematic notion of absolute unhindered free speech but rather also to make it clear that 
our contemporary understanding of the notion of free speech has emerged from the 
contextual canon of the relationship between the nation-state and its citizens. So, for instance, 
part of Milton's (1929) argument in Areopagitica is an attempt to prevent the British 
government from placing restrictions on publishing and licensing and Milton acknowledges 
that the existence of licensing is a tacit agreement that as a sovereign entity (or government) 
it has the authority to invoke or revoke the rights to free speech. The justificatory arguments 
put forward by Mill and Milton in favour of unrestricted speech have to convince the state 
that the absence of restrictions will be beneficial rather than detrimental to society constituted 
as nation-state. For is not the foundation of consensual contract theory that the nation-state's 
sovereign right to regulation over its citizens is dependent on its ability to protect such 
citizens from harm? Having provided a discussion of the "truth argument", it is now 
necessary to turn to a discussion of the "democracy argument". 
1.3.3 f ree speech a nd the ambivalence of sovereignty 
Both Mill and Milton are aware that the success of their arguments depends on their ability to 
convince the state that no harm shall come from unregulated speech. It is important to note 
that Mill ' s and Milton's discussions of rights take place within a nation-state discourse. The 
particular context in which their discussion of rights takes place would have no meaning 
outside of the nation-state. Outside of the nation-state, there would be no need for such a 
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justification. In other words, outside of the boundaries of the nation-state, there is no need to 
justify unhindered speech on the grounds of stability. Outside of the nation-state, moreover, 
we cannot engage with arguments for and against the limitation of free speech within nation-
state discourses. How can we refer to citizens without a nation-state? If the nation-state did 
not exist, the word 'citizen ' would have no meaning. Even when we talk about an 
individual's right we mean the citizen's rights (the questions of human rights and an 
emerging global citizenry inhabiting a global civil society aside for the moment). Thus, it is 
important to note that the language we have traditionally used to debate free speech is firmly 
canonised within the context of the nation-state and its "sovereign" right to govern its 
citizens. 
1.4 The "Argument from Democracy" 
In a similar way to the "truth argument", the "democracy argument", as Schauer (1982:35) 
refers to it, has had a substantial impact on free speech legislation in many Western 
democracies - most notably the drafting of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in the 
United States and the Magna Carta in Britain. The "democracy argument" requires the a 
priori acceptance that democratic principles are crucial for the successful organization and 
governance of the state (Schauer, 1982:35, emphasis added). Crucial in this statement is the 
close nexus assumed to exist a priori between the right to freedom of speech, democracy and 
the nation state. While the logic of the "truth argument" can be applied to any form of social 
organization, the "democracy argument" cannot be applied to autocracies or oligarchies. Any 
defence of unrestrained speech based on the "democracy argument" must involve a basic 
acceptance that a state based on democratic principles is the best form of governance. 
Although autocracies and oligarchies still exist, they are far less prominent than in recent 
centuries. The belief in democracy as the best model of governance is becoming more 
universally accepted around the globe (Schauer, 1982:35-36). As a political model, 
democracy can trace its roots back to nation-states in Western Europe such as Britain and 
France and particularly to the writings of theorists such as James Mill, John Stuart Mill and 
Alexis de Tocqueville (Jacobs, 1997:4). The "democracy argument" maintains that free 
speech is an indispensable component of any democratic system. Democracy is premised on 
the idea that the population of a nation-state is "sovereign". In other words, actual power rests 
with the citizens of the nation-state. One of the foremost articulators of the "argument from 
democracy" is the American political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn. 
24 
Meiklejohn (1965:1) envisioned the idea of a nation-state democracy as a larger 
manifestation of the participatory small town democracies that existed in the United States in 
the 18th century. In a small town, all members of the town assemble in a hall and vote on 
decisions that need to be made. Under such a system, there are no political representatives but 
only a moderator to chair the meeting and to make sure that everybody's opinions are heard. 
Members of the town propose ideas, debate those ideas and then vote on whether they should 
be implemented. The government is elected by the citizens to represent their interests and to 
satisfy the needs of the general population (Meiklejohn, 1965:38). Absolute power rests with 
the citizens of the town. Meiklejohn (1965:38) argued that nation-state democracies were 
merely a larger version of the small town meeting system. Despite the size and complexity of 
the modern nation-state, Meiklejohn (1995:38) argues that this should not detract from the 
fact that sovereignty still rests with the citizens of the state. Sovereignty implies that the 
power to implement decisions rests with the people and can only be endorsed by the people 
themselves. Political leaders are public servants designed to make sure that the wishes of the 
people are carried out (Meiklejohn, 1995:38). It is obvious why proponents of this system 
would argue that unrestrained speech is an absolute necessity. If the citizens of a nation-state 
are vested with the sovereign right to make decisions, freedom of speech is necessary to 
provide the sovereign electorate with all the information it needs to exercise its sovereign 
power. Without having access to all information, the citizens of a nation-state will not be in a 
position to make the most rational choice when deliberating over which decisions to 
implement. Because the citizens of a state cannot vote intelligently without having access to 
all available information, one may argue that denying the citizenry the right to information is 
as serious as denying them the vote (Schauer, 1982:38). Secondly, since governmental 
officials are essentially civil servants who are accountable to the people, freedom of speech is 
a necessary means of criticizing governmental officials when they fail to deliver on the 
demands of the citizenry. If the citizens of the nation-state are sovereign, the government 
officials are the servants of the citizenry. Any suppression of the citizenry' s demands is 
inconsistent with the notion of a government that exists to represent the demands of the 
people. Hence, we would experience a breakdown in democracy were speech to be in any 
way suppressed (Schauer, 1982: 38-39). 
Although, from a narrow interpretation, Meiklejohn's argument is convmcmg the 
"democracy argument" is problematically simplistic. The existence of differing models of 
governance in a democracy precludes the idea of the classical "town-meeting" system as 
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being the only viable democratic model. Jacobs (1997:17-19) highlights differing types of 
democratic models: a "Classical Model", which describes a participatory democracy and an 
"Elite Model" which is similar to a representative democracy. While the "Classical Model" of 
democracy is the model that directly appeals to Meiklejohn, a democratic state is not 
incompatible with an "Elite Model". The "Classical Model" is where the citizens of the 
nation-state playa direct role in the decision making process of governance. While this model 
may have been suitable for small constituencies it is highly impractical for a nation-state with 
a large population. Allowing every citizen the chance to express their opinions and have their 
desires represented would be next to impossible. We also have to question whether the 
"sovereign" citizenry are capable of making the right choices even when they have access to 
all available information. The "Elite Model" is different to the "Classical Model" in that it 
advocates a democratic system where the citizenry choose and elect representatives who 
make political decisions in the interests of the people (Jacobs, 1997: 17 -19). Under an "Elite 
Model", although political representatives would still be servants of the people, they would 
be responsible for making decisions deemed to be in the best interests of the general 
citizenry. Thus, the major difference between the two models is whether the citizenry decide 
what is in their own interests, or whether the governmental officials decide on behalf of the 
general citizenry (Jacobs, 1997: 19). Thus, if the government decides that it is in the general 
interest not to release all information or to suppress criticism of the government, is it 
necessarily undemocratic? If the general citizenry have elected government officials into 
power to decide what is in their interests, it tacitly amounts to an endorsement that the 
government officials know what is best. 
It is necessary to point out that ' classical' democratic theorists such as Meiklejohn would 
argue that final power should always rest with the citizenry, even if they have elected leaders 
to represent their interests. At the end of the day, "sovereignty" means that the citizenry 
should be able to overrule the government if they think it is acting against their wishes. In 
other words, the citizenry should always be in a position to decide what is in their best 
interests. However, the "democracy argument" fails to answer some of the major criticisms 
that have been directed at the "truth argument". Rousseau 's response to Mill's claim that 
unrestricted speech would increase the general utility of society is not addressed by the 
"democracy argument". Although the "democracy argument" argues that speech should be 
unrestricted for the sake of democratic accountability, the argument itself does not account 
for the possible repercussions that could result from unrestricted free speech. Rousseau 
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highlighted the potential civil unrest that could result from unchecked speech. He also 
questioned whether it was always better to know the "truth" than to remain ignorant. By 
allowing unrestricted free speech, the "democracy argument" has to show that the well-being 
of society will not be affected by unchecked speech. Even though unrestricted speech may 
enable the citizenry to govern, there is still the possibility that the dissemination of opinions 
in the public arena can lead to a great amount of "harm" that can decrease the general 
happiness of society. The "democracy argument" has only made an attempt to justify 
unrestricted speech on the basis of checking the government's power. Thus, the "democracy 
argument" fails to provide a convincing argument in response to critics who argue that it is 
not in the interest of society for speech to be unregulated. 
Meiklejohn's (1965) argument for unrestricted free speech seems to be premised on one 
particular democratic model. While such a theory is problematic, it has provided the 
ideological backbone behind prominent free speech legislation. The belief that the citizenry 
should have the right to openly criticise the government is one of the key principles behind 
the creation of the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights in England in 1689 (Schauer, 1982:39). 
Both documents addressed the need for the right to express grievances on behalf of the 
citizenry against the Engl ish government. The creation of the two documents enabled the 
citizenry to criticise the government through unrestrained speech. Such examples are an 
indication that the history of free speech legislation in Western democracies has been 
constructed through a discourse that compels a right to reject and criticise leaders who do not 
serve the people. In 1720, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, writing under the pseudonym 
Calo, argued for the right publicly to examine and criticise government leaders through 
unrestricted speech (Schauer, 1982:39). 
The history of free speech in Britain has been shaped around a discourse based on 
sovereignty and the nation-state. Similarly, the history of free speech legislation in the United 
States has also been constructed around a discourse that perpetuates the right to unrestrained 
speech based on the principle of democracy and the sovereign citizenry. Dworkin (1996: 195) 
argues that the United States Constitution is perhaps one of the most progressive documents 
in view of its protection of the right to freedom of speech and of the press. The ratification of 
the First Amendment has played an important part in shaping free speech discourse in the 
United States. It is the first piece of legislation that restrained the ability of the American 
government to censor speech acts deemed inappropriate for public dissemination (Dworkin, 
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1996: 195). The value of the First Amendment as an important piece of protective legislation 
is evident in its statement that government may "make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press". This statement acknowledges the superiority of the citizenry over the 
state (Dworkin, 1996: 195). The emergence of the First Amendment has to be understood 
within the context of the history of the United States and its evolution as a democratic nation-
state. As a country largely made up of immigrants escaping oppressive European theocracies, 
there was weariness among the American citizenry of the ability of an authoritarian power to 
censor speech deemed inappropriate. The document itself re-establishes the democratic 
principle that sovereignty rests with the citizenry and that the state exists to serve the interests 
of the people. Once again we are drawn to the "democracy argument" that supports the 
existence of unrestrained speech as a necessary means for governance by the citizenry. 
Dworkin highlights the great court case of 1964, New York Times v. Sullivan as an important 
moment in the constitutional protection of free speech. On 29th March 1960, the New York 
Times published an article titled "Heed their Rising Voices", which dealt with the turbulent 
problem of racial segregation in the state of Alabama. The aJiicle itself contained a number of 
factual inaccuracies that were promptly picked up by L. B. Sullivan, a city commissioner in 
charge of the local police force in Montgomery. Sullivan claimed that the article would harm 
his reputation as it portrayed the Montgomery police force in a negative light. Sullivan sued 
the New York Times in an Alabama court. An all-white jury agreed that Sullivan had been 
libelled and awarded him $500,000 in damages. The New York Times appealed to the 
Supreme Court who eventually overturned the decision. The decision by the Supreme Court 
to overturn the original decision was monumental in laying the groundwork for the rights to 
free speech in the United States. Had the decision not been overturned, the New York Times 
would have been severely damaged and few papers would have dared to print anything 
deemed to be offensive because of the dangers of being sued. In justifying its decision to 
overturn the decision, the Supreme Court declared that a public official cannot win a libel 
verdict just on the basis of defamation and false information. The public official has to prove 
that the statement made occurred with deliberate malice and that the persons who had 
disseminated the belief had done so knowing it was false. Dworkin (1996 : 195) argues that the 
Court's decision gave greater freedom to the press to investigate and report news without the 
threat of being sued for factual inaccuracies or mistakes. 
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If we judge such a decision from the perspective of the "democracy argument", the Supreme 
Court enabled the citizenry to criticise their government without any ramifications. As 
Dworkin (1996: 197) points out, without the intervention of the Supreme Court it is doubtful 
whether the press would have been able to expose future administrative scandals such as the 
Watergate saga in 1971 which eventually led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon. 
Since the "democracy argument" holds the sovereign citizenry as the true rulers of a society, 
such a ruling would grant the citizenry freedom to criticise without severe repercussions from 
the government. 
In his book, Make No Law, Anthony Lewis (1991) traces the history of constitutional speech 
in the United States from the First Amendment in the eighteenth century to the Sullivan 
decision in 1964. Lewis argues that the First Amendment originally only protected the right 
to free speech without prior restraint. Put simply, a citizen was at liberty to disseminate an 
opinion without being restrained. However, once an opinion had been disseminated, that 
person could be liable to prosecution from the government if the opinion was offensive or 
dangerous. Such a view of free speech was evident in the earliest writings in Britain. Even 
John Milton argued that speech that was disrespectful to the church, once published, could be 
punished by "fire and executioner" (1929 :64). The evolution of speech theory in the United 
States has ensured more liberty for citizens in terms of their right to disseminate opinions and 
beliefs at will without facing repercussions from the state. 
The evolution of free speech as an indispensable tool for democratic accountability is a theme 
that has been critiqued by a number of theorists such as Dworkin (1996). The fact that our 
understanding of free speech has been canonised within a discourse involving the nation-state 
and the citizenry is potentially problematic particularly when we encounter statements made 
outside of the nation-state boundary that are justified through an appeal to "freedom of 
speech". The difficulties arising from the impossibility of justifying speech acts outside the 
nation-state through an appeal to "the right to freedom of speech" - a right which derives its 
very meaning from the a priori nexus assumed to exist between democracy, the right to 
freedom of speech and the nation-state - will be dealt with specifically in the next chapter. 
1.5 Free speech and the assumption of equality 
Catherine Mackinnon (1993:71) argues that our inability to conceptualise our notion of 
speech outside of the discourse of the democratic nation-state has serious ramifications, 
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particularly with regards to the inequalities that stem from unrestrained speech. The history of 
constitutional liberalism in modern democracies, particularly America, has portrayed the 
notion of free speech as an indispensable tool. As has been mentioned, free speech is seen as 
a necessary means to ensuring democratic accountability on behalf of the state towards its 
citizenry. In a democratic state, the idea of a sovereign citizenry posits the need for speech to 
be unrestrained so as to ensure that the general population can express their desires for how 
the nation-state should be run (Mackinnon, 1993 :71-2). Unhindered speech is necessary to 
ensure that the citizenry have access to all the necessary information to make governable 
decisions and secondly to be able to critique the government when it fails to carry out the 
demands of the citizenry. Thus, by its very definition, democracy demands that speech be 
unrestrained. For without unrestrained speech, democracy exists in name only. Although the 
view put forward by proponents of the "democracy argument" is contentious - not least 
because of their narrow interpretation of the concept of democracy - Mackinnon (1993 :71) 
argues that the law of freedom of speech often nullifies the law of equality, particularly in the 
United States. 
Referring specifically to the United States, Mackinnon argues that the constitutional doctrine 
of free speech has developed at the expense of alleviating social inequality or legal 
inequality. When the First Amendment was written, its commitment to free speech did not 
have the same commitment to equality. Isaiah Berlin's famous essay Two Concepts of Liberty 
(1958) is useful here. Dealing specifically with the concept of liberty, Berlin (1969:122) 
distinguishes between negative and positive liberty. The core belief behind these two 
concepts is the belief, as stated by Berlin, that "to coerce a man is to deprive him of his 
freedom" (Berlin, 1969:122). Berlin defines negative freedom as "simply the area within 
which a man can act unobstructed by others" (Berlin, 1969: 122). This form of liberty is 
negative because it requires the absence of something. Thus, a person has negative freedom 
when s/he can act unobstructed by others. There are no obstacles that prevent them from 
acting on their desires. The positive concept of liberty centres on the presence of something, 
most importantly, self-mastery. Thus, a person has positive freedom when they have control 
over their own actions. Coercing an individual diminishes his or her freedom because they 
are being denied the right to self-mastery. As Jacobs (1996:73) argues, Berlin stresses that in 
democratic politics negative freedom is more valuable than positive freedom. Thus, since 
democratic theorists have always been concerned with the regulation of state power, there has 
always been more of a focus on non-interference. Berlin maintains that positive freedom in a 
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democracy is often non-existent. In a democracy the government makes binding decisions on 
the whole population. Even if the decisions are a direct reflection of the citizenry, they are 
still likely to be decisions made by the majority. Thus in a democracy, the minority have no 
mastery over their fate, instead being forced to succumb to the wishes of the majority. Berlin 
thus felt that that one of the main objectives of a democracy should be to promote as much 
negative freedom as possible so as to ensure that even the lives of the minority are as 
uninhibited as possible. Berlin was effectively lending support to John Stuart Mill who 
claimed that the principal danger in a democracy is the decline of individual independence 
(Jacobs, 1996:73). Berlin has been criticised by a number of theorists such as Skinner 
(1984: 1986) who argues that Berlin attempts to separate positive and negative freedom 
without realising that the two must exist hand in hand. The argument suggests that liberty 
theorists have been overly concerned with promoting negative freedoms with regards to non 
state-interference at the expense of promoting positive freedoms. Mackinnon (1993 :72) 
argues that unrestrained speech actually has the potential to exacerbate inequality rather than 
alleviate it. While the First and Fourteenth Amendments have attempted to ensure negative 
freedom as far as preventing government interference with individual liberty, both bodies of 
law have neglected to address the pertinent issue that speech is not shared equally among all 
citizens in a democracy. Access to speech is often stratified along class, gender and racial 
lines (Mackinnon, 1993 :74). The lack of awareness with regards to this unequal access to 
speech has meant that the power of those citizens who have access to speech has not only 
become more exclusive but has also been guaranteed by the American constitution. The free 
speech discourse in America has led to an obsession with preventing the state from infringing 
on the individual liberties of the citizen to the extent that the unequal access to speech is 
mostly ignored (Mackinnon, 1993 :72-73). 
Theorists who attempt to promote equality by arguing for restrictions on speech disseminated 
through hate crimes or pornography are often shut down. Thus, the attempt to ban a speech 
medium such as pornography is criticised as an attempt to restrict the negative freedom of the 
individual (Mackinnon, 1993:75-76). Whenever issues of inequality are addressed, for 
example racial inequality in education, it is always seen to be a separate issue from free 
speech. Thus, it would be incomprehensible to many freedom theorists that social inequalities 
are often entrenched or manifested through speech. Mackinnon (1993:74) argues that it is 
more than a coincidence that the use of the epithet "nigger" is synonymous with the fact that 
a disproportionate number of children who go to bed hungry in America are African-
31 
Americans. The fact that the education system of America has a history of discriminating 
against people of colour is manifested in the high rates of illiteracy in African-American and 
Hispanic communities. Such inequalities are seen to be a separate issue altogether rather than 
having a close relationship with an unequal access to speech. In a similar vein to Dworkin 
(1996: 195), Mackinnon (1993:74-75) argues that free speech discourse in America has been 
shaped by the vigilant desire to protect the rights of the individual from the state. While the 
evolution of free speech in Europe is also canonised in a discourse involving the nation-state 
and citizenry, European democracies are more vigilant of the dangers of inequalities 
manifested through speech. The role of hate propaganda in Nazi Germany is one such 
example that has created an awareness of the potential dangers of unrestricted speech. The 
history of speech in America has been shaped by events such as the McCarthy trials in the 
late 1950s in which senator Joseph McCarthy led a canlpaign against suspected Communists 
(Mackinnon, 1993:75). While the campaign itself was an infringement of civil liberties, such 
an event only helped to reinforce the belief that political dissent should not be stifled. The 
McCarthy trials are an example of what can happen when the government begins to exert 
authority over a sovereign electorate. The evil to be avoided at all costs is the ability of the 
government to restrict the ideas of individuals simply because they hold a different point of 
view. As Mackinnon (1993 :75) explains: 
the terrain of struggle is the mind, the dynamic at work is intellectual persuasion; the 
risk is that marginal, powerless, and relatively voiceless dissenters, with ideas we will 
never hear, will be crushed by government power. 
In what she describes as the 'speech you hate ' test, a political culture has been created where 
the more disagreeable an opinion is, the more important it becomes to protect it. The more 
disagreeable an opinion is, the more "truthful" or pertinent it is likely to be. If it leads to 
anger and demands for restraint, particularly on behalf of the government, it must be allowed 
to flourish. The ultimate test of how principled a person can be is judged by their tolerance 
for beliefs that they find abhorrent (Mackinnon, 1993 :75). The sign of a sound and healthy 
democracy is thus seen to be a state that allows criticality. especially criticism that is directed 
against the government. This is seen to be a sign that the state is serving the interests of the 
sovereign electorate and ensuring the civil liberty of its citizens by promoting negative 
freedom. When the sovereign electorate are given free reign to say what they please, it is a 
sign that the citizenry is in control (Mackinnon, 1993 :75-76). 
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Theorists who defend such a culture have also turned to the famous "slippery slope" 
argument as a justification for their opinion that speech should have free reign. The 
restriction of free speech is seen to be a temptation for the state to resort to totalitarian 
methods of regulation and control. The argument follows that if the state is allowed to 
regulate some speech, it will see it as an endorsement from the citizenry to regulate all forms 
of speech whenever they please. The "slippery slope" argument also highlights the danger 
that the state will not be able to distinguish between speech that deserves to be regulated and 
speech that is innocuous. After all, without leaving the judgement of speech to be decided in 
"the marketplace of ideas", any decision on the value of speech would be purely a matter of 
subjective opinion anyway (Mackinnon, 1993 :76). As long as speech is completely 
unregulated, it is objective and free. It is also in the interests of the sovereign citizenry to 
allow everyone's speech to be free. For if you partake in the suppression of another citizen's 
speech, such regulation could eventually come round to you. There is thus no such thing as a 
wrong idea, only an offensive one (MackilIDon, 1993:76-77). The only way to deal with 
offensive speech is to grow a thicker skin or to avert one's eyes. As Mackinnon (1993:76-77) 
mentions, this liberal attitude towards free speech is so ingrained in the political and cultural 
spheres of America that young children learn to absorb such ideas in primary school. They 
are taught about the value of their constitution as a progressive piece of legislation that acts as 
a check against the authoritarian state. It is perhaps ironic that in the modern era, little 
censorship occurs through state policy. Censorship tends to manifest itself through official 
and unofficial privileging of powerful lobby groups. The ability of publishers and editors to 
discriminate on what they print means that certain members of the citizenry have more of a 
voice than others (Mackinnon, 1993:77). It is also ironic that opinions that challenge the idea 
that speech in America is not free are often suppressed on the basis that it is a fascist attempt 
to regulate the citizenry. Legal accountability for speech that is unfairly distributed is seen as 
a creeping form of authoritarianism. Thus, Mackinnon (1993:77-78) argues that speech 
theory in the United States does not even consider how to address the issue of the powerful 
vanquishing the powerlessness. Instead it attempts to translate such an issue using the "truth 
argument" where truth vanquishes falsity. 
It is interesting to note that while Dworkin (2006: 132) supports the idea that free and 
unregulated speech is an incontrovertible necessity for a fully functioning democracy, there is 
a necessity to restrict speech when it has the potential to cause harm. In an interesting aIticle 
concerning the recent "caIioon debate", Dworkin (2006: 132) argues that newspapers such as 
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the Jyllends Posten in Denmark were right not to succumb to pressure from political lobbies 
aiming to prevent the dissemination of the "derogatory" material. His argument follows that 
as agents of stable democracies, it is the duty of the press to make sure that the public have 
full access to all opinions. His argument is obviously aligned with the views expressed in the 
"democracy argument" . From the perspective of democratic accountability, Dworkin 
(2006: 133) supports the opinion that the dissemination of the cartoons was the right thing to 
do. However, he later acknowledges that the potential civil unrest and anger in the Islamic 
world as a result of the publications was enough of a justification to stop the cartoons from 
further publication. One could perhaps argue that Dworkin initially failed to acknowledge the 
power dynamics highlighted by Mackinnon (1993 :77) that give power groups more access to 
speech than others. In a continent like Europe where Muslims are a minority, it is not 
implausible to suggest that the Muslim community in general is often stigmatised and not 
given a similar platform to express their grievances as others. On the basis of such an idea, 
Dworkin must concede that it is not in the interests of democracy to have unlimited speech 
particularly when it favours the majority at the expense of the minority. 
1. .6 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter firstly has been to show how the argument for free speech arose 
in the wake of the enlightenment discourse that emerged in the 18th century. The 
Enlightenmentis synonymous with the emergence of the modern Westphalian nation-state. It 
has also been necessary to trace the evolution of the notion of free speech and how it emerged 
in the context of a discourse that assumed as constitutive a priori the existence of the nation-
state and its relationship to a sovereign citizenry. By tracing the evolution of this specific 
notion of free speech and its relationship with the modern notion of democracy, it has been 
necessary to show how justificatory arguments for and against its suppression inevitably turn 
on this constitutive a priori: the rights of citizens and the obligations of the state. Even Mill 
and Milton, who are generally regarded as the forefathers of speech theory, operate within 
this particular canon to justify their arguments. As will be shown in the next chapter, this 
notion of free speech is also self-limiting, a self-limitation that becomes evident when we 
consider speech acts or statements made outside the boundaries of the nation-state. Once this 
occurs, we cannot refer to the traditional concepts of democracy and sovereignty as tools to 
analyse whether speech should be suppressed or not. This thesis argues that we need to re-
conceptualise our very understanding of free speech - both the right and its limitations - if 
34 
we are to try and deal with speech acts made in a global community (that is, outside the 
nation-state) . In the next chapter I argue the need for this . 
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Chapter 2. Free speech and the limits of sovereignty 
2.1 Introduction 
As a result of tracing the theoretical-historical lineage of modern free speech we are now in a 
position to analyse how speech becomes problematic when it is disseminated outside of the 
nation-state. It has been the principal objective of Chapter One to argue that the modern 
notion of free speech gains its legitimacy from and is made possible by the democratic 
nation-state. In fact, it is only in terms of nation-state discourse that our contemporary 
understanding of the notion of free speech makes sense at all. At the same time that the 
nation-state enables free speech to occur by guaranteeing it as a right, it is also a limitation of 
sorts. Although free speech gains its legitimacy as a democratic right of the nation-state 
citizenry, it is because free speech is bound to a notion of democratic rights that governments 
have the right to rescind free speech when it is deemed to be a threat to other citizens. As will 
be demonstrated in this chapter, there is an equal need to limit free speech on an international 
level as there is within the nation-state since the same sort of statements can be made globally 
that are limited locally. We are unable to legitimise the call for such limitations on an 
international level because we cannot appeal to a rights discourse outside of the nation-state. 
On an international level , we cannot appeal to state sovereignty as a means to legitimising the 
call for such limitations. At an international level , outside of the nation-state, the debate on 
free speech is parasitical on nation-state discourse. It is because the modern roots of free 
speech are inevocably tied to the nation-state that it becomes pertinent to ask the question, 
'How do we defend free speech as right or argue for the limitations of that right outside the 
nation-state boundary?' When speech acts are directed at cultural, and religious groupings 
that transcend state borders, arguments for and against the limitation of free speech become 
problematic and, outside the 'argument from democracy', we may not be equipped with the 
necessary language and discourse to argue for the need for speech to be censored. 
Bearing this problem in mind, it is the objective of this chapter to argue that we are faced 
with a crisis of redundancy with regards to balancing the need to restrict speech. As long as 
our arguments are embedded in a discourse of ' sovereignty' , we are not able to adequately 
evaluate contending claims for the right to , or limitation of, free speech. After all, both the 
'argument from truth' and the ' argument from democracy' are justifications for unrestricted 
free speech that have been expounded and which only make sense within the nation-state 
framework. 
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To that end, one of the major objectives of this chapter will be to look at the vanous 
infrastructures designed to both regulate and promote free speech within the international 
community. Of particular interest will be the United Nations Charter for Human Rights and 
the European Union Charter for Human Rights. However, it will first be necessary to provide 
a theoretical backgrowld concerning the clash between international law and national law. 
Since this chapter will be looking at the relationship between international organisations such 
as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) with the sovereign nation-state, it 
will be necessary to provide a theoretical background concerning which laws should take 
precedence. As will be demonstrated further on in this chapter, differing arguments as to how 
constitutional law should be implemented are exacerbated by the plethora of diverse cultural, 
social and religious values of various communities not only within the international 
community but within the nation-state itself. By highlighting examples of speech acts made 
outside of the nation-state, it is the intention of this chapter to show that, although calls for 
the limitation of free speech are legitimate, such calls for the limitation of free speech carmot 
be legally enforced outside of the sovereign nation-state. Such arguments for the limitation or 
protection of free speech are limited to a legal-rights discourse particular to the nation-state. 
It is pertinent to acknowledge that such a discourse is eminent in international law and is the 
product of a historical lineage of a human rights' discourse within the nation-state. As 
Sturgess (2005: 182) states, "the manifestation of any right in declarations, conventions, 
treaties, constitutions and laws is essentially the distillation or product of hundreds of years of 
philosophical debate". One could perhaps take Sturgess's statement a step further and argue 
that such philosophical debates are often contextualised around particular cultural and social 
traditions. 
While philosophical debates are ongoing, they are exacerbated by differing cultural 
interpretations that depart from different ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
Hence, civil rights discourse materialised within the context of the liberal-democratic 
framework that emerged within the 17'h Century transformation from monarchical to 
parliamentary power in Western Europe. Despite the fact that international bodies such as the 
UN and the EU transcend the nation-state, the constitutions of both bodies have been shaped 
by a nation-state discourse based around a liberal-democratic framework that, in turn, derives 
its meaning and legitimacy from state sovereignty. As will be shown, there is some debate 
concerning whether international law or national law should have precedence with regards to 
the implementation of constitutional rights. Bearing this theoretical framework in mind, this 
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chapter alms to identifY the promInence of nation-state discourse by highlighting the 
constitutional legislation of the European Union and the United Nations at an international 
level. With regard to freedom of expression, the United Nations Charter for Human Rights 
(UNCHR) and the European Union Charter for Human Rights (EUCHR) will be analysed. It 
will then be shown how such a discourse is inadequate or historically limited by analysing 
two examples problematic claims to freedom of expression outside of the nation-state 
boundary. Firstly, the publication of the defamatory cartoons in Denmark in September 2005 
will be analysed against the backdrop of the civil rights discourse used by the Danish media 
and government to defend the publication and dissemination of the cartoons. Secondly, the 
controversy surrounding the "Defamation of Religion" resolution that was passed in 2005 
will be analysed. When the resolution was proposed in the European Union Parliament in 
2005, all the member states refused to sign the resolution. Such a refusal is indicative of a 
civi l rights discourse that is based on the notion that freedom of speech is an indispensable 
sovereign right of the democratic citizenry. Free speech can be rescinded when there is a 
clear threat to national security. However, member states of the European Union did not 
concede that "Defamation of Religion" constituted such a threat. Critics of the resolution 
have proposed two major arguments against the legislation. Firstly, that such a resolution will 
enable certain non-secular nation-states to engage in undemocratic and inhumane practices 
without fear of public condemnation from the democratic international community. Secondly, 
that there is no need for such a resolution as constitutional procedures within liberal-
democratic nation-states ensure the protection of minority groups from defamation. It will be 
necessary to look at such arguments in more detail. 
2.2 International law and national law 
According to Triepel (cited in Sanders, 1979:215), the existence of international law as 
enforced by supra-state organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union is 
distinct from national law as enforced by the sovereign nation-state. These two distinct 
branches of the law hardly ever overlap and occupy separate legal spheres. This view as 
expressed by Triepel (Saunders, 1979:215) is known as the "dualist theory" and is based on 
the premise that the juridical and social norms of national legal systems and international law 
are completely different. The universalists or monists, on the other hand, argue that 
international law and national law together constitute one universal legal order. The 
universalists do acknowledge the distinction between international law and national law, but 
they differ from the dualists in that they argue that national law should be subordinate to 
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international law (Sanders, 1979:215). Although such a vIew exists In theory, Dixon 
(1993 :69) points out that international law has to first be introduced and reconciled with 
national law before it can operate within the nation-state. The universalists argue that 
constitutional rights agreed on at an international level should take precedence over nation-
state legislature as enforced within the sovereign nation-state. The clash between the monists 
and the dualists has created a debate in academic circles over which particular view holds 
sway in international relations (Sanders, 1979:215). As Sanders (1979:216) also argues, at the 
international level , the principal rule is that of the primacy of international law over national 
law. Thus, at an international level, legislation as expressed in the United Nations 
Constitution is above national law. Both monists and dualists accept this view. However, 
whereas the dualists argue that international law is only superior to national law at an 
international level (O'Shea, 1998:124), monists argue that international law takes primacy 
within the nation-state as well. As Sanders (1979:216) points out, international practice 
clearly indicates that the principle implies that states must arrange their national law in such a 
way that they are able to comply with their international legal duties. Such a view was 
reiterated by the Permanent Court oflnternational Justice which spoke of: 
a principle which is self evident according to which a state which has contracted valid 
international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may 
be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the obligation undertaken (Sanders, 1979:216). 
Although the International Court of Justice supports the subordination of nation-state laws to 
international law, international tribunals are reluctant to express themselves on the domestic 
effect of national law and to declare national law invalid. The national authority concerned 
must first be deemed to be illegal under international law before action will be considered. 
What, then, is the position of supra-state legislation with regards to free speech at 
international level? 
2,3 The United Nations Charter for Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as entrenched in the United Nations Charter of 
1947, provides the foundation from which any analysis of free speech outside of the nation-
state should proceed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the pivotal document in 
which arguments for the preservation and limitation of free speech take place within the 
international community of states who are members of the United Nations. As Sturgess 
(2006: 182) points out, the Declaration is a product of a range of perspectives on the rights to 
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freedom of expression. Thus, it is important to point out that the Declaration is the product of 
a history of philosophical ideas and opinions manifested in debates throughout history. What 
is important with regards to this thesis is the question of how the context in which these 
arguments occurred (the sovereign nation-state) influenced the United Nations Charter. 
Further, what limitations are revealed by this influence? For it is pertinent to acknowledge 
that, while the United Nations exists as an international body, its existence is based upon a 
collective group of nation-states who have agreed to follow the set protocols as proclaimed in 
the United Nations Constitution. Thus, the statement in the Preamble, "[w]hereas Member 
States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the 
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms" (cited in Sturgess, 2006: 182) indicates that it is the responsibility of member 
nation-states themselves to uphold the laws and principles as expressed in the United Nations 
Charter. Hence, the concept of state-sovereignty is fundamental , constitutive of the 
relationship between the United Nations body and the individual member states that make up 
such a body. While the Preamble refers to "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family" (cited in Sturgess, 2006:182), the preservation or manifestation of such 
rights can only take place within the particular context as citizens of independent sovereign 
nation-states. On one level we exist as members of a universal human race and as such are 
entitled to certain rights as prescribed in the United Nations Charter. However, such rights 
exist first and foremost at a nation-state level. This is where the crux of the problem lies. We 
cannot invoke or call for limitations on an international level because we cannot appeal to a 
set of sovereign rights. While the call for such limitations would be morally legitimate, the 
enforcement of such limitations would be illegal as we cannot appeal to a sovereign entity 
outside of the nation-state to legitimise such limitations. For the purposes of this thesis it is 
necessary to note that first and foremost we exist as citizens of the sovereign nation-state. Our 
existence as members of an international community comes second. Once again we are drawn 
to the idea that the sovereign nation-state legitimises and enables free speech to occur but 
also acts as a limitation. This is because we cannot engage with the sensitive issue of rights 
outside of the nation-state discourse. As will be shown, the United Nations Constitution 
argues that it is necessary for the nation-state to limit free speech when it poses a threat to 
other human rights. The problem arises in that international law cannot evaluate arguments 
for limitations on free speech outside of nation-state civil rights for, as mentioned, it does not 
have the legal authority to do so. International law can only engage with the notion of human 
rights in the context of the relationship between the citizen and the state. 
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In looking at legislation designed to address free speech on an international level, Article 19 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the most indicative statement regarding the 
right to free speech. As the article states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19; emphasis added what emphasis?). 
According to Sturgess (2006: 182), implicit within this statement there exist two separate, 
independent spheres in which the right to free speech can be expressed. The right to freedom 
of opinion is essentially a private right, for one call hold an opinion without actually 
expressing it publicly. The right to expression is a public right, for one is now allowed not 
only to hold an opinion or belief but is actually entitled to express such a belief in public. 
Thus, Article 19 would seem to amount to a tacit carte blanche for citizens of member states 
to hold and disseminate opinions without interference from others. The legislature in Article 
18 lends support to Article 19 by stating, 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, 
either alone or in a community with others and in private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance (Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 18). 
As Sturgess (2006: 182) further argues, implicit in Article 18 is the right to form a belief, 
change such a belief and to persuade others to change their beliefs as well. Hence, through 
teaching, a citizen is entitled to encourage others to change their beliefs and opinions without 
restraint. Thus, as paragraph 2 of Article 18 states, 
No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or 
disseminate the religion or belief of his choice (Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 18) 
The immediate problems arising from the uninhibited right not only to disseminate beliefs but 
to persuade others to adopt those beliefs as well are numerous. Within the process of 
persuading others to change their beliefs, there will more than likely exist ideas or language 
that are derogatory towards the beliefs that those people currently hold (Feinberg, 1988:16). 
For example, in the hypothetical process of trying to convince!! Christian that they should 
renounce their belief in God and become an Atheist, one will inevitably make use of language 
or ideas that are derogatory to certain Christian principles and beliefs. There is a large 
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likelihood that the attempt to persuade others to change their beliefs will inevitably result in 
remarks that could be deemed to be insulting or derogatory towards the people whose beliefs 
are being questioned or revised. Thus, Article 18 would not appear to offer beliefs that are 
being challenged any protection from negative comment. However, paragraph 3 in Article 18 
states that, 
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health or more fundamental rights and freedom of 
others (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18). 
Thus, paragraph 3 indicates that while citizens of member states are entitled to hold beliefs 
and disseminate them in the public sphere, the ability to disseminate such beliefs is subject to 
certain restrictions dependent on the factors outlined above. Should the dissemination of a 
particular belief interfere with public safety, order, health or more fundamental rights and 
freedoms as entrenched in a democratic society, therefore, governments are entitled to restrict 
such opinions if they deem it necessary. The European Convention on Human Rights, ratified 
in J 950, offers similar protection to citizens of member states whose rights are potentially 
affected by the dissemination of particular beliefs and opinions inside the state. Taken almost 
word for word from the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, paragraph 1 of Article 
lOin the European Convention of Human Rights states that, 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent states from 
requiring the licenSing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises (European Convention of Human Rights, Article 10). 
While paragraph 1 stipulates that citizens have the right to hold, receIve and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority, paragraph 2 stipulates that 
interference on behalf of the state may take place should there be a threat to other liberties 
stipulated in the European Convention 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
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integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority or impartiality of the 
judiciary (European Convention of Human Rights, Article 10). 
Hence, paragraph 2 of Article IO places limitations on the right to freedom of expression 
when it interferes with other basic rights. As Sturgess (2006:184) points out, the preservation 
of national security, territorial integrity and public safety are the principle reasons why states 
deem it necessary to limit freedom of expression. Article 29 of the United Nations 
Convention on Human Rights justifies why it is necessary on occasions to limit free speech 
when it interferes with other basic rights. As paragraph 2 of Article 29 states, 
In the exercise of his rights and fi'eedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and fi'eedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 29). 
Article 29 stipulates that the law should be the main arbitrating mechanism when determining 
whether limitations are necessary in order to prevent the violation of human rights. Hence, 
since it is a common prerequisite for democratic nation-states to have an independent 
judiciary that monitors the actions of the citizenry and the government, the judiciary should 
decide whether it is necessary to restrict certain rights and freedoms if they interfere with 
other rights as stipulated in the Declaration of Human Rights. However, Sturgess (2006: 184) 
further argues that the ability of the law to act as the main referee or arbitrator will not satisty 
certain citizens who are victims or perpetrators of free speech. While the law may account for 
instances where other rights entrenched in the Human Rights Charter have been violated, 
victims or perpetrators of speech acts may feel that a more stringent test is needed to account 
for whether or not a speech act should be suppressed. The wider ramifications of this problem 
will be discussed further on in this chapter when it will be necessary to look at case studies 
where such discourses on free speech become problematic. While Article 29 calls upon the 
judicial systems inherent within the nation-state to restrict speech that is infringing other 
human rights, Article 30 creates the necessary legislature to do so. It states, 
Nothing in this declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein (Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 30). 
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Thus, Article 30 stipulates the limitations and responsibilities that come with the freedoms 
and rights outl ined in the rest of the Human Rights Charter. While citizens of democratic 
member states are entitled to freedoms such as the right to disseminate beliefs in the public 
sphere, such rights can be withdrawn or limited when they interfere with other rights also 
entrenched in the Charter. As Sturgess (2006) argues, perhaps the most important right that 
can be potentially breached by freedom of speech is the right to dignity. However, as has 
been mentioned, it is often difficult to ascertain exactly when certain rights have indeed been 
breached and to what extent. As will be shown later in this chapter, the decision to limit or 
restrict free speech is taken particularly seriously in that such an action involves infringing on 
a citizen's civil liberties. Since the right to free speech is considered to be one of the 
fundamental tenets of the democratic state, it is understandable why governments are often 
reluctant to restrict such rights. While the Declaration of Human Rights compels individuals, 
groups and governments who have signed the Declaration to adhere to the rights expressed 
therein, the judicial courts within the member states are the only institutions that can 
intervene when such rights have been breached. This would seem to lend support to the 
dualist argument that national law is superior to international law within the confines of the 
nation-state. Whi le nation-state governments are compelled to adhere to the statutory 
requirements implicit in international law, on a domestic level national law still has 
jurisdictional supremacy. 
Since the idea behind a judicial system is to ensure that governments do not abuse the power 
invested in them, governments have to be particularly careful when taking away certain 
democratic rights, particularly the right to free speech as this is one of the principal tools that 
enable the citizenry to prevent the government from abusing its power. There is perhaps an 
irony in the fact that governments are given the authority to limit rights of citizens when 
those very rights are designed to limit government power in the first instance. Hence, the fact 
that governments have the abi lity to potentially increase their authoritarian control by limiting 
the right to free speech inevitably means that such power is not taken lightly. Governments 
thus have to provide good reasons for doing so (Sturgess, 2006: 184-5). 
2.4· The limits of nation-state discourse 
In the following two sections I will look at two examples that reveal the limitations of our 
modern notion of free speech, limitations that derive from the very fact that free speech 
assumes a constitutive a priori relation to the state and citizenry. This a priori reveals the 
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limitations of free speech discourse when such speech acts are made at a global level, not 
between citizens but between larger religious groups, cultures and their representatives. 
When it comes to the need to address rights on an international level, we cannot do so 
because we are restricted to a discourse of rights that derives their legitimacy from the 
sovereign nation-state. Outside of the nation-state such a rights discourse becomes obsolete. 
It will now be necessary to look at this problem in more detail. 
2.4.1 The Danish Cartoon Controversy 
Despite the voices of disapproval and dissatisfaction emanating from prominent clerics, 
thinkers and academics within the Muslim Community around the globe, no one could have 
predicted the sweeping wave of public anger and violence that erupted as a result of the 
publication of twelve cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30"h September 
2005. With hindsight, we can look back at the controversy and argue that at the heart of the 
controversy lay two competing arguments. On the one side, the editors of Jyllands-Posten 
argued that their decision to publish the cartoons was a response to a growing "climate of 
fear" in European countries (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 13). According to the Cultural Editor 
of Jyllands-Posten, Flemming Rose, a culture of censorship had arisen in the West as a result 
of the fear of breaching cultural and religious sensitivities and taboos, particularly with 
regards to the Islamic faith and culture (Washington Post, 19"h February 2006). This culture 
of self-censorship and self-imposed totalitarianism was threatening to erode the foundations 
of free speech considered integral to the secular, Western, democratic nation-state. On the 
other side, prominent voices within the Islamic community, such as the Organisation of 
Islamic Countries (OlC), argued that the publication of the cartoons was symbolic of a 
growing vindictive attitude in the West towards the Muslim community (Rynning & Schmidt, 
2006: 14). Besides the fact that the Muslim faith forbids pictorial representations of the 
Prophet Mohammed, calls for restrictions on free speech by certain members of the Islamic 
community have been justified on the grounds that unlimited freedom of expression, used 
irresponsibly, potentially can, and often does, cultivate and perpetuate negative stereotypes of 
ethic minority groups in Europe that are both incorrect and harmful (Sturgess, 2006:181). As 
already mentioned, the response to stich claims by defenders of free speech has been that the 
demand for respect in this case amounts to a desire for censorship and totalitarian forms of 
control, the aim of which is to suppress dissident voices in the public sphere (Sturgess, 
2006: 183). While the debate continues to rage, it is the objective of this chapter to highlight 
the events that happened around the publication of the cartoons. Secondly, it will be 
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necessary to analyse the discourse of the controversy in terms of arguments for and against 
free speech in an international domain. It is my intention to show that such discourses are 
firmly embedded in the dichotomous relationship between the nation-state and its citizenry. 
This means that while the democratic nation-state accounts for, and historically made 
possible, a discourse on free speech, by the same logic the nation-state limits the legitimacy 
of free speech and its self-evident application outside a sovereign discourse. 
2.4.2 The car toons: the event and afterma th 
It is important to place the events surrounding the publication ofthe cartoons in the context of 
the political climate that had emerged in Denmark in the years preceding the cartoon 
controversy. In autumn 2001 , the Social Democratic Party in Denmark lost power in the 
general eJections. The Liberal Party, under the leadership of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, formed 
a minority government in alliance with the Conservatives (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 12). 
Although minority governments are regular occurrences in Denmark, the majority behind the 
newly formed government was made up of the People's Party, a nationalist-populist right-
wing party advocating anti-immigration in addition to enhanced national welfare programmes 
and reduced European integration (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006:12). In light of the People's 
Party manifesto, it was not surprising that the debate concerning the Danish "welfare state" 
and the traditionally Danish liberal attitude towards the immigration of different ethnic 
minorities sharpened. The People 's Party expressed their concern at the rising levels of 
immigration and the emergence of cultural-religious protocols that had begun to permeate 
Danish society (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 12). At the heart of the concern was the fear that 
the traditional democratic values of free speech and liberalism, which have been core to 
Danish society, were under siege from minority groups who were supposedly attempting to 
suppress free speech in the public sphere, particularly where criticism was directed at the 
Islamic culture and religion (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 12). 
On 30th September 2005, Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed. Although the cartoons were caricatures, they suggested a link between Islamic 
faith and the current strain of global terrorism, pre- and post-September llth 2001, 
particularly with regards to suicide bombers (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006:12). One of the 
cartoons depicts the Prophet Mohammad in a role similar to that of St Peter. He is standing at 
the entrance to heaven refusing entry to a group of Islamic suicide bombers who wish to 
enter. In justifying his reasons for refusing them he declares, "Stop, stop, we ran out of 
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virgins!" Despite the symbolic representation of the prophet Mohammad, which is seen to be 
blasphemous, the controversy of this particular cartoon lies with the association of the 
Prophet Mohammad and the Islamic religion with violence and terrorism. 
Following the publication of the cartoons, a week went by without any reaction from the 
public. Shortly after this, however, the Islamic community in Denmark reacted and demanded 
an explanation. On 12'h October 2005, eleven Muslim ambassadors formally complained in 
writing to Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen and requested a meeting to discuss the 
defamatory nature of the cartoons. Fogh Rasmussen refused to entertain the possibility of 
taking action against the media and stressed the importance of freedom of speech within 
Denmark (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006:13). Despite pressure from the social-liberals and the 
social democrats, Fogh Rasmussen still refused to meet with the ambassadors arguing that a 
head of government cannot be summoned to discuss the issue of freedom of speech just 
because offence was taken by some local congregations against the Danish media. Up until 
this point the debate had been contained within the boundaries of the Danish state. However, 
and this is the raison d'etre of this thesis, on 7'h December 2005 the issue was placed on the 
agenda at a high level meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (or C) which 
represents 57 Islamic countries (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 14). The Organisation of Islamic 
Countries then wrote to the United Nations to complain about the refusal of the Danish 
government to meet with the eleven aforementioned ambassadors and for failing to take 
action against Jyllands-Posten. Following criticism from 22 former Danish ambassadors 
against the Danish government, foreign ministers of the Arab League criticised the Danish 
government in a statement made on the 291h December 2005. The ministers expressed their 
"surpri se and indignation at the reaction of the Danish government which was disappointing 
considering its political, economic and cultural ties with the Muslim world" (Arab News, 30lh 
December 2005). The criticism from the Arab League was also followed by a letter to the 
Danish government from the United Nations Human Rights Commission asking the Danish 
government to explain its actions. Following encouragement from various Islamic voices, on 
261h January 2006 a boycott of Danish products began in Saudi Arabia (Rynning & Schmidt, 
2006: 14). In the wake of death threats, the editor of Jyllands-Posten, Flemming Rose, made 
an appearance on Al Jazeera television to make it clear that the publication of the cartoons 
was not an intention to hurt or insult Muslims (Washington Post, 191h February 2006). 
Following Rose's statement, Jyllands-Posten published a declaration on 30lh January 2006 in 
which it apologised for the effects that the cartoons had on members of the Islamic 
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community. However, the newspaper refused to apologise for the publication of the cartoons 
claiming that the Danish public prosecutor and the judicial system had not found the 
newspaper guilty of violating sovereign limitations, that is, Danish law. Syria, Lebanon, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia chose to react diplomatically by closing their embassies in Denmark 
(Rynning & Schmidt, 2006:14). 
Following the increasing hostility towards the Danish government and economic sanctions, 
Danish Prime-Minister Fogh Rasmussen decided to appear on Al-Arabiya television on 2nd 
February 2006 to state publicly that it was not the intention of the Danish media or 
government to insult the Muslim community (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006:14). As Fogh 
Rasmussen stated, "I personally have such respect for people's religious feeling that I 
personally would not have depicted Mohammed, Jesus or other religious figures in such a 
manner that would offend other people" (The Miami Herald, 19th February 2006). However, 
his statement failed to cease hostility towards the Danish government and on 3rd February 
2006, Fogh Rasmussen met with the ambassadors of 76 countries to discuss how to solve the 
escalating crisis. On 4th and 5th February 2006, Danish embassies in Syria, Lebanon, 
Indonesia and Pakistan were attacked by protesters angry at the refusal of the Danish 
government to apologise. On 15th February, the president of the European Commission, 
Barroso, declared his full support for the Danish government and a day later, on 16th 
February, the European Parliament expressed its disapproval at the increasing wave of 
violence around the world, particularly the violence directed at the Danish embassies around 
the globe (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 14-15). However, the European Parliament also 
encouraged the Danish government to take a more diplomatic route and follow a procedure of 
respectful dialogue. It is interesting to note that despite the UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan's pledge to offer the UN as a venue for settling the affair, most European countries 
and the United States were sceptical about the possibility of the United Nations' involvement 
in the controversy. Arguing that the controversy was instigated inside the boundaries of the 
Danish nation-state, they maintained that the issue should be resolved by the Danish 
government with international assistance rather than entering the complicated mechanisms of 
multilateral diplomacy (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: IS). The stance taken by the United 
Nations is indicative of a discourse that retains the sovereign nation-state as the principal 
power broker in international relations. By arguing that the crisis should be solved 
domestically, the United Nations argued that the free speech debate should be relegated to the 
confines of the nation-state boundary and thus should be resolved by the Danish judiciary. It 
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was thus inevitable that the sanctity of free speech as a non-negotiable democratic right 
should once again emerge when the debate was confined within the Danish state. The 
argument suggested that, since Denmark was a sovereign nation-state, the Danish 
government was entitled to resolve the dispute without international interference and this was 
despite the fact that the offended community could not be limited to citizens of the Danish 
state and, hence, considered juridical subjects of Danish law. 
As Rynning and Schmidt (2006: 19) argue, prominent nation-states within the United Nations 
community stressed the importance of free speech as a democratic right. The publication of 
the cartoons in Germany and France was symbolic of the fact that, while the German and 
French governments felt that the cartoons were distasteful , the principle of free speech should 
remain intact (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 19). As the German Minister of the Interior, 
Wolfgang Schauble, argued, the German government could not apologise for the publication 
of the cartoons in the German media because such a stance would amount to interference in 
the German press (Rynning & Schmidt, 2006: 19). Such a view was reiterated by Roger 
Koppel, editor-in-chief of Die Welt , who said: 
It 's at the very core of our culture that the most sacred things can be subjected to 
criticism, laughter and satire. If we stop using our journalistic right to freedom of 
expression within legal boundaries then we start to have a kind of appeasement 
mentality (The Mail & Guardian, 3Td_9 th February 2006). 
Such an intervention would amount to an infringement of civil liberties by the German 
government. Similarly in France, while Jacques Chirac criticised the publication of the 
cartoons on the grounds that the cartoons were defamatory and insulting and called for 
respect for other belief systems and moderation, he naturally argued that freedom of speech 
was a right that could not be taken away from the citizenry. The ubiquitous nature of such a 
discourse was evident in the attitude of the European Union itself. The European Union 
countries adopted a final joint statement concerning the controversy on 27th February 2006. 
Following on from the reaction from the Danish government, they underscored the sanctity of 
freedom of speech but admitted that it must be used responsibly. However, while the 
European Union apologised for any insult caused by the publication of the cartoons, it 
refused to agree that the cartoons should not have been published in the first place (Rynning 
& Schmidt, 2006:1 9-20). 
The outline of events that followed the publication of the cartoons would seem to suggest 
reluctance on the part of member states of the United Nations and the European Union to 
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engage with the issue of free speech outside of the nation-state discourse. In arguing that the 
publication of the cartoons was a domestic matter, the state actors essentially argued for 
confining the terms of the debate to nation-state discourse and the logic of sovereignty, that is 
democracy, conceived within the limits of the nation-state. 
2.4.3 Something is rotten in the state of Demnad<: free speech and the 
nation-state of Denmark 
Responding to the cartoon controversy Issacharoff (2006:2) argues that the controversy 
provides "an illuminating window on what may be termed the problem of democratic 
intolerance". Although Issacharoff (2006:2) argues that the debate itself is complex and 
multifaceted, at the core of the controversy is the claim, made by a number of Muslim 
scholars and religious figures, that the Danish government should be held accountable for its 
refusal to censor the publication of the cartoons when they appeared in lyllands-Posten. 
Dworkin (2006: 132) argues that while the British and most of the American press were 
correct not to republish the Danish calioons, the only reason why they should not do so is 
because reprinting would likely have led to more death and destruction of property around the 
globe. Such a response can be acknowledged as a pragmatic necessity and highlights the 
notion that free speech can be rescinded by the nation-state when it is deemed to be a threat to 
other civil libeliies. Once again we are reminded of how fTee speech is both made possible 
and limited by the sovereign nation-state. However, Dworkin, 2006: 132) does not agree that 
suppressing free speech for the purposes of preventing defamation or offence is justified. 
Dworkin (2006: 132) does not agree with celiain voices within the Islamic community that 
called for the Danish government to suppress the cartoons because they were distasteful or 
offensive. As he argues: 
Freedom of speech is not just a special and distinctive emblem of Western culture that 
might be generously abridged or qualified as a measure of respect for other cultures 
that reject it, the way a crescent or menorah might be added to a Christian religious 
display. Free speech is a condition of legitimate government (Dworkin, 2006: 132). 
Dworkin follows on by saying that the right to insult is a fundamental tenet of a democratic 
state. Commenting on the tradition of satirical cartoons in Western culture, Morreall 
(2005:63) argues: 
Political cartoons have been part of newspapers almost as long as there have been 
newspapers, and the rise of democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 
correlated with the rise of sophisticated political cartooning. 
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Here, Morreall is alluding to the idea that cartoons, and the satire expressed in their content, 
have a particular association with the need and right to criticise the nation-state. Thus, weak 
or unpopular minorities within the nation-state must be willing to take insult as a condition 
for making a claim on the majority for protective anti-discriminatory legislation. As Dworkin 
(2006:132) states, " [ilf we expect bigots to accept the verdict of the majority once the 
majority has spoken, then we must permit them to express their bigotry in the process whose 
verdict we ask them to accept". Put simply, if the minority are to make a claim against a 
majority, democratic reasoning demands that the minority allow the claim they are attempting 
to revoke to be expressed by the majority in the first instance. For in a democratic arena, only 
once claims have been allowed to be expressed can criticisms against the legitimacy of such 
claims be made. This, however, does not prevent us from citing certain general speech acts as 
defamatory and/or, in retrospect, from classifying them as such since doing so would set up a 
foundation for claims to be limited (as in the case of hate speech). Dworkin 's (2006 : 132) 
particular argument in favour of unrestricted speech is synonymous with core liberal 
principles expounded by other liberal theorists such as Rawls. For Rawls (1971:217), "a 
person's right to complaint is limited to violations of principles he acknowledges himself. A 
complaint is a protest addressed to another in good faith." Thus, we can interpret Rawls as 
saying that the right to express dissatisfaction with a particular belief must necessarily 
endorse the right for such a belief to be expressed in the first place. We cannot limit the 
expression of opinions we find distasteful in the public arena and then expect others to accept 
our own beliefs. As Issacharoff (2006:2) argues, the intolerant may complain at the insults 
felt from the dissemination of an opinion in the public sphere. However, the fact that they 
have been insulted does not justifY official censorship of speech in the public sphere. 
Resisting censorship is necessary to ensure the preservation of civil liberties that make 
democratic tolerance possible. Sturgess (2005: 186) points out, however, that the case is 
altered when speech is directed at the beliefs and distinguishing characteristics of other 
groups. This would be a characteristic of hate-speech in particular. Hate-speech is a direct 
threat to the rights of others because it denies recognition of the "inherent dignity" of all 
human beings and their "equal and inalienable rights" as expressed in the preamble to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Sturgess, 2005: 186) 
Thus, Issacharoff (2006:3) argues that at the heart of Dworkin's (2006: 132) argument is the 
call for liberal democracies around the globe to resist pressure imposed by intolerant groups 
to use governmental authority to silence unpopular speech. It is debatable of course whether 
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minority ethnic groups in Europe wish to censor some forms of speech simply on the basis 
that they find it offensive. Such a view is simplistic to say the least. As Mackinnon (1993:77-
8) has argued, unchecked speech is a potentially dangerous weapon that can be used for 
destructive ends, particularly when it is unfairly distributed in favour of the majority against 
the minority. And as Mackinnon (1993:77-8) also argues, access to speech is often unevenly 
distributed in favour of powerful majorities within the nation-state. As a result, minority 
groups are voiceless and unable to defend themselves against victimisation and hurtful claims 
manifested within the public forum by the powerful majority. Issacharoff's (2006:1) claim 
that " [ d]emocratic regimes around the world find themselves besieged by antidemocratic 
groups that seek to use the electoral arena as a forum to propagandise their cause and rally 
their supporters" would seem to insinuate that the Islamic voices that condemned the 
publication of the cartoons would fall into the category of the intolerant. For he later argues 
that, as a liberal democracy, no moral or legitimate claim can be made calling for the Danish 
government to act on behalf of others to censor material deemed to be offensi ve. As 
Issacharoff (2006:3) says, "[s]imply put, democratic tolerance should not succumb to claims 
for censorship demanded by forces of intolerance". Dworkin (2006; 132) acknowledges the 
hypocrisy evident in the fact that, while many European countries are quick to defend the 
right to fTee speech, in several European countries it is a crime to publicly deny that the 
Holocaust ever took place. However, rather than calling for the even regulation of harmful or 
offensive speech across the board, Dworkin (2006 : 132) makes the claim that the remedy is 
not to make the compromise of democratic legitimacy even greater than it already is and that 
there should rather be an attempt to remove Holocaust-denial laws as well. Thus, Dworkin 
(2006: 132) argues that it is necessary to work towards a new understanding of the European 
Convention on Human Rights that would strike down laws that violate free speech. 
In contTadiction to Mackinnon (1993), Dworkin (200: 132) supports the notion that there 
should be no regulation of free speech of any kind such is his concern to alleviate the 
possibility of civil liberties being taken away. Issacharoff's (2006:3) support for Dworkin's 
argument is part of a broader question he aims to address, namely whether democratic 
governments have the capacity to resist the use of their electoral arenas as platforms of social 
intolerance, for as he points out, there is the danger not only that the state apparatus can be 
used to foster intolerance but also that the democratic state can potentially be usurped by 
intolerant pmties. As a hypothetical example, Issacharoff (2006) asks us to imagine a 
scenario where dissident Islamic groups, dissatisfied with the refusal of the Danish 
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government to prevent the publication of the cartoons in the Danish press, took it upon 
themselves to form a political party, the objective of which would be to use the electoral 
arena as a means to come to power and rescind free speech legislation deemed to be 
religiously blasphemous or culturally insensitive. Stripped down to its essentials, all 
definitions of democracy return to the primacy of electoral choice and the presumptive claim 
of the majority to rule. While Issacharoff (2006:3) highlights the dangers around such a 
scenario, he does acknowledge that democracies are equipped with legislation and 
constitutional procedures which serve as a backdrop before any electoral procedures can take 
place. However, he points out that as an historical standpoint, an inquiry into the occurrence 
of such a scenario is far from abstract. There are numerous examples from history where 
politically intolerant parties have used democratic electoral platforms to come to power. 
Hitler's final push to power occurred within the confines of the Weimar Democracy and as 
Joseph Goebbels (cited in Fox & Nolte, 1993:32) famously said, "This will always remain 
one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was 
destroyed". Goebbels was, of course, alluding to the fact that the accommodating democratic 
arena provided the platform from which a totalitarian and fascist regime could take power. 
Feldman (2006:9-10) argues that democratic tolerance becomes problematic in deeply 
fractured societies where different ethnic and religious ideologically driven movements are 
attempting to come to the fore. Referring specifically to the Middle East, Feldman (2006: I 0) 
argues that "the model of Islamist organisations that combine electoral politics with 
paramilitary tactics is fast becoming the new calling card of the new wave of Arab 
democratisation" . Feldman (2006 :9-10) points to the political manoeuvrings of Hezbollah 
and Hamas as examples of political movements that have searched for democratic legitimacy 
while at the same time engaging in paramilitary tactics on the side. In order to counter the 
potential threat from within, most democratic states prevent expression on extremist 
participation in the electoral arena. While the electoral arena can be used as a forum for the 
recording of preferences, it can also be used as a platform for the mobilisation of intolerant 
political forces (Issacharoff, 2006:4-5). Besides having access to political propaganda, if 
elected to parliament such anti-democratic forces often have the ability to cripple any 
effective governance within parliament. It is perhaps with this danger in mind that Rawls 
(1971 :2 17) states, "just citizens should strive to preserve the constitution with all its equal 
liberties as long as liberty itself and their own freedom are not in danger" . While Rawls 
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argues that citizens should generally strive to preserve liberty, there are times when it is 
necessary to restrict liberties when it threatens the freedom of the majority. 
While Isacharoffs (2006) example of the creation of a Danish Muslim party in the wake of 
the cartoons is a hypothetical scenario, it is interesting to see how the interest in preserving 
Danish civil liberties has prevented the Danish government and media from entertaining the 
interests of dissident voices opposed to the cartoons. For, as the cultural editor of Jyllands-
Posten, Flemming Rose (Washington Post, 19'h February 2006) argues, the decision to solicit 
and publish the cartoons was, in his view, a response to the emergence of a climate of fear 
that had begun to permeate Danish society, particularly with regards to not breaching Muslim 
taboos. Rose saw this as a creeping form of totalitarianism that was contradictory to the 
principles inherent in a liberal democracy like Denmark. For instance, a Danish author who 
was seeking an illustrator for a book he had written about the Prophet Mohammed and Islam 
had been unable to do so because nobody wished to be associated with such a sensitive theme 
as the depiction ofIslam (Shearmur, 2006:21). An illustrator who finally accepted insisted on 
anonymity with regards to his association with the book. As Rose (cited in Rynning & 
Schmidt, 2006: 13) stated: 
Last September, a Danish children's writer had trouble finding an illustrator for a 
book about the life of Mohammed. Three people turned down the job for fear of 
consequences. The person who finally accepted insisted on anonymity, which in my 
book is a form of self-censorship ... So, over two weeks we witnessed a half-dozen cases 
of self-censorship, pilling freedom of speech against the fear of confronting issues 
about Islam. 
In the climate of such fear , Rose's decision to commission the cartoons was based on a desire 
to rebuke the culture of self-censorship that he believed had emerged out of a respect for 
democratically intolerant groups aiming to suppress dissident opinion from the public sphere 
(Rynning & Schmidt, 2006:13). As Rose (cited in Rynning & Schmidt, 2006:13) states, '[aJs 
a former correspondent in the Soviet Union, I am sensitive about calls for censorship on the 
grounds of insult. This is a popular trick of totalitarian movements". Some theorists such as 
Uft Hedetoft (2006) argue that the publication of the cartoons should be understood within 
the context of Danish migration discourse. As Hedetoft (2006) argues, JyUands-Posten has 
the largest circulation in Denmark and is ideologically closest to the ruling political majority. 
This Danish migration discourse is considered to be fully in line with a particular brand of 
Danish Islamophobia and anti-immigrant scepticism. On the basis of such an argument, the 
decision to publish the cartoons could also be interpreted as a rebuke of cultural minorities 
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who live in Danish society. However they may be interpreted, Rose 's comments allude to a 
discourse of liberal-democratic theory that argues in favour of unrestTicted free speech as a 
fundamental right inherent in the constitution of a democratic nation-state in which such 
rights constitute the individual as a free political and juridical citizen. It is the existence of 
such a discourse that has made it impermissible for the Danish government to censor free 
speech no matter how offensive it might be. 
It is pertinent to note that this analysis of the cartoon controversy and the debate surrounding 
free speech has focused on the internal sovereign discourse of rights . The claims to freedom 
of speech with regards to the publication of the cartoons have been justified within the 
context of a nation-state discourse of human rights. Outside of the sovereign nation-state, 
such claims to freedom of speech become redundant. This is because such a discourse that 
revolves around the sovereign nation-state does not apply in instances where a community is 
larger than or overlaps the nation-state or various nation-states. The Muslim community that 
was otTended by the publication of the cartoons transcends the nation-state. This means that 
the problem of freedom of speech is an issue that immediately becomes relevant on an 
international level. As the above analysis has shown, we cannot address such a problem if we 
continue to operate in a sovereign nation-state framework. 
2.5 Defamation of religion and the nation-s tate 
It will now be necessary to look at the introduction of the Combating Defamation of 
Religions Resolution into the United Nations Constitution in 2005. The controversy 
surrounding the introduction of this piece of legislature is pertinent to this analysis because it 
highlights the friction or uneasy relationship between international bodies and nation-state 
governments. As will be shown, the introduction of the Resolution has been problematic 
because many nation-state governments have seen the act as a threat to their internal 
sovereignty. The sanctity of freedom of speech is defended within the framework ofa nation-
state discourse of human rights . As will be shown, governments are often weary of 
committing themselves to international law that threatens to restrict human rights outside of 
the nation-state framework. 
2.5.1 The "Defamation of Re ligion" resolution 
The introduction of the resolution, entitled Combating Defamation of Religions, through a 
series of provisions in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 is another example of how interpretations 
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of free speech inevitably reveal the limitations of their origins in nation-state discourse. This 
includes the sovereignty of the political subject, the sovereignty of free speech and the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. The introduction of the resolution into the United Nations 
Constitution has been shrouded in controversy. While it is inevitable that any legislation that 
seeks to place limitations on free speech will be criticised by liberal theorists, one of the most 
controversial features of the resolution is that it partly defines defamation of religion as a 
"negative projection of Islam in the media and the association of Islam with terrorism and 
human rights violations" (Grinberg, 2006: I). While the criticisms directed at such a claim are 
ubiquitous, such criticisms argue that the introduction of the resolution violates the major 
tenets of the "argument from democracy". Grinberg (2006: I) , for instance, argues that the 
resolution restricts expression on issues of public importance and prevents citizens from 
being able to criticise public officials. Also, because the resolution particularly prohibits 
negative projections of Islam in the media, this allows Muslim nation-states to escape 
international scrutiny. The existence of non-secular Islamic states such as Iran and Pakistan 
implies that a critique of the actions ofisiamic governments can be struck down as an attempt 
to portray Islam in a negative light. According to Grinberg (2006: 1-2), it is thus potentially 
feasible for Islamic nation-states not only to suppress criticism from the international 
community but also from the citizens of Islamic nation-states as well. Thus, inherent in the 
resolution is a carte-blanche freedom for totalitarian, non-democratic states to suppress 
criticisms directed at authoritarian regimes that violate human rights. Part of Grinberg' s 
thesis is an attempt to show that the introduction of a resolution that prohibits defamation of 
religion is unnecessary within a democratic state since it already contains mechanisms to 
protect cultural groups from defamation or slander. 
It is perhaps obvious that in the wake of such a controversial pIece of legislature, an 
ideological divide has emerged between, on the one hand, countries such as America and 
Britain who are exponents of liberal democracies, and, on the other hand, those countries who 
favour the introduction of the resolution. As Heinze (2006:544) points out, under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court in the United States has 
traditionally struck down the type of hate speech bans that international norms require. Khan 
(2006: I) argues that certain countries have been particularly critical of the defamation 
resolution. It is perhaps not surprising that some of the foremost proponents of the resolution 
were member states of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. Such states would have a 
vested interest in protecting Islam from negative stereotyping within the media. Before a 
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critique can be made concerning the opposition to the resolution, it will first be necessary to 
highlight the context in which it emerged. 
2.5.2 Preventing the negative stereotype 
Although the September II th attacks are widely considered to be the catalyst for the spread of 
Islamophobic attitudes around the world, the Commission on Human Rights passed a bill 
condemning defamation of Islam before 11th September 2001 (Grinberg, 2006:3). In 1999 
Pakistan introduced a draft resolution to the United Nations in which it argued that "Islam .. . 
was being slandered in different quarters ... " (Littman, 1999:3). The European Union's 
proposal to adopt a different title, ' Stereotyping of Religions,' was rejected by the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference. Shortly after this, the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference managed to have a resolution called the Defamation of Religions passed, citing 
the need for a bill to prevent the negative stereotyping of Islam in association with terrorism 
and human rights violations. When the United Nations Commission for Human Rights passed 
the bill entitled Combating Defamation of Religions in 2002, the Commission encouraged 
states to continue fighting against terrorism but urged them not to discriminate "on grounds 
of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin" and to "refrain from all forms of racial 
profiling" (Greenburg, 2006 :3). This newly proposed resolution did not find favour with 
some Islamic countries, which requested a new resolution under the same name that 
highlighted the Islamic religion in particular as a religion "frequently and wrongly associated 
with human rights violations and with terrorism" (Muravchik, 2002:4). The decision to 
reconfigure the resolution highlighting Islam as a religion subject to a particular form of 
stereotyping was defended on the grounds that such an action would provide the grounds for 
future united tolerance by all communities. Besides condemning the use of the media to 
creative negative images of Islam, the resolution also condemned physical attacks on places 
of worship and religious symbols (Khan, 2006: I). Inherent in the final draft was a desire for 
states to "complement their legal systems with intellectual and moral strategies to combat 
religious hatred and intolerance" (Khan, 2006: I) . In the original draft of the final resolution, 
it was noted "with deep concern the increase in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in various 
parts of the world, as well as the emergence of racial and violent movements based on racism 
and discriminatory ideas directed against Muslim, Jewish and Arab communities" (Grinberg, 
2006:4). This wording was deleted from the final draft of the resolution as some states were 
opposed to the use of the term "anti-Semitism" in the UN Constitution. 
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The resolution was supported by 101 states in total when the final draft was proposed in 
2005. In 2006 the resolution gained the support of 10 more states, bringing the total to III 
states in favour. All Middle Eastern states except Israel, and an overwhelming majority of 
states from Africa, Asia and South America supported the resolution. In opposition, in 2005, 
53 states voted against the Defamation Resolution including all members of the European 
Union, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (Khan, 2006:2). In 2006 South 
Korea and Japan agreed to oppose the resolution. In 2005, 37 states from Asia, Africa and 
South America did not commit themselves to lending support to or in providing opposition to 
the resolution (Khan, 2006:2). The theory that the voting blocs either providing support or 
lending opposition to the resolution represents a Christian-Islam religious clash is flawed in 
that a predominantly Christian country like Russia, and other Christian states in South 
America, endorsed the resolution. From a Western viewpoint, there has also been an attempt 
to explain the rift in terms of a liberal/non-liberal divide. Such theorists would argue that 
liberal-democratic states such as member states of the European Union, Japan and South 
Korea would oppose the resolution on the grounds that it poses a strong threat to the 
individual liberties of citizens within the nation-state (Khan, 2006:2-3). Such a theory has 
some credibility in that many members of the Western Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) do 
not consist of democratic systems. However, this does not account for the reason why strong 
democratic states like India and South Africa would lend their support to the resolution 
(Khan, 2006:3). 
As mentioned, one of the foremost criticisms of the Defamation of Religion Resolution is that 
it does not provide a definition for the term "defamation". The prevention of group 
defamation is problematic in that it not only limits free speech in the public sphere but also 
enables certain groups or non-secular governments to continue with inhumane customs and 
practices directed at the nation-state citizenry (Khan, 2006:4). The fact that the resolution 
prevents the defamation of religion goes further than group defamation in that it also prevents 
criticism directed at religious ideas and doctrines. It is perhaps not coincidental that the 
"cartoon crisis" that was allowed to manifest itself within the media structures of liberal-
democratic states in Western Europe emerged within a country that rejected the Defamation 
of Religion Resolution. In this context, how are we to understand arguments put forward by 
certain liberal-democratic states, such as the member states of the EU, that the Resolution 
threatens the right to free speech? How are such criticisms based on a discourse that places 
the right to free speech as an indispensable tool of the democratic nation-state? 
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2.5.3 The right to ofJcnd: the resolution as an infringement of civil liberties 
As Khan (2006 :4) argues, the absence of a legally sustainable definition of the tenn 
"defamation of religions" is problematic in that there are no legal parameters that can indicate 
exactly what constitutes a defamatory remark or gesture. The fact that potentially any speech 
with a religious theme can be suppressed on the grounds that it is defamatory is dangerous in 
that it poses a big threat to civil liberties. The DeJamation Resolution has been interpreted by 
liberal democracies in the West as constituting an infringement of free speech. Since the right 
to free speech is a fundamental civil and political right that is protected in national 
constitutions and treaties around the globe, many Western liberal democracies will oppose 
the power of non-secular states to suppress speech on the grounds that it is defamatory 
towards religion. As Khan (2006:4) further argues, in Western liberal states, the sacrifice of 
artistic liberty and political liberty for cultural and religious deference is a bad bargain. The 
fact that the DeJamation oj Religion Resolution fails to distinguish between the dignity of 
religion, which must be protected, and valid criticisms of certain religious practices is also 
problematic. As Article i 8 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, 
a citizen has a right to adopt a religion without coercion. While in many Islamic countries 
non-Muslims are encouraged to adopt Islam as their chosen faith, some Islamic states impose 
harsh penalties, such as the death penalty, for Muslims who convert to another religion. The 
existence of the DeJamation oj Religion Resolution will be seen to be problematic as it 
entitles certain states to engage in inhumane practices (Khan, 2006:5). 
Entrenched within the Universal Declaration oj Human Rights is the right to "freedom of 
opinion and expression". Such freedoms may be rescinded should a government deem it 
necessary "for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights of freedoms 
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in democratic society" (Grinberg, 2006:8-9). As Grinberg (2006:5) points out, the 
Universal Declaration oj Human Rights does not provide a solution for how to solve a 
dispute between two competing rights such as the right to free speech and respect for the 
freedom of others. However, Grinberg (2006:5) argues that the Universal Declaration oj 
Human Rights does not sanction incitement of violence. For as (1-2) in Article 20 of the 
International Covenant oj Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states, the state is allowed to 
restrict freedom of expression to disallow " [a ]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement, discrimination, hostility or violence ... ". Representing the 
United States, Eleanor Roosevelt (Farrior, 1996) argued that Article 20 would allow 
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governments to silence dissident criticism m the name of protection against religious 
hosti lity, which would render all other rights in the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, according to Roosevelt, null and void. Although, Article 20 enables 
governments to silence speech deemed to be hostile or an incitement to violence, according to 
Henkin (1995: 127), expressions of opinions, misstatements or distortions of fact do not fall 
under the category of "religious hatred" and could thus not be censored under Article 20. The 
publication of the Danish cartoons is particularly problematic in that it is difficult to ascertain 
whether they are a direct incitement to violence, in which case they could be censored under 
Article 20, or whether they are merely an expression of opinion or a distortion of fact and 
hence could not be classified as "hate speech". Henkin (1995) does concede that governments 
may prohibit group defamation under the stipulations of Article 19 if speech is not rescinded 
under Article 20. As Article 19 3(b) states, a government may prohibit speech "[flor the 
protection of national security or of public order or of public morals". Hence, the state is only 
justified in revoking speech when it can prove that censorship is "necessary" to maintain 
public order in a "democratic" society. It is because of the fact that infringing civil liberties in 
a democratic society is such a serious matter that governments are often reluctant to intervene 
in sensitive matters that may require censorship for the public good. In order for censorship to 
be justified on behalf of the government, there has to be a clear indication that such an action 
is not only pertinent but is in the best interests of the greater majority. 
While one of the principal criticisms directed at the Defamation of Religion Resolution has 
been that it gives a carte blanche right for governments to censor dissident criticism, another 
question concerns whether such a resolution is necessary within a democratic state. For, if 
international law ensures that speech can be censored if it is deemed to be an instigator of 
public violence, this begs the question of whether a reso lution is needed outside of the nation-
state boundary. In Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, "the right to 
freedom of expression canies with it duties and responsibilities and may be subject to such 
... as are necessary in a democratic society". Taken word for word from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Public Rights, Article lOis symbolic of a discourse that places the 
right to free speech as an indispensable tool of a democratic state. Free speech can only be 
rescinded if democracy itself is under threat. 
While speech in a democracy can be censored for the sake of "national security" or "public 
safety", international tribunals are reluctant to rescind speech simply on the basis of insult. 
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Regardless of whether speech is defamatory, it has to be proven that such speech poses a 
threat to civil liberties as entrenched in the International Covenant on Civil and Public Rights 
and the European Convention on Human Rights. In 2002, the European Convention on 
Human Rights invoked Article 10 of the Covenant to overrule a decision made by Turkish 
courts to sentence a lawyer to jail for criticising the Turkish government's policy towards the 
Kurdish ethnic group (Grinberg, 2006:8). According to the Turkish judiciary, the lawyer had 
made use of the terms "Kurds" and "Kurdistan" which were deemed to be part of separatist 
propaganda. The dissemination of such propaganda was supposedly an invocation for acts of 
terrorism against the Turkish government and hence was a threat to the public order and 
national security. While the European Convention on Human Rights recognised the Turkish 
government's concern for preventing terrorism, the court argued that limitations on 
expression as defined under Article 10 did not have jurisdiction over matters of public interest 
or political expression (Grinberg, 2006 :8). The court explained that the right to freedom of 
expression constituted one of the principal foundations of a democracy. Hence the Turkish 
citizenry had a right to be informed of the government's policies towards the Kurdish ethnic 
group. As a ruling body, the Turkish citizenry are entitled to be knowledgeable with regards 
to government policy regardless of whether the material that is presented to them is 
"offensive" or "shocking". The ruling of the European Convention on Human Rights was that 
such a restraint on free speech was not necessary in a democratic society (Grinberg, 2006:8-
9). 
However, in 0110 Preminger Institute vs Austria, the European Convention on Human Rights 
upheld a decision by the Austrian government to seize a satirical film that investigated the 
relationship between religion and worldly mechanisms of oppression. In portraying God as a 
senile old man "prostrating himself before the devil" and the Virgin Mary as exhibiting "a 
degree of erotic tension", the decision by the Austrian government to ban the film was 
justified on the grounds that the film constituted a "wholesale derision of religious feelings" 
towards the church (Grinberg, 2006:9-10). The need to curtail such criticism of religious 
institutions outweighed the director's right to freedom of expression. The European 
Convention on Human Rights argued that the film did not contribute in any way towards 
public debate and was not capable of "furthering progress in human affairs" (Grinberg, 
2006: 10). Grinberg's decision to highlight these two examples is interesting in that both cases 
raise pertinent questions with regards to justificatory arguments for speech censorship. 
Grinberg alludes to these cases in order to answer the broader question of whether a 
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"defamation of religion" resolution is necessary in a democratic society. We could perhaps 
interpret such a question as an attempt to analyse whether liberal-democratic systems are 
equipped with the necessary legislative procedures to maintain the tricky balance between 
ensuring a citizen's right to free expression while at the same time limiting speech when it is 
deemed to be an invocation of violence towards a religious or cultural group. Inherent within 
the legislature of the European Convention on Human Rights is a fundamental right to 
criticise religions. For, while the constitution ensures freedom of religion, this does not 
exclude religious criticism. Dissident judges opposing the ruling of the European Convention 
on Human Rights argued that it should not be left to states to determine whether a speech act 
has contributed to public affairs in any sort of way, for vesting such power in governments 
enables the state to favour certain power groups over others (Grinberg, 2006). 
Once again we are faced with a discourse centred on the sovereign citizenry. In both cases, 
the decision by the European Convention on Human Rights to enable or censor speech was 
based on the "public interest" and "political expression" of a well defined and constituted 
polity. Hence, if we are to view such a ruling based on the "argument from democracy", the 
European Convention on Human Rights is willing to revoke a speech act if it does not 
contribute to the greater good of the sovereign citizenry. If it can be proven that a speech act 
is necessary for the citizenry to govern and that it does not infringe other civil liberties, such a 
speech act is not rescinded. The controversy surrounding the introduction of the Defamation 
of Religion Resolution is based on two factors. Firstly, the Resolution fails to provide a clear 
definition of defamation and, secondly, the Resolution silences speech directed at non-secular 
oppressive states - that is, states not constituted along the Western, liberal, democratic line -
because such criticism is seen to be an attack on religion or culture. Hence, authoritarian or 
oppressive regimes are allowed to continue engaging in inhumane practices without fear of 
public criticism. Hence, too, criticism of the Resolution is based on the argument that speech 
is a necessary component of a functional democracy and cannot be revoked on the grounds of 
defamation. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter has been to indicate the impossibility of legally invoking 
limitations on free speech on an international level by appealing to a nation-state rights 
discourse. Within the nation-state, we are able to invoke the call for absolute or limited free 
speech by appealing to a rights discourse that is exclusive to the nation-state. Such a rights 
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discourse cannot be invoked to limit free speech on an international level, however, as no 
sovereign body has the legal authority to do so. As was shown in Chapter Two, the rights 
discourse inherent to the nation-state makes the modern notion of free speech possible. At the 
same time, this rights discourse acts as a limitation of sorts because we are unable to invoke 
limitations on free speech outside of the nation-state boundary. An analysis of the publication 
of the Danish cartoons in Jyllands-Posten in 2005 and the Defamation of Religions resolution 
passed in 2005 suggested that our ability to engage with free speech on an international level 
is limited by its origin in nation-state rights discourse. As will be demonstrated later in this 
thesis, there is an equal need to limit free speech outside of the nation-state. Although 
international bodies like the UN and the EU can call for the limitation of free speech, they do 
not have the ability to legally restrict free speech without violating a nation-state's 
sovereignty. Having highlighted this problem, we are left with the dilemma of how to 
conceive the limitation of free speech on an international level without appealing to the rights 
discourse particular to the nation-state. The argument for the limitation of free speech is a 
legitimate cause; however, we cannot legally impose such limitations on an international 
level because we cannot appeal to a sovereign body with the legal power to do so. It will be 
the objective later on in this thesis to propose a way to invoke limitations on free speech 
without appealing to a nation-state rights discourse. 
In the next chapter I start exploring an alternative way of conceiving limitations at this level. 
Clue to re-imagining the very notion of "limitation" is the tension between our desire for 
absolute freedom (here, of speech) and the need to recognise limitation of that desire by 
context and history. To this end I look in the next chapter at Derrida's analysis of a number of 
concepts where a similar tension exists . It is useful to look at Derrida's analysis of such 
aporetic concepts because it will later be suggested that free speech is similarly aporetic. 
Besides describing the aporia of certain concepts, Derrida also suggests a way "beyond" the 
impasse suggested by the aporetic tension inherent in the concept. This "way beyond" entails 
a constant oscillation between or negotiation of the two extremes, the absolute and the 
historical: one only makes sense because of the other and in this co-constitutive relation lies a 
clue to conceiving limitations on the absolute freedom of speech in the global arena. 
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Chapter 3. The historical and the absolute: Denida's 
aporiae 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two, the objective of the discussion was to identify and critique discourses 
surrounding the controversy of free speech outside of the nation-state. The intention of that 
chapter was to show that arguments for and against limiting or restricting free speech are 
historically rooted in a nation-state discourse that is irrevocably tied to various political 
models of democracy. These models cannot be assumed to exist and although they may in 
time come to exist and the arguments associated with them regain relevance, for now the 
arguments that derive from them are inadequate to address the issue of free speech at a global 
level. To state this differently, our modem notion of free speech emerged within the context 
of the modern nation-state and is thus irrevocably tied to democratic appeals for popular 
governance in the form of democracy. It is because free speech emerged in the context of the 
nation-state that we cannot reconcile claims to absolute or limited free speech outside of the 
nation-state boundary. Chapter Two showed how we are unable to argue for or against the 
suppression of free speech outside of the nation-state because we are restricted to discussing 
free speech in terms of a nation-state discourse with its appeals to the conditions for 
democracy (of which "truth" is one). It is therefore pertinent to ask how, beyond the nation-
state, we are to address the need for the right to freedom of speech to be absolute (as a 
democratic understanding of the concept demands) with the equally necessary requirement 
for speech to be limited or restricted in certain contexts. How are we to reconcile both 
appeals to freedom and limitation without an appeal to absolute truth and the conditions for 
democracy? 
The following two chapters will propose a solution for accommodating both necessities. The 
guiding theme of Chapters Three and Four is that perhaps the concept (not the notion) of 
"freedom of speech" should be considered aporetic in the way suggested by Derrida 
(200 I :32); that is, that the concept contains within itself both that which enables and that 
which limits claims to freedom of speech. In order to show how such an approach can be 
used, it will be instructive to analyse how Derrida critiques certain problematic concepts that 
are similarly aporetic. To that end, this chapter will consider his analyses of forgiveness , 
friendship, democracy and justice. In each case the object of the discussion will be to show 
how Derrida identifies and then reconciles the structural aporiae within each concept. On the 
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basis of the analysis offered in this chapter, I shall, in the fourth chapter explore if and to 
what extent it is useful to consider the concept of free speech aporetic in a similar way. 
Fritsch (2001: 185) argues that, in the wake of post-structuralist challenges to the concept of 
truth and enlightenment thought, we are faced with the problem of how to respond ethically 
and responsibly to the violence incurred in recent history. In addressing a responsibility for 
such violence, Derrida (in Fritsch, 2001: 185) argues that the responsible memory of violence 
cannot avoid a reflection upon an inescapable or "originary violence" for which we have to 
take responsibility. For Derrida, violence so considered has quasi-transcendental status. The 
idea of a "quasi-transcendental" concept of violence is inherent to the structural analysis of 
the concepts to be discussed in this chapter. For Derrida the idea of rectifying an "originary 
violence" or injustice is constitutive of the concepts of forgiveness, democracy, friendship 
and justice and it is to a discussion of these that I now turn. 
3.2 Forgiveness 
According to Bernstein (2006:394), Derrida' s investigation of the concept of forgiveness is 
premised on three key issues. The first issue pertains to the several Truth Commissions that 
have been organized throughout the world. Although these commissions are not in any sense 
legal or juridical, the purpose behind their creation was to create some sort of healing process 
for the purposes of reconciliation (Bernstein, 2006:394). Despite being sympathetic to the 
function of such commissions, Derrida questions whether it is appropriate to speak of 
forgiveness with regard to such healing activities. Derrida argues that forgiveness, rightly 
understood, has nothing to do with the normalizing processes of political healing or 
redemption (Bernstein, 2006:394). The second issue that concerns Derrida regards the 
ubiquitous use of the concept of forgiveness in public discourse. Since the end of the Second 
World War it has become common for a number of state and non-state actors, such as 
sovereigns, heads of government, and corporations, to acknowledge past misdeeds and ask 
for forgiveness publicly. Again, Derrida argues that forgiveness rightly understood has 
nothing to do with such public requests . As soon as forgiveness becomes embroiled in what 
he refers to as an "economy of forgiveness", where forgiveness is exchanged for truth or an 
apology, forgiveness disappears and becomes something else entirely (Bernstein, 2006:394-
5). To clarify what I mean by "forgiveness rightly understood" it will be necessary to look 
more closely at Derrida's genealogical and logical analysis of forgiveness. This traces its 
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roots to an Abrahamic discourse based on the three major world religions, Islam, Christianity 
and Judaism. 
With regards to the third issue, it will be necessary to look at Derrida' s response to an essay 
by Vladimir Jankelevitch (1967) entitled Should We Pardon Them ? Jankelevitch (cited in 
Derrida, 2001:32) argues that some acts or misdeeds are so atrocious that they are beyond 
forgiveness, they are unforgivable. Derrida (2001:32) responds by saying that it is only 
because such deeds are beyond forgiveness that pure and unconditional forgiveness can occur 
or that it becomes possible. It will be necessary to go into such an argument in more detail, 
for it is here where Derrida unravels the aporetic nature of the concept of forgiveness. Lastly, 
it will be necessary to question why Derrida defends a pure, unconditional notion of 
forgiveness. Such a question will be answered by looking at what Kaposy (2005 :204) calls 
the "Argument from Meaning" and the "Argument from Disappearance". 
3.2.1 A genealogical analysis of forgiveness: its use in public discourse 
According to Kaposy (2005:204), Derrida's analysis of the concept of forgiveness takes place 
on at least two levels. Through a genealogical analysis, Derrida (200 I :28) aims to locate our 
understanding of forg iveness by tracing the historical conditions and contexts in which the 
concept first emerged in public discourse. Derrida (2001:28) argues that the concept of 
forgiveness has at its roots the "Abrahamic" tradition. By the term "Abrahamic", he is 
referring to the three monotheistic global religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The 
emergence of the concept of forgiveness and the traditional way in which it has been 
understood in this "Abrahamic" tradition is what he refers to as the "heritage" (Bernstein, 
2006:395-6). According to Derrida (2001 :28), since the end of the Second World War the 
concept of forgiveness has become internationally ubiquitous on the world stage. It has 
become common for individuals, communities, professional corporations, sovereigns and 
heads of state to ask for forgiveness in public. The language of forgiveness has even been 
used by representatives of non-Abrahamic countries such as Japan and Korea (Bernstein, 
2006:395-6). The spread of forgiveness on the world stage is associated with what Derrida 
refers to as "globalatinisation", which is a globalised normalisation of the influence of Roman 
Christianity. As Derrida (2001 :32) argues, globalatinisation "overdeterrnines all language of 
law, of politics". This particular form of Abrahamic forgiveness has found a particular niche 
in the international discourse of human rights, particularly with regards to the phenomenon of 
"crimes against humanity" (Derrida, 2001 :30). So what is the purpose of Derrida's 
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genealogical analysis of forgiveness? Critchley and Kearney (cited in Bernstein, 2006:395-6) 
argue that, 
What Derrida is seeking to do in much of his recent work might be described as the 
historical analysis of concepts, a form of conceptual genealogy. He selects a concept 
from what he always describes as 'the heritage' - let's call it the dominant Western 
tradition and then proceeds, via an analysis that is at once historical, contextual, and 
thematic, to bring out the logic of that concept. 
While the "Abrahamic" religious tradition determines our understanding of forgiveness, our 
Western philosophical tradition allows us to understand forgiveness from a logical 
perspective. The distinction between a genealogical understanding of forgiveness and a 
logical understanding is important for Derrida (2001 :34-5). Through a Western philosophical 
tradition, he analyses how forgiveness operates on a purely logical level. Such a logical 
analysis investigates the logical structure of the concept of forgiveness independently of 
particular social-historical contexts. Hence, an analytical investigation allows us to 
understand the logic of the concept of forgiveness and how it works. Such a distinction is 
important because Derrida distinguishes between conditional forgiveness, as expressed in the 
Abrahamic tradition, and unconditional forgiveness, which is associated with the Western 
philosophical tradition (Kaposy, 2005 :202-3). It will be necessary to go into such a 
distinction in more detail. 
3,2.2 Unconditional forgiveness : dependent yet in-dissociable 
Conditional forgiveness is what we frequently mean by forgiveness according to Derrida 
(Bernstein, 2006:396). Having been used ubiquitously in the Abrahamic religious tradition, 
the key to conditional forgiveness is an "exchange in economy." Simply put, a sinner or a 
perpetrator who has committed a crime or injury acknowledges their crime or misdeed and 
asks for forgiveness from the victim or their representatives. There is an exchange or 
economy because forgiveness will only be granted in exchange for an acknowledgement of a 
misdeed and repentance on behalf of the perpetrator (Bernstein, 2006:396). Once forgiveness 
has been exchanged for repentance, a process of healing and reconciliation can occur. This 
particular form of conditional forgiveness has found its way into public discourse 
internationally, particularly with regards to the 'Truth and Reconciliation Tribunals" that 
have been prevalent in a number of countries. However, Derrida (Bernstein, 2006:397) insists 
that conditional forgiveness taken on its own is not forgiveness. In order for conditional 
forgiveness to have any meaning, it must necessarily be in-dissociable from and dependent 
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upon unconditional forgiveness. Unconditional forgiveness is different from conditional 
forgiveness in that it can take no part in an economy of exchange. A victim of a crime or 
misdeed should thus forgive a perpetrator for a crime without expecting an apology or 
repentance on behalf of the victim. For this is the definition of unconditional forgiveness 
according to Derrida (Bernstein, 2006:397). In order for conditional forgiveness to have any 
meaning, it must be dependent upon unconditional forgiveness. As Derrida (200 I :45) states, 
"[t]he unconditional and the conditional are, certainly, absolutely heterogeneous, and this 
forever, on either side of a limit, but they are also in-dissociable". 
The use of conditional forgiveness in public discourse is often part of what Derrida refers to 
as "strategic calculations", where some sort of reconciliation is the main objective (Bernstein, 
2006:396). While Derrida does not actually have a problem with the motives of heads of 
state, communities or individuals who attempt to achieve some sort of reconciliation and 
healing, he does have a problem with the use of the word forgiveness in such a process. For, 
as he (Derrida, 2001 :56-7) argues: 
Speaking of this equivocal use of the word forgiveness, we see that all these political 
scenes of forgiveness, of asking for forgiveness and repentance are often strategic 
calculations made in the view of healing away. I have nothing against that. I have 
something against the use of the word forgiveness to describe these cases. "Healing 
away" is a major term in South Africa. In France, each time a head of state, the prime 
minister, wants to grant amnesty and to erase crimes of the past, it is in the name of 
"national reconciliation 10 reconslitute Ihe healthy body of the nation, of national 
community ". I have nothing against that. But if the word forgiveness is used in view of 
such an economy or therapy then I would say no, thai is not to forgive. II is perhaps a 
very noble strategy. So forgiveness, if there is such a thing, should be devoid of any 
at/empllo heal or reconcile, or even to save or redeem. 
It will be necessary to analyse exactly why Derrida argues against the use of the word 
forgiveness in public discourses of reconciliation and healing. This will be looked at in detail 
with regards to what Kaposy (2005:205) calls the "Argument from Meaning." Derrida's 
principle concern is that as soon as forgiveness is used in public discourse, it becomes 
embroiled in and perhaps indistinguishable from other concepts such as clemency and 
amnesty. It is because forgiveness can become meaningless and indistinguishable from other 
concepts that Derrida insists on the need for conditional forgiveness to refer to the notion of 
unconditional forgiveness (Bernstein, 2006:397). Such an argument will be dealt with in 
more detail. For the moment it is necessary to look at Derrida's analysis of unconditional 
forgiveness from a logical perspective. 
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3.2.3 Possibility through impossibility: Den-ida, Arendt and Jankelevitch 
Rather than investigating the concept through a genealogical analysis, Derrida (cited In 
Kaposy, 2005:205) undertakes a more logical-analytical approach to investigating 
forgiveness. Conditional forgiveness takes it as a given that certain perpetrators, and the 
misdeeds they commit, can be forgiven as long as the perpetrator acknowledges their crime 
and asks for forgiveness. However, what do we do about acts or misdeeds that are beyond 
forgiveness? In asking this question, we are referring to deeds that are so horrendous, so 
extreme, and so evil that they are essentially unforgivable (Bernstein, 2006:394). 
3.2.4 The duty not to forgive: Janl(clcvitch 011 not forgiving 
Janekelevitch's (1967) essay entitled, "Should We Pardon Them?" provides the basis upon 
which Derrida explains his logical analysis of unconditional forgiveness (Bernstein, 
2006:394). Referring specifically to the terrible deeds committed by the Germans during the 
Holocaust, Jankelevitch (cited in Derrida, 2001 :55) argues that such acts are irreparable and 
inexpiable. Put simply, they are un-forgivable. For Jankelevitch, it is not a question of 
whether an economy of exchange can take place, as with conditional forgiveness for we owe 
it to the victims not to forgive the perpetrators of such heinous crimes against humanity. 
Forgiveness is impossible and should not be granted. As Jankelevitch (in Derrida, 2001:55) 
argues, "forgiveness 'died' in the death camps". Such a view is reiterated by Hannah Arendt 
when she argues in The Human Condition (1958:241) that, 
Men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish and they are unable to punish what 
has turned out to be unforgivable. This is the true hall mark of those offences which, 
since Kant, we call 'radical evil; and about whose nature so little is known, even to us 
who have been exposed to one of their rare outbursts on the public scene. All we know 
is that we can neither punish nor forgive such offences and they therefore transcend the 
realm of human affairs and the potentialities of human power, both of which they 
radically destroy wherever they make their appearance. 
Through this statement, Arendt (1958:241) is supporting Jankelevitch's view that certain 
deeds are unforgivable or beyond forgiveness. On the basis of the claim that certain acts are 
so atrocious that they are beyond forgiveness, Jankelevitch is arguing that forgiveness is 
impossible. Such a statement is crucially important for it lays the foundation for Derrida's 
response concerning the aporetic nature of forgiveness. 
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3.2.5 Forgiving the unforgivable: the aporia of forgiveness 
Derrida (Bernstein, 2006:395) agrees with lankelevitch that certain deeds are so atrocious 
that they are beyond forgiveness. Indeed, he agrees that in such cases forgiveness is 
impossible. However, in what Bernstein (2006:395) refers to as a deconstructive twist 
Derrida argues that it is only because such deeds are impossible to forgive that forgiveness 
becomes possible. For as Derrida (2001 :55) says: 
Jankelevitch says that forgiveness has come to an end, died in the death camps. I 
oppose this. It is exactly the opposite. It is because forgiveness seems to become 
impossible that forgiveness finds a starting point, a new starting point. 
In order to understand Derrida's claim, it is necessary to go into his logical analysis of the 
concept of forgiveness in more detail. As stated, Derrida (Kaposy, 2005:203) argues that in 
order for absolute or pure forgiveness to occur, it is necessary to forgive the unforgivable. 
Such an idea is aporetic in the sense that forgiveness is made possible through its 
impossibility. Forgiveness can only occur when it comes to forgiving an act that is 
unforgivable. This idea of unforgivable forgiveness is aporetic in that unconditional 
forgiveness is both impossible yet necessary in order for forgiveness to occur. Derrida 
(2001 :32-3) reiterates such a point by arguing: 
If there is something to forgive, it would be what in religious language is called mortal 
sin, the worst, the unforgivable crime or harm. From which comes the aporia which 
can be described in its dry and implacable formality, without mercy: forgiveness 
forgives only the unforgivable. 
As Kaposy (2005:204) argues, Derrida 's logical level of analysis of forgiveness is different to 
his genealogical analysis in that he focuses solely on how the language of forgiveness is used. 
A logical analysis of absolute or unconditional forgiveness is separated from particular 
historical and social contexts. Conditional forgiveness operates in a particular context where 
its logic is based on its means to achieve an objective. Thus, conditional forgiveness is used 
in an economy of exchange for the purposes of achieving some form of reconciliation or 
healing. Absolute or unconditional forgiveness cannot be manipUlated to operate in such 
contexts. It is this very problem that causes Derrida to concede that if forgiveness is to occur 
in reality it must engage in a series of compromises or conditions (Kaposy, 2005:207). In 
other words, if forgiveness is to occur in reality it must become conditional forgiveness. It 
must engage in an exchange of economy. However, this begs the question that if Derrida 
concedes that forgiveness can only occur when it operates under a series of conditions, why is 
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it necessary to preserve a notion of unforgivable forgiveness in the first place? Such a 
question raises two pertinent issues. If forgiveness can only ever occur when it is conditional, 
how can Derrida maintain that the only real or pure forgiveness is unconditional? Secondly, 
why does Derrida see the need to preserve the concept of unconditional forgiveness in the 
first place? The answer to the first question is based on the logical structure of forgiveness 
just discussed (Kaposy, 2005:206-7). Derrida argues that it is logical to assume that 
forgiveness can only forgive what is unforgivable (Kaposy 2005:203). The answer to the 
second question brings us back to the problem highlighted by Derrida at the beginning of this 
discussion. While Derrida does not have an issue with the use of forgiveness as a tool used in 
public discourse for achieving reconciliation and healing, he is concerned that the concept of 
forgiveness can become indistinguishable from other concepts such as clemency and amnesty 
(Kaposy, 2005:205). Derrida argues that in order to prevent this from happening it is 
necessary to preserve what he refers to as a 'quasi-transcendental' notion of unconditional 
forgiveness. It will be necessary to look at this argument in more detail. 
3.2.6 The "Argument from Meaning" and the "Argument from 
Disappearance" 
Bernstein (2006:394) highlights three key issues that have provoked Derrida's questioning of 
forgiveness . The argument forwarded by lankelevitch (1967) and Arendt (\958) that 
forgiveness is sometimes impossible provided the basis for Derrida's logical critique of 
forgiveness. Derrida's response to lankelevitch forms the basis of what Kaposy calls the 
"Argument from Disappearance." Derrida (2001:32) says, " [i]f one is only prepared to 
forgive what appears forgivable, or what the church calls 'venial sin', then the very idea of 
forgiveness would disappear". As mentioned, Derrida (Bernstein, 2006:395) asserts that 
absolute forgiveness is made possible when it comes to forgiving acts that are so atrocious 
they are unforgivable. He (200\ :32-3) maintains that, "[i]f there is something to forgive, it 
would be what in religious language is called 'Mortal Sin', the worst, the unforgivable crime 
or harm". Derrida is stressing the point that if one is only prepared to forgive what is 
forgivable the notion of forgiveness would disappear. Derrida agrees with lankelevitch that 
certain deeds or acts are so atrocious that they are impossible to forgive. However, he argues 
that forgiving the unforgivable is necessary to prevent the notion of forgiveness from 
disappearing altogether. Without the notion of unconditional forgiveness , the meaning of 
fo rgiveness would disappear when it engages in an economy of exchange (Bernstein, 
2006:395). 
71 
What Kaposy (2005 :211) calls the "Argument from Meaning" is a critical response to the role 
played by conditional forgiveness in public discourse. Despite claiming that forgiveness must 
necessarily involve forgiving the unforgivable, Derrida is forced to concede that because of 
the impossible or aporetic nature of forgiveness, in order for forgiveness to occur or manifest 
itself in reality, it must engage in a series of conditions. Although Derrida expresses his 
scepticism about the theatricality and hollowness of the use of forgiveness in public 
discourse, nevertheless he acknowledges the import role forgiveness plays in the process of 
reconciliation and healing (Bernstein, 2006:394-5). Derrida's principal concern is that when 
forgiveness engages in an exchange of economy, there is a danger of forgiveness losing its 
meaning and becoming something else entirely. Any act of forgiveness granted for some 
reason other than forgiveness itself is in danger of losing its meaning. In essence, forgiveness 
would disappear. For conditional forgiveness to have any meaning, it is necessary that it refer 
back to a notion of pure, unconditional forgiveness (Kaposy, 2005:211). 
Despite arguing that forgiveness can only occur when it engages in a series of conditions or 
an economy of exchange, Derrida still defends the necessity of preserving an absolute or pure 
notion of unconditional forgiveness. However, pure or unconditional forgiveness IS 
impossible and cannot actually occur in reality (Kaposy, 2005 :208). The complexity of 
unconditional forgiveness demands that it derives its meaning from having no meaning at all. 
Pure or unconditional forgiveness cannot be involved in an economy of exchange for if it 
does, it becomes conditional forgiveness . As Kaposy (2005 :212) understands it, "meaning 
cannot be given to an instance of pure forgiveness by providing a reason for granting it. It 
must exist outside of reason and outside of any particular context". In other words, 
unconditional forgiveness derives its meaning from having no meaning at all. Unconditional 
forgiveness operates as what Levinas (1969:23) refers to as "a signification without a 
context". All the conditions placed on forgiveness can potentially threaten the purity of the 
concept itself. In order to preserve its purity, it must necessarily avoid all such conditions. By 
standing outside of any particular context, pure forgiveness is a condition of possibility of 
conditional forgiveness. In order for conditional forgiveness to have any meaning and to 
prevent its disappearance or assimilation with other concepts, it must necessarily refer back to 
the notion of pure or unconditional forgiveness (Kaposy, 2005:212). Derrida (2001 :45) puts 
this point succinctly when he argues: 
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Despite all the confusions which reduce forgiveness to amnesty ... or some political 
therapy of reconciliation ... it must never be forgotten nevertheless, that all that refers 
to a certain idea of pure and unconditional forgiveness, without which this discourse 
would not have the least meaning. 
As Kaposy (2005:213) points out, pure or unconditional forgiveness can be regarded as a 
"quasi-transcendental". It is a quasi-transcendental , and not a real or traditional 
transcendental condition, because of its impossibility. It is impossible for pure or 
unconditional forgiveness to occur since one cannot forgive the unforgivable. Unconditional 
forgiveness must not be tainted by any other concept such as amnesty or clemency. It must 
stand alone and cannot operate in any context. For Derrida, the aporetic or impossible notion 
of unconditional forgiveness is necessary to provide meaning to any conditional forgiveness 
that occurs in certain historical contexts. Were unconditional forgiveness not to exist, 
conditional forgiveness would lose its meaning when it engages in an exchange of economy. 
Forgiveness would become indistinguishable from other concepts such as amnesty and 
clemency if it could not refer back to the quasi-transcendental concept of absolute or 
unconditional forgiveness (Kaposy, 2005:213). In this very specific sense, the absolute 
(unconditional forgiveness) is a quasi-transcendental possibility for the historical (conditional 
forgiveness). 
3.2 .7 Conclusion 
Derrida' s analysis of forgiveness is primarily motivated by his concern with the use of the 
concept in public discourse. Forgiveness has become ubiquitous in politics, particularly with 
regards to the "Truth and Reconciliation Tribunals" and its use on behalf of political leaders 
as a means to achieving some sort of healing or reconciliation. Perhaps Derrida's main 
objective has been to clarify how the language of forgiveness is used, particularly in 
conjunction with other concepts such as clemency and reconciliation. In fact, he asks us to 
"agree on some 'proper' meaning of this word" (Kaposy, 2005:210). His concern for the 
preservation of a pure or absolute notion of unconditional forgiveness has been the primary 
motivating factor behind his desire to ensure that the concept has meaning when it becomes 
involved in an exchange of economy. By highlighting the aporetic nature of the concept, 
Derrida has shown that unconditional forgiveness cannot manifest itself in reality. However, 
as a "quasi-transcendental" concept, it nevertheless adds meaning to any conditional 
forgiveness that might occur. For the purposes of this thesis, it has been necessary to show 
the important role that unconditional forgiveness plays in this process for, to pre-empt the 
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analysis of Chapter Four, I shall argue that the concept of "freedom of speech" rightly 
understood reveals a similar quasi-transcendental structure. 
3.3 Democracy 
Deuida's de constructive analysis of "democracy" is closely associated with his analysis of 
the concept of "hospitality." It will be argued that Deuida's investigation into the aporetic 
nature of the concept of hospitality can be better understood within the broader framework of 
his analysis of democracy. At a conceptual level, an analysis of the aporia of hospitality is not 
limited to an understanding based on the relationship between a host and a stranger. It is true 
that Deuida explains the problem of hospitality within the context of the relationship between 
the host and the outsider; however such an analysis has a broader meaning at the level of the 
democratic nation-state. At the level of the nation-state, the relationship between the host and 
the guest is synonymous with the relationship between the citizen and the non-citizen (or 
outsider). The aporia that marks this relationship is prevalent in both democracy and 
hospitality. The idea of welcoming the other without restrictions or boundaries is a necessary 
part of both democracy and hospitality, at the same time both concepts demanding that there 
are necessary limitations with regards to welcoming the outsider. Because of the similarity of 
these concepts, it will be necessary to show how Deuida's analytical discussion of the aporia 
of democracy provides a foundation upon which the aporia of hospitality can be discussed. 
Thomson (2005:12) argues that the most extended analysis of Deuida's "democracy to 
come" can be found in his book, The Politics of Friendship (1997). As Thomson (2005: 12) 
further argues, the book itself is based around the relationship between friendship and 
democracy. Derrida's analysis of such a relationship is based on Aristotle's reading of 
friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics (1941: 1 058). Here Aristotle characterises democracy as 
a political association modelled on the friendship between brothers. Deuida' s reading of 
Aristotle is an attempt to use friendship as a base for a deconstructive critique of democracy 
(Thomson, 2005: 12). In particular, Derrida aims to highlight the "self-delimitation" of 
democracy. Democracy is aporetic in that it acknowledges its own limits, but democracy also 
removes limits as well (Thomson, 2005: 12). Such a deconstructive twist is also prevalent in 
the concept of hospitality. In order to be truly hospitable, the host is obliged to open their 
home to the stranger without placing any limitations or boundaries on the guest. However, the 
act of being a host demands some kind of limit or boundary with regards to how far the guest 
can cross the threshold. Before Derrida's argument can be elucidated upon, it will be 
necessary to provide a reading of Aristotle that is independent of Derrida's interpretation. 
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Once such a reading has been provided, we will be in a position to investigate how Derrida 
uses Aristotle's idea of friendship as a basis to highlight the aporetic concept of democracy. 
After that, I will show how the aporetic concept of democracy provides the foundation for the 
analysis of the concept of hospitality. This will be followed by an analysis of yet another 
closely related concept, namely "justice", for, as Thomson (2005:12) points out, it is 
friendship that forms the junction for Aristotle between the question of justice and that of the 
proper constitution of the city, between ethics and politics. 
3.3 .1 True friendship: reciproci ty and equa lity 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle analyses what friendship consists of (1941: I 059). For 
Aristotle (1941: I 059), friendship is an active form of love towards another person. In order 
for a friendship to exist, love has to be reciprocated between two people. It is possible for a 
person to ascribe or wish goodwill on another person; if such goodwill is not reciprocated 
however, such an act of love cannot be considered as a basis for a friendship. But Aristotle 
goes further to question what reciprocal goodwill or love is based upon. According to him 
(1941:1060), there are three mutual or recognised types of friendship. The first kind of 
friendship deals with utility and pleasure. A friendship between two people that is based on 
utility or usefulness is not a friendship based on admiration for the people themselves. Rather, 
such an act of love is based on the utility or benefits loving that person provides. The same 
goes for pleasure for, according to Aristotle, men do not love ready-witted people for their 
character but because such ready-witted people provide some kind of pleasure (1941: I 060). 
Thus, people who love for the sake of utility only love for the sake of what is good for 
themselves. Likewise, those who love for the sake of pleasure love for the sake of what is 
pleasant for themselves. Aristotle (1941: 1 060) refers to such friendships as incidental because 
they are only founded on the benefits they provide. Such friendships are fragile because as 
soon as one of the persons ceases to be useful or pleasurable, the friendship is ended. 
The second form of friendship that Aristotle refers to is perfect friendship . Put simply, perfect 
friendship is the friendship of men who are alike in goodness and virtue. Such men wish well 
to each other, not because of some utility or pleasure, but out of genuine concern for each 
other's well-being. Such friendships are strong and not easily broken because they are built 
on the intrinsic goodness of character and goodness is an enduring trait (1941:1061). As 
opposed to friendship that is based solely upon utility or pleasure, two persons in a perfect 
friendship derive pleasure from the intrinsic goodness inherent to their own nature. It is 
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through wishing the best for each other that utility or pleasure is gained (1941:1 064). Such a 
friendship is considered to be perfect not only because of its duration (which is long-lasting 
because it is based on goodness) but also because each person in the friendship receives 
equally from each other in terms of utility or pleasure. Those who are friends purely for the 
sake of utility or profit end such a friendship when such benefits or utility ceases. Good men 
can only be real friends , according to Aristotle, because they delight in each other's company 
and because they give equally to each other (1941: I 064). 
However, Aristotle also argues that there is another type of friendship, which involves 
inequality between the parties. An example of such an unequal friendship would be that of a 
father and son, a man and wife or a ruler and subject (1941: 1065). These unequal friendships 
differ greatly, for the friendship between a man and wife is different from that between a 
ruler and subject. The virtue and function of each of these friendships is different for Aristotle 
along with the reasons for which they love. Unlike friendship that is based on equality, 
parties in an unequal friendship crumot expect the same from each other, nor should they aim 
to seek it. Thus, love is proportional to the merit or position that each person holds in relation 
to each other (1941:1066). For example, in an unequal relationship a king will receive more 
love than he shall give to his subject for such inequality is proportional to the difference in 
status or power. However, as Aristotle argues, when love is in proportion to the merit of the 
parties, equality in a sense emerges out of such a relationship. However, while an unequal 
friendship can be retained despite such inequalities, when one party is removed or distant to a 
great extent, friendship ceases altogether (1941: 1066). Aristotle uses the example of a God to 
illustrate such a point. The stature of a God would mean that he would surpass us in all 
things. A friendship with such a being would be impossible. The idea of a distanced or 
removed God creates a dilemma with regards to the idea of an equal friendship according to 
Aristotle. If, in an equal friendship , one wishes the greatest good for a friend, this would 
amount to wanting a friend to become a God. However, were someone to become a God, the 
friendship would cease to exist. Derrida addresses this dilemma in more detail when he 
argues that a friendship based on equality is impossible. Such an argument will be dealt with 
in more detail at a later stage. 
3.3.2 Democl'acy and equal fi'iendship 
Aristotle (1941: I 069) argues that there are three kinds of political constitution and an equal 
number of deviations that form from them. Such distinctions are important for Aristotle 
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because he equates different types of friendship as being representative of these different 
constitutions. Highlighting these differing constitutions is crucial for the purposes of this 
discussion because Derrida builds upon Aristotle's analysis to uncover the aporetic nature of 
democracy. The three constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy and, thirdly, that which is 
based on property qualification which is referred to as "timocratic" or "polity" (1941: 1 069). 
Monarchy is defined as being the rule of one-man or a monarch in the form of a king. 
Tyranny is a deviation from a monarchy for, although both constitutions involve one-man 
rule, the tyrant looks to better his own advantage whereas the monarch looks to the welfare of 
his subjects. As Aristotle (1941:1070) argues : 
a man is not a king unless he is sufficient to himself and excels his subjects in all good 
things; and such a man needs nothing further; therefore he will not look to his own 
interests but to those of his subjects; for a king who is not like that would be a mere 
titular king. 
Aristocracy passes into an oligarchy through the corruption of the rulers. Such rulers do not 
distribute wealth equally, as is required for the inhabitants of a city, but distribute it among 
themselves. The final constitution is that of timocracy. Aristotle argues that timocracy and 
democracy are coterminous since it is the ideal of a timocracy to be the rule of the majority, 
and all those who have property qualification count as equal (1941:1070). For Aristotle, one 
may find resemblances to the constitutions or patterns of them in the household. A monarchy 
bears a resemblance to the association between a father and his sons, for the father is in a 
position of higher authority and has a duty to care for his sons. Tyranny on the other hand 
would be the rule of a master over his slaves and the master appropriates any benefits for 
himself. The association of a man and wife is symbolic of an aristocracy, for the man rules 
over his wife in accordance with his wealth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, 
but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her (1941 : 1070). If a man rules in relation 
to everything with regards to his wife, such a friendship passes over into oligarchy. This is 
because he is not ruling in accordance with their respective worth, and not ruling in 
proportion to his superiority. The association of brothers is associated with the model of 
timocracy. Brothers are equal except in so far as they differ in age (1941:1070). Unlike a 
monarchy or an aristocracy, democracy is found chiefly in master-less dwellings according to 
Aristotle. Thus, democracy is modelled on a friendship based on equality. A man and a wife 
are not equal according to Aristotle because the man is necessarily superior to the wife and 
thus holds more power as befits his elevated position. The friendship of brothers on the other 
hand is equal. No brother has more power or occupies a higher position than the other. Such 
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an equal friendship is associated with a timocratic government, for a democracy demands that 
all citizens be treated equally and fairly. Rule is taken in turns and on equal terms between 
citizens of a democracy. Thus, an equal friendship between brothers is most synonymous 
with a democracy according to Aristotle (1941:1071). 
3.3.3 The aporia of friendship and democracy 
It has been necessary to outline Aristotle's interpretation of friendship and its relation to the 
various constitutional forms of monarchy, aristocracy and timocracy because Aristotle ' s 
association of democracy with an equal friendship between brothers is built upon by Derrida 
to reveal an aporetic structure inherent within the concept of democracy (Thomson, 2005: 12). 
Thomson (2005:13) argues that The Politics of Friendship is an analysis of the concept of 
friendship in the history of Western philosophy. Through tracing the lineage of the concept 
and its canonical formulation by a range of philosophers, most notably Aristotle and 
Nietzsche, Derrida aims to reveal the aporetic nature of friendship. It is by doing this that 
Derrida aims to show how an analysis of the aporetic structure of friendship can be used to 
highlight a similar structure inherent within the concept of democracy. In the Force of Law 
(1992:20), Derrida states that deconstruction is practised in two ways; firstly, deconstruction 
is an investigation into the a-historical allure of logical-formal paradoxes, and, secondly, it is 
an historical account based on tracing the genealogy or historical lineage of the concept 
through interpretations or texts. Derrida's analysis of the aporetic structure of friendship and 
democracy is deconstructive in the second way in that he aims to analyse the concepts 
through Aristotle's historical interpretation. Thus, Derrida aims to show how the 
deconstruction of friendship implies a deconstruction of democracy. It will now be necessary 
to go into Derrida's interpretation of friendship in more detail. 
3.3.4 Aimance: the quasi-transcendental condition for friendship 
As mentioned, Derrida' s analysis of the aporetic structure of democracy is dependent on 
Aristotle ' s interpretation of friendship in the Nichomachean Ethics . As Thomson (2005: 13) 
argues, Aristotle's definition of friendship is characterised by the "two values of reciprocity 
and equality between men who value each other". It is these very values underpinning 
friendship that will provide a foundation for the birth of the state and justice according to 
Aristotle. For Aristotle, the most perfect form of friendship is built on virtue and equality. 
However, Derrida (J 997: 13) questions the perfection of an equal or virtuous relationship. An 
equal friendship would be based on the ideal of wanting the best or the greatest good for the 
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other person. However as Aristotle acknowledges, wanting the best for a friend would 
amount to wanting them to become a God which would then nullify the friendship altogether. 
Aristotle counters such a problem by arguing that in an equal friendship, a friend wishes the 
best for their friend as long as they both remain men. Wishing the best for one 's friend is 
limited in this context because one cannot wish for a friend to become a God. Since an equal 
friendship is based on equal reciprocity, a friendship would involve actively loving someone 
and having him or her reciprocating such love in return. However, as Aristotle (1941:1064) 
argues: 
One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect 
type with them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a 
sort of excess offeeling, and it is the nature of such only to befelt towards one person); 
and it is not easy for many people at the same time to please the same person very 
greatly, or perhaps even to be good in his eyes. 
Aristotle reiterates such a point in the Eudemian Ethics when he argues that "it is not possible 
for affection to be active in relation to many at once since it takes time to test a friendship, 
and friendship is an experience reserved for humans (not immortals)" (cited in Thompson, 
2005: 15). Derrida agrees with Aristotle that a friendship is an active experience. An active 
experience of friendship must necessarily be exclusive. For as Derrida (1997:37) says, "one 
must choose and prefer: election and selection between friends and things, but also between 
possible friends". However, while an active friendship must necessarily be exclusive or 
limited, there is no limit to the amount of people one could potentially be friends with. 
Derrida tries to bridge this gap between active and passive friendship by arguing in favour of 
an experience of friendship that avoids such a di stinction between active and passive 
friendship (Thomson, 2005: 15). While it is not possible to actively love everybody, no one is 
excluded from the potential of being loved. While an individual could potentially be friends 
with anyone, it would be impossible to be friends with everybody at the same time. 
Friendship is exclusive since there is a limited amount of people one can love (Thomson, 
2005: 15). Through what Derrida refers to as "aimance", he tries to conceive of an experience 
of friendship which manages to avoid such a distinction between "active" and "passive" 
friendship. As Thomson (2005:15) argues, Derrida ' s idea of "aimance" would operate as a 
quasi-transcendental condition of friendship since it is neither active nor passive. Aimance 
exists prior to any activation or instantiation of friendship. Aimance would not be a present 
moment in friendship but rather the necessary condition for any friendship. It is necessary for 
aimance to bridge the gap between active and passive friendship because it is a 
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conceptualization of friendship outside of the apona one encounters when it comes to 
actively loving people. 
Friendship, then, is aporetic because, in order to be active, it necessarily requires one to 
choose or be selective about individuals with whom one can be friends. At the same time 
Derrida argues that one can potentially be friends with anybody as long as there could be a 
reciprocal friendship between two people. The availability of many possible friends is 
necessary for friendship to occur, although one betrays this multiplicity of possible friends by 
being selective (Thomson, 2005: 15-16). This necessary betrayal and exclusion is what 
Derrida (cited in Thomson, 2005: 16) refers to as "the logic of fraternisation". As a quasi-
transcendental condition, aimance allows us to conceive of the concept of friendship. Like all 
quasi-transcendental concepts such as hospitality, forgiveness and justice, aimance can never 
actually occur because it demands a suspension of the necessary limitations or exclusivity 
placed on selecting friends and excluding others. The compulsion to choose certain friends 
over others is an act of fraternisation, according to Derrida, because of its exclusivity. 
Thomson (2005: 16) argues that in order to gain an understanding of the significance of 
fraternisation, it is necessary to look at Derrida's thoughts on responsibility. 
3.3.5 Responsibili ty and friendship 
It is important to analyse Derrida's association of friendship with responsibility if we are to 
understand how he attempts to apply the aporia of friendship to an understanding of 
democracy. According to Derrida, irresponsibility would be the absence of an unfolding 
programme or a set pattern, in which case the individual cannot be held responsible because 
he has no control over the course of events (Derrida, 1995:68). Following a set pattern would 
involve following sets of rules and the individual can thus not be said to act responsibly in 
any meaningful sense of the word at all. However, if individuals choose their course of 
action, they are forced to betray others for, as Derrida (1995:68) argues, "I cannot respond to 
the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other 
other, the others others". With regards to friendship, the individual is forced into an absolute 
responsibility to choose an active relationship to a limited group of friends, and must 
necessarily break their responsibi lity to those who are excluded. The paradoxical nature of 
responsibility is that responsibility only exists in the absence of responsibility (Den'ida, 
1995 :68). While one is not forced to choose certain fi'iends , one has an obligation or a 
responsibility to love them all "actively", for that is what the concept of friendship demands. 
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In reality, however, this is not possible as one is forced to be selective. In such an event or 
obligation, responsibility ceases to exist (Derrida, 1995:68). 
Having laid out the foundations of Aristotle's analysis of friendship , it is now necessary to 
look at how Derrida demonstrates how the aporetic structure of friendship can be applied to 
an analysis of a similar aporetic structure of democracy. Derrida's attempt to link friendship 
with democracy is built on Aristotle's analysis, for Aristotle is particularly interested in 
showing the association between friendship, brotherhood and democracy. Like Aristotle, 
Derrida takes democracy to be the exemplary form of brotherhood, since it is modelled on the 
equality of the relationship between brothers. Derrida argues, "[ dJemocracy ... is rarely 
determined in the absence of confraternity or brotherhood" (1997: 13). 
3.3.5 The exclusivity offraternisation 
The paradox or double movement in the structure of friendship can also be applied to the 
model of democracy. If we recall, the act of choosing friends takes place in the context of 
absolute possibility. Thus, since a friendship is not only based on being loved by someone but 
also loving that person in return, an act of friendship must necessarily be active and not 
passive. However, this implies that friendship must necessarily be exclusive or limited. One 
cannot love everybody, therefore the number of friends one can have is necessarily limited 
despite the fact that anybody could potentially be one's friend. This aporetic structure can 
also be applied to the concept of democracy, according to Derrida (cited in Thomson, 
2005: 19). The primary attraction of democracy is its universal appeal or non-exclusivity. 
Democracy demands that everybody be treated equally and that everyone has the universal 
right to govern through equal participation in the making and application of decisions. 
However, while the preservation of equality inherent to the ideal of democracy demands that 
nobody be excluded, coexisting with such a universal appeal are limitations or conditions that 
necessarily restrict or exclude non-citizens from participating in a democracy. As Thomson 
(2005: 19) argues, such a scenario invokes the logic of fraternisation, which is found in the 
concept of friendship. Democracy and friendship are limited to citizens of the state, to one set 
of boundaries or one people grounded in a spiritual or ideal identification. Like friendship, 
while the principle of democracy does not exclude or restrict people from equal participation, 
the amount of people who can actively participate in a democracy is limited to those 
members of the nation-state. Derrida identifies three sets of problems introduced into the 
concept of democracy by the structural homology with friendship. Such problems are 
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identified in Plato's Menexenus, for it is there that democracy is described as aristocratic. As 
Derrida (1997: 117) explains, "a form of government which receives various names, 
according to the fancies of men, and is sometimes called democracy, but is really an 
aristocracy or government of the best which has the approval of many". The debate 
concerning whether a democracy can be called an aristocracy is poignant for Derrida because, 
like friendship, the question of democracy revolves around a question of number. For as he 
(1995 : 124) argues, "If the word democracy allies itself or competes with that of aristocracy, it 
is because of number, of the reference to the required approbation of the greatest number". 
Although Derrida does not build on this claim, Thomson (2005: 19) argues that when 
democracy is juxtaposed against aristocracy or oligarchy, an uncertain borderline will emerge 
between the few and the many. While Aristotle distinguished aristocracy from democracy by 
defining aristocracy as "rule of the few" and democracy as the "rule by many", Derrida's 
point is that rather than attempting to distinguish between true democracy and an aristocracy, 
it is pertinent to recognise that such a question of numbers will occur in democracy itself. 
How much is the "many" raises similar questions with regards to "how many friends can a 
person potentially have?" The question of numbers will inevitably raise questions concerning 
the bureaucratization of the political sphere, according to Thomson (2005: 19), with regards to 
the correct and most inclusive democratic decision-making procedures. 
The second problem to which Derrida wishes to draw our attention pertains to the 
"fraternisation" or limitation of democracy to those citizens of a particular state, to the 
exclusion of others. Drawing on the assertion made in the Menexenus , Derrida (1997:95) 
highlights a part of the text to support his argument that, despite the fact that equality 
between brothers is inherent to the idea of democracy, such equality cannot be reconciled 
with the necessary exclusivity or limitation on the amount of friends one can have. 
Democracy is similarly aporetic or paradoxical because it is self-limiting or exclusive. 
Democracy is limited to a particular group of citizens who are citizens of a particular state. 
But what is the basis for such exclusivity within a democracy? According to Derrida, 
democratic equality is left to a principle of birth. For he (1997 : 121) argues, "equality at birth 
founds in necessity legal equality". The foundation of equality between men is thus 
entrenched at birth through a process of natural law and, hence, the common equality 
between men is founded on the citizenship of a nation. Such a process reflects the effect of 
fraternisation in a similar way to that of friendship. Because democratic equality is 
determined by a principle of birth, there is the same suspension of decision that resulted in 
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the necessary betrayal and exclusivity with regards to choosing friends. Such a view is 
reiterated by Derrida (1995:121) when he says: 
Everything seems to be decided where the decision does not take place, precisely in 
that place where the decision does not take place qua decision, where it will have been 
carried away in what has always already taken place at birth. 
The fate of democratic equality as entrenched through birth is what Derrida refers to as "the 
law of the polis" that is determined in advance by natural law. As the concept of friendship 
fails to reconcile the notion of brotherhood with the necessary exclusion of others, so 
democracy fails to reconcile the principle of equality and the process of naturalization at birth 
that fosters a necessary exclusivity. 
The third foundational limit with regards to the concept of democracy pertains to a question 
of gender and extends to a critique of Aristotle 's political models based on forms of 
friendship. The traditional texts on friendship and democracy are primarily based on the 
association of friendship with brotherhood. For Aristotle, the highest model of friendship is 
that between men. The implication behind such a claim is that true equality as reflected in a 
democracy exists where there is equality between men. In describing a relationship between 
husband and wife, Aristotle argues that such a relationship cannot be grounded on equality 
and is based on the relationship between a superior and an inferior (1941: 1 066). This is the 
reason why Aristotle associates such an unequal relationship with an aristocracy. Derrida' s 
concern lies with the fact that Aristotle makes no mention of a conceivable relationship 
between a man and a woman outside of a husband and wife relationship, or for that matter, 
between two women. As Derrida (1997:311) argues, " [t]his double exclusion of the feminine 
in this philosophical paradigm would then confer on friendship the essential and essentially 
sublime figure of virile homosexuality". As Thomson (2005:21) argues, the exclusion of 
women from this paradigm of friendship and democracy is problematic in that it raises the 
obvious question of whether the concept of democracy has been organized around a model 
that either excludes women completely, or neutralises their sexual difference. From this 
perspective, the woman is forced to become a sister to a brother. 
Derrida' s last two criticisms pertaining to the contradiction between fraternisation and 
naturalization and the exclusion of women from political-democratic discourse raises an 
interesting question about the notion of democratic equality. If democratic equality with 
regards to access to resources, welfare and security is necessarily or naturally limited to 
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citizens of a particular state united by birth, the resultant exclusion of non-citizens will not 
only amount to inequality but an act of injustice as well. This begs the question according to 
Derrida, that if justice is premised on or represents or invokes a principle of equality, and if 
equality is limited to the citizens of a state who are citizens by birth, can such democratic 
equality be regarded as just if it is exclusive? Surely the exclusion of non-citizens or 
neighbours would equate to an act of injustice (1997: 197). With regards to these two 
criticisms, Derrida has attempted to show how the notion of democracy based on equality is 
aporetic. Like friendship, democracy is forced to be exclusive in order to operate within the 
boundaries and confines of a nation-state. A democracy has universal appeal but it is forced 
to be limited with regards to those who live in a democracy. 
3.3.6 Aimancc and democracy-to-come 
It is now necessary to look at the contradiction between what Derrida calls "respect for 
irreducible singularity or alterity" and "the citizen as countable singularity" . Derrida's 
account of democracy is based on the notion of democracy he develops in the Gift of Death 
(Thomson, 2005:23). Responsibility, according to Derrida, has the same aporetic structure 
that is prevalent in the concepts of friendship and democracy. As Thomson (2005:24) states, 
"[r]esponsibility only begins in this situation of infinitization, as we have seen, where my 
duty is owed unconditionally to each and every other, and not to some rather than others -
whether this restriction is based on family, nation or state allegiances - or to my friends". It is 
in this space of infinite responsibility where Derrida situates his quasi-transcendental notion 
of "democracy to come" (Fritsch, 2002:205). As mentioned, the appeal of democracy is its 
commitment to equality and the rule of the many over the few. Such responsibility is infinite 
because it demands a commitment to treat everybody as equals under the notion of 
brotherhood. If we recall, the idea of infinite responsibility is present in Derrida's analysis of 
friendship. Infinite responsibility exists in the idea that anyone could potentially be one's 
friend. One has a collective responsibility to treat everybody who could potentially be one's 
friend equally. 
Thus, in the sense that the ideal of democracy aims to embrace everyone as equals, there is an 
infinite responsibi lity to do so. However, as Thomson (2005:25) states, "there is no 
democratic state or democratic theory which will not limit this appeal by grounding it in an 
association of citizens organized around a natural ising principle which locks up and 
neutralises the possibility of political responsibility". Hence, as soon as democracy is forced 
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to be exclusive, responsibility is no longer infinite but is only confined to those citizens of a 
democratic state. The aimance of democracy exists in the idea of infinite responsibility that 
comes with treating everybody as equals. This aimance is what Derrida calls "democracy to 
come." It is a quasi-transcendental concept that defines what democracy ought to be, the 
principle of democracy strives to treat everybody as equals. However, the mere impossibility 
of treating everybody as equals means that such an ideal is immediately effaced. Like 
unconditional forgiveness, it never arrives but is always "to come". Yet it provides the 
principle upon which any state that claims to be democratic may be judged. For the concept 
of friendship , Derrida distinguishes aimance from fraternisation, with regards to democracy. 
"Democracy to come" is distinguished from the necessary limitations or exclusivity as 
enjoyed by citizens of a state decided at birth. 
3.3.7 Conclusion 
As Derrida (1997: 1 04) points out, any criticism directed at democracy, such as its traditional 
exclusion of the "sister" from its fraternal and its exclusion of the outsider in favour of the 
natural born member of the state, does so in the name of democracy or democracy to come. 
In this regard Fritsch (2002:579) points out: 
For democracy, by granting the right to free speech, free assembly, and a free press. is 
the form of political organisation that calls for its own critique and that admits the 
fondamental revisability, and openness to challenge, of its own self-understanding. 
With this admission, democracy opens up a space between its actual condition and its 
future space-which mayor may not be a regulative idea- and situates itself between the 
present present and the future present, between presence and the future to come. 
Fritsch (2002 :579) is alluding to Derrida's idea that "democracy to come" is an ideal or 
meaning that never occurs, and perhaps never should occur; nevertheless it exists to shape 
any meaningful deconstruction of democracy that exists. "Democracy to come" exists as a 
quasi-transcendental condition, which allows us to critique democracy in its empirical form. 
Having analysed Den'ida 's critique of democracy through Aristotle 's interpretation of 
friendship, it is now necessary to turn to the aporetic concept of "hospitality". A 
deconstructive critique of hospitality is associated with the concept of democracy because it 
has strong connotations with the aporetic structure of democracy, that of reconciling the 
welcoming of the stranger with the implementation of necessary boundaries or restrictions. 
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3.4 Hospitality 
The concept of "hospitality" resonates strongly with the concepts of democracy and justice. 
An analysis of the concept of democracy has shown that Aristotle's interest in the association 
between friendship, democracy and justice is implicit in The Nicomachean Ethics. As 
Thomson (2005: 12) argues, " It is friendship which forms the junction for Aristotle between 
the question of justice and that of the proper constitution of the city, between ethics and 
politics". In seeking to provide another reading of friendship and democracy, Derrida 
attempts to escape the aporetic problem of the rhetoric of brotherhood and the "logic of 
fraternisation". Such an aporetic structure that is prevalent in both friendship and democracy 
also extends to the concept of hospitality. Hospitality is similarly aporetic in that it is 
necessarily limiting and de-limiting at the same time. As Kearney (2002:8) argues, "notions 
of self-identity in western thought have been constructed in relation to some notion of alterity 
or other". 
Western philosophical thinkers such as Levinas and Derrida have pointed out that the western 
meta-physical heritage has generally discriminated against the other in favour of the same 
(Kearney, 2002:8). Such discrimination or hatred of the outsider has been referred to as the 
"ontology of sameness" by Levinas and "logocentrism" by Derrida. The pathological 
discrimination of the "other" or "outsider" is an act of injustice according to both thinkers. 
Justice requires a redressing of the balance so as to arrive at a more ethical appreciation of 
transcendence and alterity (Kearney, 2002:8). Discriminating against the outsider is seen to 
be an act of injustice because it is associated with "alien" scapegoating in the name of 
preserving a self-identity. As Kearney (2002:8) points out, most nation-states attempt to 
preserve their "body politic" by discriminating against the outsider. A process of 
deconstruction reveals that the national identity of "we" is often juxtaposed against the 
"other" or the foreign "them". The restoration of justice would require an act of reconciliation 
with the "other" - an act that, for Levinas, calls for the recognition of our "infinite 
responsibility" and, for Derrida, the need for absolute hospitality (Kearney, 2002:8-9). While 
Kearney himself attempts to create a critical hermeneutic capable of addressing the dialectic 
of others and aliens, this section aims to highlight the aporetic structure of the concept 
"hospitality". Kearney's main concern lies with the delicate need to balance the alleviation of 
essentialist binary exclusions with equally necessary ethical decisions regarding "others" 
(Kearney, 2002:7). According to Kearney, it is still necessary to distinguish between the 
harmless other or "alien" and the malignant outsider. The challenge of identifying the 
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outsider is difficult as we have to take care not to fall into a terminology that reduces 
"otherness" and "sameness" to a black and white discourse (Kearney, 2002:8). 
The aporetic structure of hospitality is similar to that of friendship and democracy. As 
mentioned, "democracy to come" is based on the idea of universal equality. It is opposed to 
any form of exclusion that would amount to a manifestation of inequality. It is thus necessary 
that "democracy to come" embraces the idea of the other. However, at the same time it is 
necessary for communities to exclude the other, for this is the sine quo non of the very 
existence of any community. At the same time the quasi-transcendental concepts of 
friendship and democracy demand a de-limitation of sorts with regards to not excluding the 
"other". It will now be necessary to see how such an aporetic structure is prevalent in the 
concept of hospitality. 
3.4.1 Hostile hospi tali ty and hospit.lblc hostili ty 
According to Derrida (1997:53), the word "hospitality" means to invite and welcome the 
"stranger" or the "other" into one's home or community. An act of hospitality on behalf of 
the host is an invitation for the outsider or "guest" to transcend or cross the boundary in order 
to enter the host's home or space. Derrida (Derrida & Dufourrnantelle, 2000: 135) argues that 
to engage in an act of "hospitality" is aporetic. As Kearney (2002: 10) argues, hospitality 
requires the gracious host as master to decide who to let into their home. The laws of 
hospitality require the host to evaluate, select and choose those they wish to include or 
exclude. Such a process of discrimination necessarily amounts to an act of injustice; however, 
the imperative to discriminate is part of the law of hospitality or "hospitalite en droit". The 
aporia or problem occurs with the need to restore justice, which would require absolute or 
unrestrictive hospitality. Derrida (1997:53) sums up this problem when he argues: 
There can be no sovereignty in the classic sense without the sovereignty of the self in its 
own home, but since there is no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only 
operate by filtering, choosing and therefore excluding and doing violence. A certain 
injustice ... is present from the outset, at the very threshold of the right to hospitality. 
This collusion between the violence of power or the force of law (Gewalt) on the one 
hand, and hospitality on the other, seems to be radically integral to the very inscription 
of hospitality as a right .. . 
Derrida' s sense of the concept of hospitality does not only operate on a personal level, in the 
sense of an individual welcoming a stranger into their home, but also at a state level in the 
welcoming of foreigners in the fOlm of immigrants, or minority ethnic groups (Derrida & 
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Dufourmantelle, 2000: 151-55). The word "hospitality" is derived from the Latin word 
"hospes" which, in turn, emerged from the word "hostis". In its original form, the word 
"hostis" was a reference to a stranger, more particularly, an enemy or a hostile stranger 
("hostilis"). Combined with "pets" (potentia) or the potential to have power, implicit in the 
definition of the word hospitality is the threat of the hostile stranger and his potential to usurp 
the host by entering their home (Caputo, 1997: II 0). In order to prevent the usurpation of the 
host by the stranger, it is necessary for the host to retain some form of self-mastery. In fact, in 
order for someone to be a host, they have to remain a master of their premises. They cannot 
relinquish their mastery of their premises since this would be tantamount to relinquishing 
their position as host (Caputo, 1997:135-6). Thus, according to Derrida (Caputo, 1997:147), 
when engaging in an act of hospitality, the host must manage to maintain that delicate 
balance between retaining power or "potential" as the host while at the same time inviting the 
stranger or "hostis" to freely partake of the premises as if they owned it themselves. Despite 
the fact that implicit in the very definition of "hospitality" is a necessary imperative that the 
host retains power over the premises, the restoration of justice demands that the host does not 
discriminate or engage in an act of hostility. The concept of hospitality is aporetic in the 
sense that an inequality of power between the host and the guest is both necessary yet 
contTadictory to the restoration of justice (Derrida, 1995:68). If the host does not relinquish 
power or sovereignty over the guest, justice cannot occur. Instead, a paradoxical or 
contradictory moment arrives where the hospitality of the host becomes somewhat hostile 
because it is limited. In order to continue being the host it is imperative that a certain element 
of hostility should occur. As Caputo (1997: III) says: 
When the host says, 'make yourself at home', this does not actually imply that the guest 
should treat the premises as their actual home by right of ownership; they may partake 
of the home as if they were in their own home, but they must remember that their ability 
to do so is limited, for they do not have actual sovereign mastery or ownership. 
Thus, Derrida's argument that hospitality is self-contradictory is based on the idea that the 
concept of hospitality is aporetic. The hospitality of the host towards the guest claims to be an 
open invitation but the invitation is in fact self-limiting because, despite the fact that 
hospitality claims to offer a porous and limitless invitation to the guest, the concept IS 
dependent on limitations being placed upon the guest's access (Derrida, 1995:68-70). 
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3.4.2 HospitaIity-to-comc 
Like aimance, democracy to come, and unconditional forgiveness, absolute hospitality can 
never actually occur. Absolute hospitality exists as a quasi-transcendental condition for any 
limited form of hospitality that does occur (Derrida, 2001:22). The paralysis or state of 
stagnation as a result of the innate impossibility inherent within the concept becomes a means 
by which hospitality can transcend its own limitations. Simi larly to the concept of 
forgiveness, such a scenario demands a compromise or a moment of self-sacrificing madness 
(Caputo, 1997: 111). In order for such a paradoxical or impossible scenario to be overcome, it 
is necessary for hospitality to cross the threshold of its own limitations in order for hospitality 
to become possible. It is pertinent to ask what type of sacrifice Derrida is referring to here. 
For, if hospitality is a product of the power dynamics between the host and the guest, is 
Derrida expecting one of the actors to compromise their position within the relationship? For 
Derrida, such an act of madness would require the host, in a moment of madness, to upturn 
the power dynamics of the relationship and relinquish all control or self-mastery of their 
premises (Caputo, 1997: 111-2). The host would thus be expected to act with "excess" and 
make an absolute gift of their property by placing no limitations or boundaries upon the guest 
so that they may truly feel as if they were in their own home despite being in the host's home. 
l! is only by foregoing all ownership and mastery of the household that true hospitality can 
occur on behalf of the host towards the guest. It is only through being made to feel absolutely 
welcome without any limitations or boundaries that the guest will be comfortable and made 
to "feel at home". For Derrida, true hospitality, like unconditional forgiveness and - as we 
shall see, justice - never actually occurs or manifests itself in reality; it is always waiting to 
happen or going to come (Caputo, 1997: 112). Although hospitality is always demanded of 
the host, they can never be absolutely hospitable because to do so would be to relinquish self-
mastery. 
On a state level, absolute or unconditional hospitality would have to make a break with 
everyday conventions of national security such as treaties, duties, contracts and pacts. The 
necessary or guarded power dynamics that occur in reality prevent the host or state from 
foregoing self-mastery. Absolute or true hospitality exists as an ideal , an abstract concept 
waiting to be enacted upon. As Derrida (1997:29) argues, absolute hospitality: 
requires that I open my home and that J give not only to the stranger (fitrnished with a 
family name and the social status of a stranger, etc.) but to the absolute other, unknown 
and anonymous; and that I give place (donne lieu), let come, arrive, let him take his 
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place in the place that I offer him, without demanding that he give his name or enter 
into some reciprocal pact. 
True hospitality would perhaps be an unconsclOUS action, a self-defeating moment of 
absolute kindness and generosity. Similarly to Derrida' s understanding of the aporia inherent 
within the "gift", the host cannot be aware that they are doing the guests a favour by opening 
up their home to them; a true act of hospitality would surely attempt to disguise any form of 
generosity at all. Absolute and conditional hospitality are heterogenous yet irreducible to 
each other (Kearney, 2002: 12). The quasi-transcendental notion of absolute hospitality is 
what makes any form of limited hospitality possible. For the reasons mentioned, conditional 
hospitality can never be absolute but must engage in a series of conditions. The stranger can 
never be completely welcome. Absolute hospitality is both heterogenous and irreducible 
because although it is separate from conditional hospitality, it enables any form of conditional 
hospitality to occur (Kearney, 2002: 12). 
3.4 .3 Conclusio n 
An analysis of the concept of hospitality sits well with the concepts of democracy, friendship 
and justice. The aporetic structure of friendship, democracy and hospitality attempts to 
grapple with what Kearney (2002:8) refers to as the "logo centric prejudice against otherness 
that informs the history of Western metaphysics". Like democracy and friendship, absolute 
hospitality is necessary in order for injustices to be rectified. However, like friendship and 
democracy, limitations with regard to inviting the stranger or the outsider must be adhered to. 
In this sense, absolute hospitality can never actually occur. At a quasi-transcendental level, 
Derrida attempts to situate absolute hospitality between justice and the social-historical 
conditions in which the concept operates. Like aimance and democracy to come, absolute 
hospitality exists as a quasi-transcendental concept that shapes or enables any limited form of 
hospitality to occur. 
To conclude this chapter, and in order to return more directly to the general concern of this 
thesis with "freedom of speech", it is now necessary to analyse the aporetic structure of the 
concept "justice" itself. After all, the appeal or call for absolute democracy, friendship and 
hospitality is done in the name of justice. 
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3.5 Justice 
As mentioned, Derrida's critique of forgiveness, friendship, democracy, and hospitality is an 
analysis of how these concepts attempt to reconcile the appeal for justice with the necessary 
exclusions, limitations or restrictions that each concept demands. The aporia of friendship 
represents the aporetic need to reconcile the un-reconcilable notion of brotherhood with the 
exclusive logic of fraternisation. Similarly, the restoration of justice is a call for democracy 
and hospitality "to come". The call for justice is a call for absolute or unlimited democracy 
and hospitality. The manifestation of absolute unrestricted democracy and hospitality is 
impossible, however, as the appeal for justice enables any limited form of the two concepts to 
occur by appealing to the quasi-transcendental absolutes they both represent. It is thus evident 
that justice is strongly associated with the concepts just discussed. As Aristotle (1941: 1 068) 
argues: 
Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion, to be 
concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every 
community there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at least men 
address as friends their fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers, and so too those 
associated with them in any other kind of community. 
3.5,1 Deconstruction is justice 
The most prominent attempt by Derrida to describe the relationship between deconstruction, 
justice and the law is his text The Force of Law: the Mystical Foundation of Authority in 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (J 992). Here Derrida is requested to respond to 
the assertion that deconstruction has nothing positive to contribute towards an analysis of the 
law. The principal criticism directed at the notion of deconstruction is that its nihilistic nature 
prevents it from affirming or adding meaning to the law (Caputo, 1997:128). It is the 
objective of deconstruction to analyse traditions, societies, institutions, beliefs and texts, to 
highlight the discourses upon which these pillars are built and to show how meaning has been 
constructed. Thus, deconstruction aims to show that such beliefs and institutions do not have 
definable meanings but rather such meanings are socially constructed through the discourses 
in which they are defined. As Caputo (1997:31) argues, it is the objective of deconstruction to 
bend meaning, to stretch beyond the limited boundaries of definitions that restrain concepts. 
Perhaps the principal criticism directed at deconstruction is that it has nothing positive to 
contribute to law because it is lawless itself. Hence, rather than contributing to or building 
onto the foundations of law and thus enacting justice, deconstruction is said to have a 
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"negative" influence by breaking down the very foundations upon which laws are enacted 
and built (Caputo, 1997:128). Derrida boldly answers the question of whether deconstruction 
has the ability to enact justice upon the law by arguing that "deconstruction is justice" (cited 
in Cornell , Carlson & Rosenfeld, 1992:4). As Caputo (1997:128) argues, Derrida challenges 
the assertion that deconstruction is destructive and negative in its attempt to breakdown 
meanings; on the contrary, deconstruction is an attempt to affirm or an analysis undertaken in 
the name of something un-deconstructive. Deconstruction has no meaning or rationality if it 
is not undertaken in the name of something that cannot be deconstructed (Caputo, 1997:129). 
While Derrida (1992:14) argues that the law must be deconstructed, it is imperative to his 
argument to claim that justice cannot; for it is the fact that justice cannot be deconstructed 
that allows deconstruction to take place. Justice provides the driving impulse from which the 
law can be improved or changed through deconstruction (Derrida, 1992:14). However, the 
paradoxical nature of the concept of justice means that while justice makes deconstruction 
possible, is indeed inseparable from it, at the same time justice is made possible through 
deconstruction and the ability of the law to be deconstructed itself. Such a scenario is 
paradoxical in that while justice enables the deconstruction of the law to occur, justice can 
only occur through the process of deconstruction. Hence, justice, law and deconstruction are 
mutually dependent on each other to exist (Caputo, 1997:131). In order for Derrida to assert 
the existence of such a paradoxical relationship, he has to prove that the law can be 
deconstructed in the first place. But what does Derrida mean by the law? 
In describing the law, Derrida (Caputo, 1997:130) refers to the positive structures that make 
up judicial systems and in turn add legitimacy or legality that enable such judicial systems to 
exist. For Derrida, the law can be deconstructed because it is constructed in the first place. In 
other words, the law is not natural but has its roots in particular social and historical contexts. 
Thus, regardless of whether a law claims to be natural, conventional, written or orally passed 
down, divinely imposed by a supreme being or democratically composed by consensus, laws 
do not naturally exist but are the product of social or historical processes (Derrida, 1992:6-7). 
3.5.2 The mystical roots of authority 
The most detailed discussion in which Derrida addresses the historical or social processes 
that give birth to law centres on the subtitle of Force Of Law, namely: "The Mystical 
Foundation of Authority" (Derrida, 1992). The phrase itself actually originates from 
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Montaigne (Carlson, Cornell & Benjamin, 1992:10), whose analysis Derrida builds upon. 
Derrida's reading of Montaigne is slightly complex in that he is reading the text through that 
of Pascal (Derrida, 1992: 11). Montaigne's expression, the "mystical foundation of authority", 
refers to the idea that the foundations or conventions that gave birth to law are shrouded in 
obscurity and that they derive much of their authority from the fact that these foundations 
remain obscured. Such a claim alludes to a statement made earlier in the text by Derrida that 
the legitimacy oflaw is circular (Derrida, 1992:6). 
In order for laws to be legitimate, it is necessary that they appeal to force , for force provides 
the legitimacy upon which laws are to be obeyed. However, if force provides the legitimacy 
for laws, from where does such force gain its legitimacy? As Derrida points out, one cannot 
here refer back to the law as a legitimating factor, for to do so would be circular. Thus, 
because the legitimacy that provides the basis for laws is mysterious and obscure, Montaigne 
(cited in Derrida, 1992:12) argues that "custom is the so le basis for equity, for the simple 
reason that it is received; it is the mystical foundation of its authority. Whoever traces it to its 
source annihilates it." Montaigne is thus alluding to the idea that we cannot appeal to the 
foundation of authority as a basis for obeying laws, we can only appeal to authority itself. We 
cannot attempt to legitimise laws by tracing their socio-historical origins since to attempt to 
do so would be to de-legitimise the authority of law altogether (Derrida, 1992: 12). 
Montaigne (cited in Derrida, 1992:12) reiterates such a point when he argues that laws "keep 
their good standing, not because they are just, but because they are laws: that is the mystical 
foundation of their authority, they have no other ... " The only basis upon which laws gain 
their legitimacy is from their authority or appeal to force and nothing else. Thus, according to 
Derrida (1992: 12), "Montaigne is clearly distinguishing laws, that is to say droit, from 
justice. The justice of law, justice as law is not justice. Laws are not just as laws. One obeys 
them not because they are just but because they have authority." Justice is not law but stands 
outside the law. Through deconstruction, justice permeates laws to change them and make 
them more just. Thus, Montaigne (cited in Derrida, 1992:12) distinguishes between natural 
law and positive law by claiming that "even our law, it is said, has legitimate fictions on 
which it founds the truth of its justice". Montaigne is thus referring to the idea that, in the 
absence of natural law, positive law or a "legitimate fiction" was created to legitimise the 
law. As Derrida claims (1992:12), all laws are based or derive their legitimacy from cultural 
artefacts such as documents, constitutions or ideologies. 
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Such a claim is necessary for Derrida as the purpose of deconstructing the law is to provide a 
"de-sedimentation of the superstructures of law that both hide and reflect the economic and 
political interests of the dominant forces of society" (Maley, 1999:53). The use of force as the 
primary mechanism for establishing these superstructures of law is implicit in the title of 
Derrida' s (1992) essay, The Force of Law. Derrida maintains that both the law and force are 
mutually reliant in that the law is not only enforced and made legitimate but also comes into 
being as a result of the forces that create it. Such a view is expressed by Walter Benjamin in 
his book A Critique of Violence (cited in Derrida, 1992:12) who points out that, while law 
gains legitimacy from force or violence, law in turn provides legitimacy for such violence to 
be enacted in the name of the law. Hence, the terms "applicability' or "enforceability" do not 
imply some sort of exterior or secondary features that may be induced as a supplement to 
law; on the contrary, force is implied in the very concept of law itself. Law already implies 
force. For as Derrida (1992:6) says, "There are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but 
there is no law without enforceability, and no applicability or enforceability of the law 
without force". 
If law is legitimised or comes into existence through force , this raIses an interesting 
conundrum for, as Derrida points out (1992:7), how are we to distinguish between the 
"illegitimate" use of force to bring law into being and the so called "legitimate" force that is 
used to safeguard the law' s interests? For in the moment when a law is brought into being, 
the force used to do so is neither just nor unjust as it cannot appeal to any anterior authority to 
give it legitimacy. Such a scenario is problematic in that one cannot appeal to the law as a 
legitimising condition for the use offorce since such an argument is circular. If the legitimacy 
of the law is determined by the force that brought it into being, it cannot in turn be used to 
justify such an original force (1992:6-7). The constructability of the law, whether it be 
through legitimate or illegitimate means is unproblematic for Derrida in that he sees it as an 
opportunity for the law to be constantly rectified and restructured particularly during times of 
political transformation. If the law is positive rather than natural, this would imply that the 
law has been constructed and can hence be deconstructed. The ability to deconstruct the law 
is a contributing factor towards historical progress, for as Derrida (cited in Maley, 1999:54) 
argues, "each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider and so to reinterpret the very 
foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited." 
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3.5.3 Deconstruction in the name of justice 
It is pertinent, however, to question the driving factor behind the need to deconstruct the law. 
As has been mentioned, the principle criticism directed at deconstruction is the negative 
critique surrounding its desire to unravel suppressed meaning within a text or to reveal, as 
Johnson (1981:14) puts it, "warring forces of signification" within the text. Derrida's 
response to such criticism is based on the argument that deconstruction is carried out in the 
name of something that cannot be deconstructed. Otherwise, there would be no point to 
deconstruction (Caputo, 1997:128). The desire or even the abi lity to deconstruct the law is 
driven by the desire to make laws more just, to bring more justice about. Justice is what the 
deconstruction of the law intends to bring about. This mutual relationship between the law, 
justice and deconstruction is paradoxical in that both deconstruction and the law mutually 
support and render each other possible. As Derrida (1992:14) says, "[b]ut the paradox that I'd 
like to submit for discussion is the following: it is this deconstructible structure of law (droit), 
or if you prefer of justice as droit, that also insures the possibility of deconstruction". Hence, 
if law is constructed, this would imply that the law can in turn be deconstructed. The ability 
to deconstruct the law allows for the application of justice which would not be possible if the 
law were not able to be deconstructed. However, at the same time, it is because justice cannot 
be deconstructed that deconstruction is made possible. When we deconstruct the law we do 
so in the name of justice (Caputo, 1997:131). The law is never static and can constantly be 
rectified particularly with regards to formal legal procedures that often need to be guided by 
justice. 
Caputo (1997:130) refers to examples from history where the law has fo lded in upon itself. 
Up until 1958, the law in the state of Alabama made it illegal for African-Americans to sit at 
the front of buses. However, the stance taken by Rosa Parks to invoke justice to punctuate the 
law led to a change in the laws that had previously been legitimate and thus allowed justice to 
manifest itself. 
One can also point to the resistance of the media against oppressive censorship policies that 
were introduced by the National Party government in South Africa during Apartheid. Such an 
example is pertinent for this thesis because it highlights the censorship of freedom of speech 
by the state. In 1974 in South Africa, new censorship legislation was introduced that removed 
the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, except in cases of mala fides (Merrett, 1994:79). 
This new censorship enabled the Directorate of Publications to ban items for possession, as 
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well as the right to ban further issues of a periodical and all output of a publisher. In response 
to these censorship measures, black reporters became pivotal for fighting censorship (Merrett, 
1994:87). The Black Consciousness-aligned Union of Black Journalists (UBJ) was targeted 
by the state. The creation of the newspaper Bulletin was banned for exposing the events 
unfolding in the black townships under the Publications Act on 26th August 1976 
(Raubenheimer, 1991:98). A successor called Azizi Thula ("We won ' t keep quiet") was also 
banned. This was also followed by the banning of two newspapers, World and Weekend 
World in October 1977 under the Internal Security Act. Both newspapers had been pivotal in 
reporting news from Soweto and expressing black opinion. Within 1976 alone the circulation 
of both newspapers had risen from 131 000 to 159 000 (Woods, 1981 :32-4). 
Such examples allude to the idea that justice stands outside positive law, and is the principal 
driving factor behind the need to change the law. For, as Montaigne mentions (Caputo, 
1997:130), law and justice are independent of one another. We obey laws not because they 
are just but because they have authority. 
3.5.4· Justice-to-come 
While the notion of justice is used to deconstruct the law, the concept itself exists as a quasi-
transcendental concept in that, although we invoke a transformation in the name of justice, 
such justice never actually manifests itself. Instead, laws are changed or made as a result of 
the calculation of justice. As Caputo (1997:135) argues, "Justice solicits us from afar, from 
the future, from and as a future always structurally to come, calls ' come' to us, preventing the 
walls of the present from enclosing us in the possible." Hence, for Caputo (1997: 135), 
"justice does not exist as a Platonic eidos or a Kantian regulative Idea, but rather exists as a 
' remnant' or a 'fragment' that drops through the cracks of the law, not as a merely factual 
omission or defect of existing laws, but structurally, necessarily." Thus, in relation to the law, 
justice is a vision that becomes enacted into a "call" for justice through deconstruction. In 
what Derrida refers to as the "aporia of justice", justice is only enacted when justice has been 
revoked or denied by the law. When such a denial of justice occurs, the quasi-transcendental 
notion of justice is called upon to enact justice. 
The application of justice requires a suspension of the law. A decision cannot be just by 
merely conforming and abiding by judicial procedures that are already in place; instead the 
law has to be lifted or suspended, only then can the invocation for justice be acted upon. 
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Caputo (1997: 130) refers to the criminal justice laws in America as an example where the 
law continues to operate without being punctuated by justice. The "three strikes and you're 
out" system in America is an example where no suspension or deconstruction of the law 
occurs. Instead, such a principle merely requires conformity and an adherence to the legality 
of state laws. If felons commit three 'strikes' , they are subject to penalties as imposed by the 
state judiciary. Such a system does not invoke or call upon justice because there has been no 
suspension of the law, deconstruction is not provided with a platform to take place. The 
aporetic nature of justice requires that the law be suspended before justice can be invoked. 
3.6 Conclusion 
As has been shown, laws can be deconstructed, because they are constructed in the first place. 
Montaigne 's analysis (cited in Derrida, 1992) in The Mystical Foundation of Authority shows 
that the customs or principles on which laws are based are not rooted in any natural laws. 
Such customs are shrouded in obscurity. As a result, laws can only attempt to justify their 
legitimacy by appealing to force. This is circular in that the force used to legitimise the law 
has no appeal for legitimacy other than the law itself. Like the concepts of democracy, 
justice, friendship and forgiveness, absolute justice exists as a quasi-transcendental concept 
that enables the law to be deconstructed in the first place. Without an appeal to justice, there 
is no basis for de constructing laws. However, absolute justice never takes place, perhaps 
never should take place. Instead, the concept shapes any limited or restricted justice or 
transformation in the law that does occur. 
An analysis of the concept of aporia has been useful because we are now in a position to 
suggest that the concept of free speech is similarly aporetic. Like the concepts just discussed, 
by suggesting that free speech is aporetic, we are able to re-imagine the tension between the 
absolute claim to free speech and the historical and linguistic limitations of free speech. If we 
are suggesting that the concept of free speech is aporetic, this implies that this tension is 
present regardless of the historical or cultural contexts in which free speech operates. This 
means that free speech is aporetic both within and outside the nation-state. Within the nation-
state, we can reconcile this tension or aporia through a rights discourse that legitimises the 
invocation or call for the limitation of free speech, while at the same time acknowledging the 
need for free speech to be absolute. 
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A problem arises on an international level in that we cannot legitimately invoke calls for the 
limitation of free speech; we have no sovereign body with the legal means to do so. We have 
to find a way of reconciling the need to limit free speech on an international level without 
appealing to a rights discourse inherent to the nation-state. This problem will be dealt with in 
the conclusion to the thesis. In Chapter Four, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the same 
historical and linguistic limitations of free speech present within the nation-state are also 
present outside of the nation-state. This will support the argument that the concept of free 
speech is aporetic both within and outside the nation-state. 
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Chapter 4 . Transcending the nation-state: the linguistic 
and historical limitations of free speech outside the nation-
state 
4 .1 Introduction 
An analysis of the historical roots of free speech has shown that the democracy-based notion 
of free speech emerged as a function of the birth of the nation-state. It cannot be stressed 
often enough that while the nation-state legitimises our modern notion of free speech - with 
reference to truth and democracy - it also limits free speech through certain rights; as citizens 
of the nation-state, the right that made possible free speech was limited by other rights, most 
notably the right to be protected from hate speech. The modern notion of free speech is made 
possible as a result of a human rights discourse whose emergence is co-terminus with the 
birth of the nation-state. Although this rights discourse legitimises free speech, it also limits 
free speech that is deemed to be a threat to other rights associated with the nation-state. If the 
right to free speech is deemed to be a threat to the right not to be subjected to hate speech, 
governments reserve the right to restrict free speech. 
We can thus see how the nation-state discourse legitimates free speech but also restricts it in 
certain contexts. We can also see how this nation-state discourse reconciles the claim to 
absolute free speech with the necessary linguistic and historical limitations of free speech. 
The nation-state has the power to both grant and limit the right to free speech. This means 
that a problem arises on an international level, outside of the nation-state boundary, when 
claims are made and defended with reference to the right to freedom of speech or attempts are 
made to limit such freedom - as the cartoon case ill ustrated. 
In such cases, as I argued in Chapter Two, the historical and linguistic limitations of free 
speech are addressed within the nation-state by appealing to the rights discourse discussed in 
Chapter One. With regard to the "Defamation of Religion" resolution passed in 2005, the 
United States and most countries in the European Union have used such a rights discourse to 
question the validity and legitimacy of such a resolution. On an international level, the 
primary problem concerns the need to reconcile one's claim to absolute free speech - and 
here one refers to representatives of states as we ll as individuals who invoke the protection 
afforded them as members of specific nation-states - with the need to restrict speech in 
certain contexts. The thorny question then is: How are we to justify or even frame a call for 
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the limitation of freedom of speech outside of a nation-state rights discourse where there is no 
authority qua Leviathan to limit the right to free speech? Within the nation-state, limitations 
on free speech are justified on the grounds that absolute free speech infringes on other rights. 
However, outside of the nation-state, we cannot appeal to such limitations as we are outside 
the nation-state. 
In order to solve the problem, we need to find a way of legitimising claims that argue in 
favour of limiting free speech on an international level without appealing to notions of 
authority implicit in nation-state rights discourse. It is the objective of this chapter to take a 
step back as 't were and, in a sense, to go prior to the conceptual distinction between local 
and global acts of free speech and to demonstrate I) that free speech on an international level 
is bound by the same historical and linguistic limitations that pertain to free speech on a 
national level; 2) that, while the nation-state proceeds by codifying these limitations as law, 
thereby making limitations enforceable, a "crisis of limitation" arises on international level 
where such historical and linguistic limitations cannot be codified as law; 3) that in the 
absence of conceiving limitations as law we have to, at international level, appeal to the prior 
historical-linguistic limitations which make the concept of free speech aporetic, as point of 
departure for a re-interpretation of limitation, not as legal, but as ethical. In order to illustrate 
point three listed here, it is the objective of Chapter Four to extend Derrida's analysis of the 
aporetic to include the concept of free speech. 
By suggesting that free speech is aporetic, one can claim that the right to absolute free speech 
has quasi-transcendental status and cannot, and perhaps should not, ever occur in reality. By 
suggesting that free speech is aporetic, we can find a way of reconciling the need for such 
limitations with the claim to absolute/unrestricted free speech. How is this possible? I shall 
argue that the quasi-transcendental notion of absolute free speech allows - as in makes 
possible and meaningful - any historical or particular claim to free speech. Just like justice, 
democracy and forgiveness, our understanding of the "free" in freedom of speech derives its 
very meaning and possibility from a quasi-transcendental notion of absolute freedom . 
Although we can invoke our right or claim to absolute free speech, it will be argued that such 
a right is subject to certain contextual conditions that necessarily place limitations on the 
concept. 
In the previous chapter, it was illustrated how Derrida' s analysis reveals the aporetic structure 
of other concepts like justice and forgiveness. On the basis of that analysis the suggestion is 
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made here that the quasi-transcendental notion of "free speech" is both heterogeneous and 
irreducible to conditional free speech. It is heterogenous because, as an idea it makes possible 
limited or conditional free speech while remaining unrealisable itself. It is the absolute that 
enables conditional free speech to take place, to have meaning, to be invoked at all, as a right. 
Without the idea of absolute free speech, we would not be able to engage with a conditional 
understanding of free speech in any form. However, the quasi-transcendental notion of 
absolute free speech is also irreducible to conditional free speech because it cannot ever 
actually occur and perhaps never should occur. Like absolute forgiveness, the notion or 
perhaps idea of "free speech" must remain pure and free from any contextual limitations. 
This is necessary in order for the concept of absolute free speech to have any meaning. In this 
chapter I will analyse the aporetic structure of the concept itself in order to reveal within the 
concept "free speech" a tension between the absolute and the historical. 
As shown in Chapter Two with reference to the United Nations Charter for Human Rights 
(UNCHR) and the European Charter for Human Rights (ECHR), governments are only 
entitled to restrict speech acts that are deemed to be a threat to other democratic civi l 
liberties. Such decisions revolve around a nation-state rights discourse that legitimises claims 
for the restriction or protection of free speech. Such a rights discourse does not apply on an 
international level outside of the sovereign nation-state - as was clearly illustrated by the 
inability to censor the cartoons or de-legitimise their authors ' and publishers ' claim to 
freedom of speech, despite the fact that others perceived them as a form of hate speech. This 
leads to the problem of how we are to conceive the very idea of "limitation" on an 
international level when we cannot appeal to the limitations and authority implicit in 
democratic nation-state discourse. After teasing out the aporetic structure of free speech in 
this chapter, the conclusion to this thesis will suggest that Kant's proposed solution of a 
voluntary rule of law that is observed among sovereign nation-states may be useful. Although 
Kant's analysis dealt specifically with the need to restrict or prevent conflict between warring 
nations, the principle of his argument may be of some use here. The attraction of Kant's 
argument is that it calls for the voluntary observation of law without appealing to force. The 
argument is based on moral reasoning and is useful for the free speech dilemma because it 
does not need to appeal to any legal legislation or enforcement to achieve the desired 
outcome. To build upon Kant's argument, I shall look at the controversy surrounding the 
decision by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to intervene in Kosovo during the 
Balkans conflict in March 1999. Such a case scenario is useful for two reasons: firstly, it 
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highlights the discrepancy and tension between international law and state sovereignty, and 
secondly, the intervention has been called an "illegal but legitimate" action, suggesting that 
there are ways of conceiving "legitimacy" outside the narrow confines of what is considered 
legal. In the context of the debate in this thesis, such a case scenario is an example of how 
legitimate or moral codes of conduct should or could perhaps triumph or usurp legal or 
binding constitutional legislation, offering us a way out of recognising limitations, even the 
absence of their un-enforceability as law. In other words, that the notion of legitimate or 
binding moral codes of conduct can be invoked without appealing or adhering to state 
legislation. Good. Very nice 
But first, I want to take a tep back an go anterior or prior to the distinction between local and 
global acts of free speech and to point out that the same historical and linguistic limitations of 
free speech highlighted in Chapter One exist on an international level as well. By way of 
illustrating this common source in socio-historical limitations it will be useful to look at the 
controversy surrounding George W Bush's use of the word "crusade" in a speech following 
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001. An analysis of this 
particular example will highlight the point that free speech is characterised by the same 
historical limitations on an international level that exist in the nation-state which suggests that 
we should look for a solution to the problems generated by the former prior to the solutions 
found for the latter. The use of the word "crusade" was controversial in that it inescapably 
referred to the series of religious wars between the Christian West and the culture of Islam, 
which lasted for roughly 200 years and officially ended in 1291 (Kurtz, 2000:5-8). Although 
Bush argued that he used the word as a synonym for a modem day struggle against terrorism, 
it will be argued that the social-historical connotations of the word make its use problematic, 
particularly with the increasing tension surrounding "Islamophobia" and a discourse of a 
"clash of civilizations" made famous by Samuel Huntington's (1993) article of the same 
name. The significance of this is the limitation of our imagined absolute freedom to use 
words as we please is imposed on us by the very history and context in which those words 
appear as meaningful. But socio-historical context is just one limitation imposed on our 
absolute right to speak freely. There is a more fundamental limitation at play and I will look 
at that first before I return to a more extensive analysis of the socio-historical limitations of 
(free) speech. In the next section I look at the structural limitations implicit in using certain 
words from a linguistic perspective. To that end I discuss Saussure' s analysis of the arbitrary 
nature of the sign. 
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4.2 Oflanguage and speech: the primary limitation 
An analysis of Saussure's (1966) revolutionary structural approach to language is pertinent 
for the purposes of this chapter. The second part of this chapter intends to analyse how 
language cannot be interpreted outside of specific social-historical contexts. Such a claim is 
crucial if we are to lend support to the idea that the right to free speech is always limited by 
certain contexts. In this chapter I argue that, although one may legitimately claim an absolute 
right to unrestricted free speech, the fact that speech operates in particular social-historical 
contexts suggests that speech acts take on specific meanings and connotations. The claim that 
language can operate (in the sense of generating meanings) outside historical contexts and 
free from its determination is flawed; in fact, that very imagined freedom is a function of the 
quasi-transcendental status of the word "free" in the phrase "freedom of speech". This much 
is suggested at the fundamental semiotic level. 
Saussure (Hawkes, 1977: 19) inherited a traditional view of linguistics that subscribed to the 
positivist belief that language consists of an aggregate of separate units, called "words". Such 
a traditional view held that words exist independently of each other and have separate 
"meaning". Complementary to this, was the view that there is a one-on-one relationship 
between words and the things they represent. However, there is also a distinction to be made 
between the relationship between words and the things they represent over time, and the 
meaning of such a relationship at a particular moment in time. Bearing this distinction in 
mind, it will now be necessary to look at Saussure's distinction between "synchronic" and 
"diachronic" language (Holdcroft, 1991:69). 
The diachronic approach to language studies involves an understanding of language as an 
"aggregate" of separate words. The idea that language consists of separate words each with 
their own separate meaning implies that language can be studied objectively and is subject to 
specific laws of change. These laws of change allow language to be observed and recorded 
over a period of time. Saussure rejected such a "substantive" view of language and argued 
that language should not only be observed as an aggregate of separate individual parts, but 
also in terms of the relationship between those parts (Hawkes, 1977: 19). Such a view is 
"synchronic" because it analyses language within a particular context in time rather than over 
time. Within a synchronic perspective, Saussure argues that language should be studied as a 
Gesfaiteinheit, a wlified "field" and as a self-sufficient system. Thus, according to Saussure, 
language becomes meaningful by operating in a particular context in time rather than over a 
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period of time. It is on such a basis that Saussure distinguishes between langue (language) 
and parole (speech). Langue refers to the abstract language system, which takes the form of a 
set of abstract rules or patterns. Speech on the other hand refers to the practical use of 
language through everyday interactions (Kearney, 1986:241). Although they are distinct, 
parole and langue are connected in that speech is determined and made possible through 
language. Although language makes speech possible, it only exists on an abstract level and 
has no concrete existence until it becomes operational in speech. In what Saussure refers to as 
a system of distinct signs correlating to a set of distinct ideas, the construction of language or 
"the linguistic faculty proper" exists as a separate abstract entity beyond that of speech 
(Hawkes, 1977:20). Language only manifests itself or occurs in the momentary 
manifestations of human speech. 
4.2.1 Language and the arbitrary sign 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is necessary to note Saussure 's ideas (1966) concerning 
the existence of language as a "system of signs". Saussure challenged the linguistic idea that 
language consists of a set of terms that exist in a one-on-one relationship to a set of objects. 
For example, Saussure rejects the idea that the word 'horse' is irrevocably tied to a particular 
animal. Saussure rather subscribed to the idea of language as consisting of a set of concepts 
represented by a sound-pattern or signifier. Such an idea is structural in that language is based 
on a relationship between concepts and sound-patterns. The concept would be what Saussure 
refers to as the "signified" and the sound pattern is what Saussure refers to as the "signifier". 
Together, the signifier and the signified combine to form the "sign" (Hawkes, 1977:21). 
Language thus consists of a series of signs that make up ideas. 
However, it is important to note that the relationship between the signifier and the signified 
that combine to form a sign is arbitrary. For Saussure there is no rigid or necessary 
connection between a sound-image (signifier), the concept that is being signified, and the 
physical object or thing the concept alludes to in reality. The signifier does not bear any 
appeal or resemblance to "reality" beyond the structure of language (Hawkes, 1977 :22). As 
Saussure argues, the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign is not reasonable. The signifier, used 
to describe that which is being signified, can be altered and changed. There is no reason to 
prefer any particular word over another. Language is self-defining and complete in the 
particular context in which it is being used. In essence, language constitutes its own reality 
and does not appeal to a broader reality beyond itself (Hawkes, 1977:22). 
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It is also pertinent to note Saussure's syntagmatic and paradigmatic distinction in language. 
As Saussure argues (Holdcroft, 1969:89), considered in isolation, signifiers and signified 
words are not linguistic entities. A succession of sounds has to support an idea in order to be 
linguistic. In what he refers to as a "primordial principle" or the "linear nature of the 
signifier", Saussure argues that a complex signifier needs to be segmented so that the 
resulting units must be distinct both from what precedes them and from what succeeds them 
in the chain. Thus, as Saussure argues, a linguistic entity needs to be delimited in order to be 
accurately defined. Put simply, the signifier needs to be separated and distinguished from 
everything that surrounds it on the phonic chain. 
Saussure's relational theory of structuralism (Hawkes, 1977:19) is pertinent because it 
suggests that the meanings of words (like "crusade") are differential; that is, at a linguistic 
level they derive their meaning in relation to other words or signs. Words, as signs, do not 
have a positive meaning but derive their meaning from, or in relation to, other signs. 
[Illustrate brief illustration with reference to the word 'crusade']. The idea that language is 
relational suggests that meaning is derived from a specific "synchronic" way in which 
language operates. Thus, as will be shown, certain words invoke certain connotations and 
cannot be interpreted outside of the specific social contexts in which they operate. This is the 
first limitation that operates at conceptual level prior to the distinction between local and 
global acts of free speech. The limitation inheres in the very structure of language per se. A 
second limitation becomes apparent when we situate the use of language in its specific social-
historical context. This will add a socio-historical limitations to the use of language and 
suggest a second way of re-thinking ' limitation'. In order to do this it will be useful to look at 
the controversy surrounding George W Bush's use of the word "crusade" in a speech shortly 
after the 9/11 bombings in 200 I. 
4.2.2 The crusade controversy: the secondary limitation 
The linguistic limitation of language just discussed is fundamentally important and can be 
considered to be a primary limitation of how words are used irrespective of whether that is 
done on a national or international level. In what we can call a secondary limitation, it will be 
necessary to show how our use of words is limited by the socio-historical contexts in which 
they operate. 
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4.2.3 The "War 0 11 Ter ror" speech 
Five days after the cataclysmic events that occurred on Tuesday 11th September 2001, George 
W Bush attempted to express in his own words the challenge that now faced the most 
powerful nation in the world. Speaking spontaneously, Bush described the need, not only for 
the United States but also for other nation-states equally horrified by the events that had 
unfolded on American soil, to commit to "this war on terrorism". Had his speech been crafted 
with the aid of speechwriters or advisers, it is unlikely that his words would have created the 
controversial response that they did (Carroll, 2004:5). The controversy surrounding his 
speech did not lie in the content of what he was saying, for most countries shared a similar 
abhorrence to the events that had unfolded on that fateful Tuesday morning. The most 
contentious part of his speech was his use of the word "crusade" to describe the impending 
battle that now lay in front of those nations opposed to terror. Summing up the aftermath of 
the attacks on the Twin Towers, Bush said (cited in Graham, Keenan & Dowd, 2004:209): 
Today, millions of Americans mourned and prayed, and tomorrow we go back to work. 
Today, people from all walks of life give thanks for the heroes; they mourn the dead; 
they ask for God's good graces on the families who mourn, and tomorrow the good 
people of America go back to their shops, their fields, American factories, and go back 
to work .. . This is a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are 
beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. 
As James Carroll (2004 :3) points out, Bush's use of the word "crusade" was an offhand 
reference. Bush later suggested that the word was used as a synonym for an impending 
struggle against terrorism around the globe. As his aides attempted to argue, Bush's use of 
the word "crusade" in the particular context of his speech was devoid of any religious 
reference to Christianity versus Islam (Carroll, 2004:4). The word was supposedly a reference 
to the ideological struggle between the free world and those who aim to suppress individual 
liberties that liberal democracies like the United States supposedly stand for. Whether he used 
the term merely as a synonym for struggle or not is beside the point. Carroll (2004:3) for one 
argues that Bush meant to use the word "crusade" to describe a renewed clash between 
Christianity and Islam. However, it is necessary to ask how we are to reconcile the absolute 
claim to use certain terms without hindrance with the limitations necessarily invoked by 
language (as a system of signs) and context (of associations and history). 
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4.2.4 Sacrifice and the sw ol'd: marching on the infidel 
The word "crusade" is derived from the Latin word for cross or "crux" and, as Kurtz (2000:5-
8) notes, refers to the series of battles that occurred for roughly 200 years officially ending in 
1291 but, in truth, carrying on well into the 16th Century. At the behest of Pope Urban II, the 
crusades amounted to a warlike march in the name of Christianity against the infidel Muslim. 
Far from representing the historical Christian representation with the humble and the poor 
(Sheppard, 1983: 14), the crusades represent a long and shameful chapter of conquest in the 
name of Christianity. Kee (1982:5-8) argues that the crusades were foreshadowed by the 
Roman emperor Constantine. Constantine took the legacy of the cross to be a sign of war and 
it is a legacy that continues to haunt Christianity today. Believing that he had received a call 
from heaven to conquer the in.fidel Islamic world (in hoc signa vince), the calling supposedly 
justified the butchery and bloodshed that followed. As Carroll (2004:5) points out, before the 
crusades, Christian theology had given central emphasis to the resurrection of Jesus and to 
the idea of incarnation. However, the crusades invoked the idea of the bloody crucifixion 
itself as a primitive notion that violence can be a sacred act. The crusades thus began to assert 
the idea that violence could become a sacred act. 
The cult of martyrdom emphasized in suicidal valour became institutionalized in the crusades 
(Carroll, 2004:5). Rather than reflecting the triumph of the cross in defeat and humility, the 
crusades were indicative of a conquest built on violence, bloodshed and self-sacrifice in the 
spread of Christianity through the sword (Moltmann, 1974:305). Carroll (2004:5) argues that 
the cult of martyrdom institutionalized in the crusades has also become entrenched in certain 
radical groupings among Muslims. Thus, there is a parallel between the culture of self-
sacrifice and violence entrenched in the crusades and the suicide bombers of 9111. The 
culture of suicide bombings justified in the broad category of "terrorism" is a result of the 
perverse desire to explore the link between the willingness to die for a cause and the 
willingness to kill for it. 
It is here that Bush' s use of the word "crusade" is so problematic simply because of the 
social-historical connotations it invokes. Despite an attempt to mitigate the use of the word as 
a synonym for a looming battle, the use of the word in such a context raises questions about 
the existence of implicit limitations. As Maddox (2003 :403) argues, there is a haunting 
similarity between the Roman imperial power under Constantine and the imperial war 
machine controlled by Bush. Carroll (2004:5) argues that there is a deeper significance to 
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Bush's inadvertent reference to the crusades. Charged with outlining a response to the attacks 
on the Twin Towers, Bush, cognitively or not, made reference to a discourse that saw 
violence as a perfectly appropriate, even chivalrous, first response to what is wrong in the 
world. Thus, rather than portraying violence as a last recourse or a necessary evil, violence 
and self-sacrifice were explained as two of the unavoidable certainties of the war on terror. 
As with the crusades in 1096, the "war on terror" demonstrated certain similar patterns of 
violence. One of the most evident similarities was the urgent purpose of a war against the 
"enemy outside" - or what Samuel Huntington (1993 :22) has referred to as the "clash of 
civilizations". However, the search for the "enemy outside" quickly led to the discovery of an 
"enemy inside". The crusaders, en-route to attack the infidel far away, first fell upon "the 
infidel near at hand". For the first time in Europe, large numbers of Jews were being 
murdered and blamed for willing the murder of Jesus. As in 1096, the "war on terror" has 
resulted in the search for an "internal enemy" generally in the form of immigrant Muslims 
and people of Arabic descent coming under heavy pressure in the West. Although they do not 
suffer the same fate as the Jews did, Muslims in Europe and the United States are still subject 
to "profiling" and are demonized (Carroll, 2004:7). 
The similar discourse used by the current American administration to initiate and justify the 
"war on terror" bears a shocking resemblance to what Carroll (2004:70) calls "a dark, 
seething religious history of sacred violence". In other words, the historical and cultural 
significance of the word "crusade" inadvertently and inescapably came into play the moment 
Bush used it in his speech. This necessary invocation of a socio-historical meaning derives 
further, more specific meaning from a pattern in war discourse identifiable throughout history 
according to Graham, Keenan and Dowd (2004: 199). Using a discourse-historical approach, 
these authors attempt to highlight similarities in several "calls to arms" speeches across time 
- not only by Bush but also by Pope Urban II in 1095, Queen Elizabeth I in 1588, and Adolf 
Hitler in 1938. Constitutive of these speeches are four generic features. Firstly, there is the 
appeal to a legitimate power source external to the orator; secondly, there is an appeal to the 
historical importance of the culture in which the discourse is situated; thirdly, there is the 
construction of a thoroughly evil other and fourthly , an appeal for unification behind the 
legitimate external power (Graham, Keenan & Dowd, 2004:199). 
There is a striking similarity between the speech made by Pope Urban II to the Church's 
Council at Clermont-Ferrand and the speech made by Bush in the immediate aftermath of the 
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"war on terror". In the speech made by Pope Urban II, he states (Graham, Keenan & Dowd, 
2004:201): 
Most beloved brethren, today is manifest in you what the Lord says in the Gospel. 
Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them; 
for unless God had been present in your spirits, all of you would not have uttered the 
same cry; since, although the cry issued from numerous mouths, yet the origin of the 
cry is one. Therefore I say to you that God, who implanted is in your breasts, has 
drawn it forth from you. Let that then be your war cry in combats, because it is given to 
you by God When an armed attack is made upon the enemy, Ihis one cry be raised by 
all the soldiers of God: 'II is the will of God! It is the will of God!' Whoever, Iherefore, 
shall determine upon this holy pilgrimage, and shall make his vow to God to that effect, 
and shall offer himself to him for sacrifice, as a living victim, holy and acceptable to 
God, shall wear the sign of the cross of Ihe Lord on his forehead or on his breasl. 
When, indeed, he shall relurn from his journey, having fulfilled his vow, let him place 
the cross on his back between his shoulders. Thus, shall ye, indeed, by Ihis twofold 
action, folfil the precepl of the Lord. As lie commands in the Gospel, 'he that taketh not 
his cross, andfolloweth ajier me, is not worthy of me '. 
As Braudel (1993:32) points out, with this speech Pope Urban II successfully launched the 
Crusades, which lasted for roughly 200 years. As the speech demonstrates, the crusade he is 
calling for is not of his own willing but is the will of God. There is a strong resonance 
invoked in the idea that the crusader should be a willing sacrificial victim in a similar vein to 
that of Christ, offering his life in divine destiny and according to God's will. Behind such a 
discourse is the idea of an individual responsibility to serve a higher purpose. 
In his speech delivered five days after the attack on the Twin Towers, Bush uses a similar 
discourse similar to that used by Pope Urban II. Perhaps the most obvious similarity is an 
appeal to an external force as a legitimization for the "call to arms". As Graham Keenan and 
Dowd (2004:205) argue, Bush draws on the support and authority of God, by aligning God 
with the nation-state in a quest against a new form of evil. Much has been made of Bush's 
Christian faith. However, as Carroll (2004:6) argues, Bush' s God is more characteristic of the 
Old Testament. His saviour is the Jesus whose cross is wielded as a sword. In such a 
discourse, violence is presented as a legitimate necessity against an "evil" other (Carroll, 
2004:7). In his "Clash of Civilizations", Huntington (1993:22) highlighted three 
irreconcilable blocks of culture in the Christian West, the Confucian East, and the scattered 
nations of Islam. The fact that Huntington refers to these cultures as "irreconcilable" would 
seem to support the idea behind some sort of inevitable violence. In his speech, Bush alludes 
to a clear-cut divide between good and evil, and as Colson (2002:80) points out, the 11th 
September attack signalled a "body blow to postmodernism". Colson (2002 :80) further went 
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on to argue, "Can anyone who saw the incineration of thousands of innocent Americans 
believe, as postmodernists teach, that there is no objective reality, no good or evil, or that all 
cultures are morally equivalent?" 
In announcing a crusade against a new kind of evil, Bush inescapably draws on thousands of 
years of history in his appeal to American citizens and other nation-states opposed to global 
terrorism. The fundamentalist Christian right in America even went as far as referring to him 
as "God's President" (Conason, 2002:80). The idea that President Bush had a responsibility 
to enact God's will and ensure the triumph of good over evil was reiterated by Morey 
(200 I :40), who argued that: 
In response to the Muslim holy war now being waged against us, we, the undersigned, 
following the example of the Christian church since the 7th century, do commit 
ourselves, our wealth, and our families to join in a holy crusade to fight against Islam 
and its false god, false prophet, and false book We the under-signed, believe that Islam 
is the root cause of all Muslim terrorism, which is the fruit of Islam. 
4.2.5 Meaning and context 
In response to the uproar surrounding his use of the word "crusade", Bush attempted to 
deflect criticism by stating that, as opposed to the views expressed by the Christian 
fundamentalist far right, he believed Islam to be a religion of peace (Beinart, 2002:6). 
Shortly after the speech Bush promptly visited Washington ' s principal mosque in order to 
appease the minds of Muslim academics, clerics and Muslim citizens who voiced concern 
over the insinuation that the wrath of the American nation would be directed at Muslims or 
Islam in general (Kepel, 2004: 117). Already a plethora of Islamist websites claimed that the 
real "war on terror" was directed at Islam, just as Islam had been the target in the medieval 
crusades (Kepel, 2004: 117). 
As has been shown, Bush's use of the word "crusade" was controversial. It is debatable 
whether his use of the term was intended or not. It is perhaps possible to put it down to the 
President's inexperience in dealing with international crises. The possibility that the term was 
a Freudian slip that betrayed his subconscious desires can also not be discounted. Such 
arguments are not pertinent to the question being asked in this chapter. Bush defended his use 
of the term "crusade" as a synonym that was not meant or intended by him to be interpreted 
in the way it was. 
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Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to ask whether claims to absolute free speech can be 
justified on the grounds that words transcend the social-historical contexts in which they 
operate. If Bush really meant to use the term "crusade" as a metaphor for an impending 
struggle for terrorism, can he legitimately claim the right to do so? 
The first part of this chapter intended to highlight the linguistic limitations of our use of 
language. As Saussure points out, language only has meaning in particular contexts. Building 
on from Saussure's claim, the second part of this chapter has attempted to indicate the 
possibility that the use of language or terms cannot be divorced from the particular social-
historical history from which they derive and within which they continue to function 
meaningfully. Bush defended his use of the word "crusade" on the grounds that he did not 
intend for it to invoke the sensitive social-historical connotations it did. However, it can be 
argued that particular words cannot be divorced from their association or connection with 
history, that their meaning is beyond 'our intention'. The legacy of the word "crusade" and 
the particularly violent era it represents cannot be separated from the sensitive connotations it 
invokes in the "war on terror". It was perhaps unfortunate that terrorists who carried out the 
attacks on the World Trade Towers were Muslims themselves. Had the term "crusade" been 
used in the aftermath of the act of terrorism committed by Timothy McVeigh in 1995, the 
term might not have created such controversy. However, within the particular context of the 
attacks of 9111, and the sensitive connotations surrounding the resurgence of the clash 
between Islam and the Christian West, it is easy to see why the term "crusade" would have 
such negative connotations. 
The purpose of providing an analysis of the linguistic and historical limitations of free speech 
has been to show that 1) all meaning is constituted differentially - that is we do not determine 
the meaning of words; language and the free-play of signs determine meaning. This is true of 
all statements (whether in cartoon pictures or words), nationally or internationally; also, that 
2) meaning is contextual and therefore historical. Not only do I not control the meaning 
generated by language, I do not control the context and history in which that meaning is 
embedded and of which it is a continued function. This tension between our desire to make 
meaning - that is, to be free of already made meanings - and the limitation of that desire by 
the working of language and the reality of history already indicates something of an aporetic 
tension between freedom and language, that is, between freedom and speech - a tension 
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inherent in free speech. I now turn to a more detail reading of free speech in these aporetic 
terms. 
4·.3 Reconciling the absolute with the historical: reading the aporia of 
free speech 
Like the concepts of justice, democracy, friendship and hospitality discussed in Chapter Four, 
it is possible to suggest that a similar tension exists between the absolute concept of free 
speech and the necessari ly limited historical notion of free speech. It will now be 
demonstrated that inherent within the concept of free speech itself, is an aporia similar to the 
concepts discussed by Derrida. When discussing the aporia of these various concepts, it is 
necessary to distinguish between a concept, which is timeless and a-historical, and a notion, 
which is situated in particular linguistic-historical contexts. In Chapter One, it was shown 
how the modern notion of free speech emerged out the birth of the nation-state and the rights 
di scourse associated with a democratic citizenry. It will be argued that as a concept, the 
concept of absolute free speech is timeless and a-historical. It is also important to note that 
because it is being suggested that the concept of free speech is aporetic, such an aporia is 
therefore constitutive of all claims to freedom of speech whether inside or outside the nation-
state. The concept of free speech exists without any restrictions or limitations. As a notion 
however, free speech is limited by the particular historical-linguistic limitations just 
discussed. This is why free speech is similar to other concepts like justice, democracy, 
friendship and hospitality. As concepts they are all absolute and unlimited. As notions they 
are limited by the particular historical-linguistic contexts in which they operate. 
In his critique of Derrida's aporetic analysis of forgiveness, Kaposy (2005:206) makes 
reference to Derrida's (2001 :32) claim that "forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable." Part 
of Derrida' s logical analysis of forgiveness is his attempt to make explicit the aporetic 
structure inherent in such an argument. From a linguistic view, Derrida's concept of 
forgiveness does not make linguistic sense. For as Kaposy (2005 :206) argues, if a person or 
an act is forgiven, linguistically this would imply that it is forgivable; if a person or an act 
cannot be forgiven, this would imply that it is unforgivable. This is what it means to have an 
adjective with the prefix "un-" and the suffix "-able". Such a linguistic formulation is 
necessary to provide meaning to language. For example, if something is "undrinkable", this 
would imply that it is something that cannot be drunk. From a linguistic perspective, 
Derrida 's paradoxical analysis does not make logical sense. In answer to such critics it is 
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necessary to point out that the analysis is limited to a conceptual understanding of 
forgiveness. At a conceptual level it can be argued that it is possible for Derrida to make such 
an aporetic linguistic claim because a concept operates outside of any linguistic-historical 
context. A criticism concerning the linguistic inconsistencies of such an aporetic claim must 
extend to the notion of forgiveness. 
Having suggested the historical-linguistic limitations for the notion of free speech outside of 
the nation-state rights discourse, it is necessary to question how we are to accommodate 
someone's conceptual claim to absolute free speech with the necessary limitations 
concerning the notion of speech. As with the other aporetic concepts Derrida discusses in 
Chapter Three, it is necessary to question how we are to reconcile the absolute with the 
historical or linguistic limitations. 
4.4 Absolute free speech: a return to the "Argument from Meaning" 
As with the concepts of justice, democracy, hospitality and friendship, the concept of 
absolute free speech is timeless and operates outside of particular social contexts. It is 
possible to argue that the concept of absolute free speech, like the concepts of justice, 
democracy, hospitality and forgiveness , cannot be and in fact is not restricted or limited by 
certain historical and linguistic conditions. However, as mentioned, if free speech is to occur 
or manifest itself in reality, like forgiveness or democracy, it must necessarily be recognised 
as always already subject to limitations and conditions that are at once linguistic and 
historical. In order to occur, claims to freedom of speech must necessarily be made in 
particular social-historical contexts. However, if free speech can only occur when it moves 
from being a conceptual absolute to a notion restricted by linguistic-historical contexts, it can 
be argued that there is a danger of free speech losing meaning. It can be argued that like the 
concepts of absolute forgiveness, justice or democracy, the concept of absolute free speech is 
necessary to give the notion free speech any meaning. It will be necessary to go into this 
argument in more detail. 
4·.5 The possibility of conditional free speech 
Although one may claim a right to absolute free speech, free speech must necessarily be 
understood as always already limited because it cannot be divorced from social-historical 
contexts. In a similar way to the aporetic concepts highlighted in Chapter Three, it is possible 
to suggest that the concept of absolute free speech exists as a quasi-transcendental condition 
113 
for limited notions of free speech. As a quasi-transcendental concept, absolute free speech 
exists outside of any historical-linguistic contexts. As with other concepts, like forgiveness, 
absolute free speech would operate as what Levinas (1969:23) calls "a signification without a 
context". 
The concept of absolute free speech cannot engage in social-historical contexts because, as 
soon as it does, it no longer remains absolute but must submit to a number of conditions and 
limitations. Like the criticism Kaposy (2005:212) directs at Derrida, it must be asked why it 
is necessary to preserve the concept of absolute free speech in the first place. It can be argued 
that were it not for the existence of an absolute concept of free speech, the limited notion of 
free speech would not have any meaning. Like the concept of forgiveness , free speech would 
be in danger of becoming something else entirely. Thus, like the notion of forgiveness, the 
conditional notion of free speech must necessarily refer back to the quasi-transcendental 
absolute in order to have any meaning. 
This answers the important question of how we are to reconcile the need for the quasi-
transcendental absolute with the necessary need to restrict free speech in certain contexts. 
While free speech can only occur when it engages in a series of conditions, any conditional 
notion of free speech must necessarily refer back to the quasi-transcendental absolute. For it 
can be argued that although free speech is necessarily limited by social-historical contexts on 
an international level and within the nation state, the quasi-transcendental concept of free 
speech is necessary to add meaning to any limited or conditional free speech. Without the 
concept of the quasi-transcendental , the meaning of free speech would disappear. When we 
invoke or claim a right to free speech, our ability or claim to free speech is nevertheless 
dependent on the quasi-transcendental absolute. As with forgiveness, democracy and 
hospitality, the quasi-transcendental concept of free speech cannot and perhaps should not 
ever occur. Absolute free speech must necessarily be divorced from occurring in specific 
social-historical contexts. The quasi-transcendental concept of absolute free speech can only 
have meaning outside of particular contexts. In the same way that conditional hospitality or 
conditional democracy are dependent on the quasi-transcendental absolute, absolute free 
speech gives meaning to and enables any conditional free speech to occur. 
We can thus argue that absolute free speech is both "heterogeneous and irreducible" to 
conditional free speech. It is heterogeneous because absolute free speech can only occur by 
engaging in a series of conditions and limitations. At the same time absolute free speech 
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cannot and perhaps should not ever occur. It is thus also irreducible to conditional free 
speech. Without the idea of the quasi-transcendental absolute, the limited notion of free 
speech would cease to have meaning. 
4.6 Absolute freedom-of-speech to come 
Like "justice" and the "law", absolute free speech enables a process of deconstruction to take 
place. The quasi-transcendental concept of justice enables us to deconstruct and change laws. 
At the same time, the quasi-transcendental concept of absolute free speech allows a process 
of deconstruction to occur. It is this deconstructive process that allows conditional free 
speech as well as justice to occur. Like the concepts of "justice" and "democracy", absolute 
"free speech" is always waiting to come. Any limited or restricted free speech occurs in the 
name of absolute free speech. While absolute free speech cannot ever occur, the objective is 
to get as close as possible. 
But why has it been necessary to suggest that free speech is aporetic? The answer to this 
question is that by suggesting that the concept of free speech is aporetic, we are able to 
reconcile the claim to absolute-unrestricted free speech with the historical and linguistic 
limitations discussed above. Having suggested that free speech is aporetic, we are faced with 
another problem. In the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, we are able to legally invoke 
limitations on free speech by appealing to a rights discourse discussed in Chapter One. 
Sovereign governments are entrusted with the legal right to rescind access to free speech 
when it interferes with other rights. Such a right emerged out of the birth of the Social 
Contract and the democratic Westphalian nation-state. As has been shown, free speech is 
subject to the same linguistic and historical limitations as exist in the nation-state. The 
problem is that no intra-state body on an international level is vested with the legal right to 
restrict free speech when circumstances require it. International bodies like the UN and the 
EU can impose sanctions or potentially expel a state from the global community; they are not 
however legally entrusted with the power or right to rescind the right to free speech. 
If we cannot invoke limitations on free speech by appealing to a rights discourse particular to 
the nation-state, we have to, for the moment, find some other way of thinking limitations that 
are legitimate if not legal. In the conclusion I argue that the self-constituted limitation of free 
speech qua aporetic concept can be employed towards, if not the legal enforcement of 
115 
limitations, at least its invocation in an ethics of limitation. Given the limitations of this study 
I can only conclude with an example of what this may mean. 
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Conclusion 
Reason without rights: Applying Kant's argument on an international 
level 
At the end of the previous chapter, it was stated that we were left with the dilemma of how to 
invoke or legitimise limitations of free speech on an international level without appealing to a 
nation-state rights discourse. The fact that we are trying to regulate free speech on an 
international level implies that we cannot use such a rights discourse as we are operating 
outside of the sovereign nation-state. If we cannot appeal to nation-state laws as a means of 
regulating speech, how are we to invoke or legitimise, even understand such limitations? 
Dealing specifically with the issue of international relations between sovereign nation-states, 
Kant (2006:72) proposes a solution for the stability and peaceful interactions between nation-
states that will be useful in proposing a solution for how to understand the relevance of the 
linguistic and socio-historic limitations inherent also in free speech at a international level. 
The context for Kant's argument concerned the prevention of international conflict and the 
maintenance of stability between sovereign nation-states. During the time at which Kant 
wrote, the Westphalian nation-state system had created a new but somewhat unstable 
international order. The existence of many sovereign nation-states, with no system of law 
enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to 
the dictates of its own reason or desire, necessarily implied the inevitability of war or 
conflict. Such a view or image led to the birth of the 'Realist' school of thought In 
international relations (Kant, 2006:72-85). In an international order that consists of sovereign 
nation-states, the Realist view holds that there is no automatic harmony or peace between 
states. The idea is that states exist as separate and individual entities and are thus driven by 
their own goals or desires; the use of force is often deemed to be a necessary means of 
achieving such goals. According to the Realists, states are more than willing to sacrifice 
peace and stability and will resort to force in order to pursue their own selfish interests (Kant, 
2006: 160). In an international system consisting of sovereign nation-states, each state is the 
final judge of its own cause, and can resort to force whenever it is deemed to be necessary. 
Because any state may resort to force at any particular time, it follows that all states must 
necessarily be vigilant and be prepared to counter force with force in order to survive. 
On the basis of such altruistic-selfish behaviour, the international system is unstable and 
peace is uncertain. States cannot afford to work together or to trust each other as this may 
117 
expose any particular state and will lead to vulnerability and weakness, making it vulnerable 
to attack from another state (Kant, 2006: 160). In order to survive, states must necessarily 
pursue their own selfish interests. Survival is seen to be a more worthy pursuit than the 
maintenance of global peace or stability. This is not to say that periods of peace or stability 
do not exist in such an international order. It may be in a state' s interest to avoid conflict, as 
the use of force may not be deemed an appropriate means to achieving a goal. The point is 
that any peace or stability that does occur between states is not the result of trust or a desire to 
work together for the purposes of global stability; it is rather the result of the selfish desire of 
each state to avoid conflict for the purposes of survival (Kleingeld, 2006: 160). Such a period 
of peace is uncertain and only lasts until any particular state decides to resort to force to 
achieve a goal or objective. 
Within such a Realist view, any attempt to understand the international system and the 
behaviour of nation-states cannot occur without an attempt to understand the nature of man. 
Under such a view, man, the state and the state system are so intrinsically linked that a 
political scientist cannot study one image without looking at the other two. In writing about 
the behaviour of states in the international order, Rousseau, Spinoza and Kant made specific 
reference to the reason or passions of man in order to explain the selfish behaviour of states 
(Kant, 2006:160-165). The relationship between the behaviour of states and the intrinsic 
nature of man could not be separated in such an analysis. 
Spinoza (2002:680) attempted to explain the makeup of the international order by reference 
to the nature of man. According to Spinoza, reason is displaced by passion, the result being 
that men who should cooperate with one another in perfect harmony resort to violence as a 
means to achieving their goals. In explaining the behaviour of nation-states, Spinoza 
(2002:685-687) argued that states are like men; they are driven by a desire to survive but 
cannot order their desires by using reason. State actions on an international level are driven 
by passion at the expense of reason. Spinoza pointed out, however, that man, despite being 
driven by his passions, is forced to combine and depend on others for the purposes of 
survival. According to Spinoza (2002:611), states are "overcome daily by sleep, often by 
disease or mental infirmity, and in the end by old age". Man is forced to cooperate because of 
his vulnerability. States on the other hand can survive without the need to cooperate with 
each other. War is inevitable between states because they are not subject to the same 
vulnerabilities as man. 
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Kant's analysis is more complex than Spinoza's, and his analysis will be used to suggest a 
solution for how to conceive the limitation of free speech outside of its enforceability as law. 
Kant (2006:72) argues that man has the capacity to be rational and make decisions based on 
reason. However, man is also driven by instinct and passion, and it is passion that overcomes 
reason. The result is that rational behaviour is seldom followed in the state of nature and 
conflict and violence is inevitable (Kant, 2006:72-75). The civil state is necessary to prevent 
conflict and to prevent humans from harming each other. The civil state acts as a supreme 
judge and must be able to enforce decisions in order to prevent violence. According to Kant 
(2006:75), the civil state is necessary to ensure that men behave morally. The security of law 
is necessary to prevent humans from acting on their passions and secures the natural rights 
that man is entitled to in a state of nature but cannot actually enjoy. While the civil state is 
necessary to preserve internal order, this is not enough according to Kant. Peace among states 
is equally necessary as peace within states, for states are also governed by passion as much as 
reason, which results in international instability (Kant, 2006:75). Kant disagrees with the idea 
that the creation of a world state is the answer to ensuring global stability. The creation of a 
world state with supreme power and the sovereign ability to govern and control other states 
would run the risk of becoming a global despot that could potentially destroy liberty 
altogether. It could lead to member states revolting against such a despot in order to preserve 
their liberty resulting in global anarchy and war. In order to prevent such a scenario from 
occurring, Kant proposes a solution that may be of particular use for this thesis. 
Kant suggested the possibility that all states in an international order act on universalised 
maxims or morals that they would in time come to recognise as obligatory without them 
being enforceable. The problem is that passion more often than not displaces reason, the 
result of which might be that a universally applied code of conduct could be abandoned 
(Kant, 2006:75-82). Does this once again imply a need for a global state to enforce such a 
moral code of law or conduct on an international level? Fearing the consequences of a 
despotic state, Kant prefers the idea that states may improve or learn from the suffering and 
devastation of wars so that they voluntarily ensure that passion does not usurp reason. If a 
moral code of conduct is to exist on an international level, it must be voluntarily observed, it 
cannot be enforced. The creation of a universally applied code of conduct or moral law on an 
international law is dependent on the internal perfection of states (Kant, 2006:75-82). Only 
once states have learnt from the dangers of war are they in a position to agree to the 
application of a universal law. 
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The second maxim is dependent on the first maxim. It is perhaps problematic or wishful to 
hope that the application and adherence to voluntarily obeyed universal laws will occur. Kant 
himself confessed that he had not established the "inevitability" of perpetual peace; however 
he believed that such a condition was not impossible. It is necessary to ask how Kant's 
proposed solution of a universally agreed upon code of moral law between slates can help us 
address the problem of invoking limitations on free speech without appealing to a rights 
discourse on an international level (Kant, 206:75-82). 
The triumph of reason: the potential application of a voluntary code of 
conduct between nation-states with regards to free speech 
In Chapter Four we were able to reconcile the absolute claim to free speech with the 
linguistic and historical limitations of free speech in aporetic terms. Nation-states take the 
limitation constitutive of this aporia (historical association and meanings of words) and turn 
them into a legal limitation by calling such forms of speech "hate speech". However, outside 
of the sovereign nation-state, we are unable to legitimately invoke or enforce the necessary 
limitation of free speech because we cannot agree on a rights discourse to do so; we can 
appeal to a rights discourse but, as the cartoon episode made clear, it is a rights discourse 
without any enforceability. This is where Kant's proposed solution may be useful because it 
provides a way for us to legitimately call for the limitation of free speech inherent in the 
meaning of words and the history of their usage without having to appeal to a rights discourse 
enforceable by law. 
On the basis of Kant's solution, it is possible to suggest the feasibility of calling for a 
universal law or code of conduct with regards to speech acts on an international level. We are 
unable to enforce the adherence to such a moral law or code of conduct because we cannot 
appeal to a rights discourse outside of the nation-state. Following on from Kant, such a moral 
law would have to be based on a voluntary agreement between states to adhere to the need to 
limit speech acts in certain situations given the constitutive limitations of the historical 
meaning and associations of words. Since such a moral law would have to be voluntarily 
observed rather than enforced, it must be assumed that states need to be convinced or 
persuaded of the need to limit free speech without appealing to a nation-state rights discourse. 
Such convincing would depend on a moral or ethical awakening among nation-states and an 
acknowledgment of the detrimental affects of unrestricted speech and the possibility that a 
war of words may erupt in a war of destruction. It is possible to argue that such a moral code 
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or agreement already exists among member states of international bodies such as the United 
Nations and the European Union or, at the very least, that there is precedent for it. One brief 
example will suggest that such a moral code is not as idealistic as it sounds; that there is 
precedent, for invoking limitations in a way that is legitimate even if illegal. 
Legitimate but Illegal: NATO and the Kosovo Cris is 
According to Wheeler (2000: 145), the provocative challenge issued by the UN Secretary-
General to the General Assembly during its 54th session in September 1999 encapsulated the 
conflict between legality and legitimacy posed by NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in 
March 1999. The controversy surrounding NATO's intervention in Kosovo lay in the 
illegality of such an action. The decision by NATO to bomb the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) was deemed to be illegal because it contravened the laws stipulated in the 
UN Charter (Wheeler, 2000: 145). However, the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously agreed that the FRY was committing an act of genocide against the Albanian 
minority and that this constituted a gross violation of human rights; the actions of the FRY 
were considered to be a threat to 'international peace and security' (Wheeler, 2000:145). 
Another mitigating factor in support of NATO was that the UN Security Council had 
demanded a cessation of violence in Kosovo in three successive resolutions that were adopted 
under Chapter Seven in the UN Charter (Wheeler, 2000:145). The gross violation of human 
rights and the decision by the FRY to ignore the resolutions were deemed to make the 
intervention by NATO a legitimate action. However, because the intervention in Kosovo 
could not be endorsed by UN Charter law, coupled with the threat of a Russian and Chinese 
veto against such an intervention, the intervention was deemed to be an illegal action. 
Wheeler (2000: 146) questions whether NATO's action in Kosovo represents a watershed in 
the development of a new norm of humanitarian intervention. The international order has 
consisted of a society of states built on the principles of sovereignty. The purpose of creating 
international bodies like the United Nations was to create a stable climate of peace and 
stability built on the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force. The creation of a 
stable international order was always meant to be built around the principles of sovereignty 
(Wheeler, 2000:146). As mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis, there has existed a tension 
between the supremacy of international law and the sovereignty of national law. Although 
UN legislation creates laws that are meant to be respected and upheld, should any particular 
government wish to perpetrate acts within its own borders, the principle of domestic 
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sovereignty prohibits international bodies or other nation-states from intervening in another 
state's internal affairs. In the context of the international environment, Wheeler (2000: 146) 
asks what the ramifications are concerning NATO's intervention in Kosovo. On the one 
hand, it is possible to argue that NATO's actions have signalled the arrival of a doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention that values the precedence of civilian protection over nation-state 
sovereignty. On the other hand, despite the legitimacy or moral value of such humanitarian 
thinking, such actions threaten to shake the very foundations of the international order. To 
break down the pillars of nation-state sovereignty is to potentially break down the 
international order itself (Wheeler, 2000: 146). 
However, it must be acknowledged that certain NATO governments, Britain in particular, 
have contested the 'illegality' of the intervention in Kosovo. Supporters of the intervention 
have contended that a legal right of humanitarian intervention is legal under two conditions: 
first, on an interpretation of UN Charter provisions relating to the protection of human rights, 
and second, on customary international law (Wheeler, 2000: 147). In the preamble to the UN 
Charter, Articles 1 (3), 55 and 56 impose a legal obligation on member states to cooperate in 
promoting human rights. This is pointed out by Fernando Teson (1988:131) who argues that 
the 'promotion of human rights is as important a purpose in the Charter as is the control of 
international conflict'. Under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, the Security Council has a 
legal right to authorise humanitarian intervention irrespective of whether it has found a threat 
to 'international peace and security'. Reisman and McDougal (cited in Arend & Beck, 
1993 :134) claim that rather than contradicting the principles of the UN, such humanitarian 
intervention upholds the very purposes for which the UN was created. Reisman and 
McDougal (cited in Arend & Beck, 1993: 134) were responding in particular to the argument 
that unilateral humanitarian intervention violates Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of 
force by states: 
Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge to 
the political independence of the state involved and is not only not inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations but is rather in conformity with the most fundamental 
peremptory norms of the Charter, it is a distortion to argue that it is precluded by the 
Article 2(4). 
Wheeler (2000: 148) argues that the majority of international lawyers restrict the legal right to 
use force under the Charter other than for the purposes of self-defence. According to these 
'restrictionists', there are only two legally recognised exceptions to the general ban on the use 
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of force in Article 2(4): the right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 
and Security Council enforcement action under Chapter Seven of the Charter (Wheeler, 
2000:148). The issue is complicated somewhat by the difference between customary law and 
treaty law. Customary law is different from treaty law because it is not created by written 
agreements between states that set down the rules to regulate their interactions in a specific 
area. States cannot defend their actions that only have the status of customary law; they must 
also justify such actions as being legally permitted under treaty law. The decision concerning 
which norms of behaviour have become the customary rules that become legally binding 
upon states is called opinio juris. The 'restrictionists' have argued that state practice and 
opinio juris since 1945 do not support a legal right of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
(Wheeler, 2000: 148-149). In particular, the 'restrictionists' have pointed to the 1965 
Declaration of the Inadmissibility ofIntervention that denied legal recognition to intervention 
'for any reason whatever'; the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation and the 1987 Declaration of the Enhancement 
of the Effectiveness of the principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in 
International Relations. Under these Declarations, the ' restrictionists' argue that the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo was illegal (Wheeler, 2000:149). 
Despite the controversy surrounding the 'illegality' of NATO' s intervention in Kosovo in 
March 1999, it has been useful to allude to this particular case scenario as an example of the 
tension inherent in an action that is deemed to be illegal but legitimate. Could this case study 
in particular help us to address the sensitive issue of restricting speech on an international 
level? One can argue that such a case study legitimises a distinction between what is 
considered legal and what is considered legitimate; it allows us to consider legitimacy outside 
the juridical and that is exactly what we need in order to re-think "limitations" at an 
international level. As the cartoon case illustrated, the day will probably never come when 
states agree among themselves on what constitutes hate speech (particularly its religious 
version) and that such acts could or should be limited legally. What the category "illegal but 
legitimate" allows us to speculate on is the possibility that, once we recognise the aporetic 
limitations implicit in the working of the notion of free speech, such limitations could and 
should impose limitations on free speech that may not be juridical limitations but ethical 
limitations. 
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As argued earlier, Kant would be opposed to the use of force as a means to ensuring that 
international codes of conduct are not broken. Kant expressed particular concern about the 
potential threat of a World State and thus ruled out force as an option. A similar view to 
Kant's is expressed by pluralists who argue that, if a right of humanitarian intervention is 
conceded to individual states, this will open the door for powerful states to act on their own 
particular moral preferences. This could potentially result in a global despot that has the sole 
power to decide whether international law has been broken, and whether intervention is 
necessary. By lifting the general ban on Article 2(4), this will open the way for vigilante 
action on behalf of powerful states that can instigate interventionist actions at their will. Such 
a view is reiterated by Ian Brownlie (1973: 147 -148) who argued: 
Whatever special cases one can point to, a rule allowing humanitarian intervention, as 
opposed to a discretion in the United Nations to act through the appropriate organs, is a 
general licence to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial intervention. 
On the basis of such criticisms, it could be suggested that the introduction of international 
codes of conduct pertaining to the use of speech cannot be enforced by any particular nation-
state or international body. The adoption offree speech legislation would arguably have to be 
completely voluntary. For the reasons just discussed, the adoption of free speech legislation 
on an international level by nation-states would not have any legal basis. It would be illegal 
to attempt to force the compliance of nation-states with regards to abiding by free speech 
codes of conduct. As the Kosovo intervention illustrates, it is possible to defend 
interventionist actions by claiming to operate outside of juridical boundaries in those cases 
where there is nonetheless democratic, ethical support for such an intervention. This is why 
such actions have been described as legitimate but illegal. However, as Brownlie (1973: 147-
148) has pointed out, this could potentially threaten the stability of the international order as 
it opens the door to vigilantism that is deemed to be legitimate. 
Going back to Kant's example, it is possible to conceive of a global hegemonic state or 
international body designated with the responsibility of deciding which actions are legitimate 
or illegitimate. This is problematic for two reasons; firstly, Kant alludes to the possibility that 
a global state or international body assigned with the responsibility of ensuring global order 
could easily become despotic . It is very possible that interventionist actions in the pursuit of 
selfish interests can be defended as legitimate. Secondly, as this thesis has suggested 
throughout, such a global body would not be vested with any rights or authority to decide 
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which actions are legitimate or illegitimate anyway. This suggests that the limitation of 
speech must be voluntary and cannot be enforced. Since the limitation of speech on an 
international level cannot be invoked by appealing to rights, it is necessary to describe such a 
need as legitimate but illegal. 
Conclusion 
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the claim exists that there is a need to limit free 
speech outside of the nation-state on an international level. Within the nation-state we are 
able to call upon a rights discourse that legitimises the enforcement of free speech legislation 
by nation-state governments. Outside of the nation-state, we cannot appeal to a rights 
discourse as a means to limiting free speech, and it is because of this that any attempt to 
enforce the restriction of free speech would be illegal. Using Kant's idea of the voluntary 
adoption of universal principles, this thesis has suggested a way to re-think the limitation of 
speech without appealing to legalised force as a means to do so. While such a claim would be 
legitimate, the example of the NATO intervention in Kosovo has demonstrated that such a 
need has no legally binding discourse of rights to refer to. Since we cannot resort to force, we 
would have to depend on what Kant refers to as 'the internal perfection of states'. It is only 
on such a basis that we may in a time yet to come recognise the limitations on free speech at 
an international level, not as juridical but as ethical limitations. 
In short, the answer to the question: what is the relevance of pointing out the aporetic 
structure of free speech for international politics? The same ethical commitment that made 
the Kosovo intervention possible - although illegal - must compel us, not just to recognise 
the social-historical meaning of words and cartoons but to accept that recognition as ethical 
limi tation. The recognition of an ethical need to recognise the social-historical meanings of 
words could make a voluntary universal recognition of the limitations of free speech possible. 
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